

Oil Wealth a Motivation

The Iraqi Regime's Obsession For Security Pervades Nation

By Jonathan C. Randal

BAGHDAD, April 11 (WP).—A foreign guest who complained that the hotel envelopes lacked glue was told by a smiling room clerk: "But that way, sir, at least they don't have so much trouble opening them."

It was not necessary to explain who "they" were. Even the most casual of visitors is quickly made aware of the regime's security obsession, which is perhaps understandable in view of Iraq's history of political instability and violence—and its oil wealth.

Little publicity is given to Iraq's oil business. The only statistics published about its various aspects invariably come from specialized publications edited abroad.

Criticism of the regime is not

encouraged, as the West German Embassy discovered when it failed to win the release of an embassy chauffeur. He was sentenced to a year's imprisonment for expressing his discontent when he found that a government-run service station was out of gasoline.

Curbs on Diplomats

Diplomats must apply two weeks in advance for permission to leave the capital and appear in person in telling newcomers that they have learned little about the country during their tours of duty.

Months after rumors of an abortive coup, alleged executions and other alleged signs of unrest at the beginning of the year, diplomats were reduced to comparing various versions—and concluding that if anything indeed had occurred it had had no visible effect on the power structure.

Membership in the ruling Arab Ba'ath Socialist party's Politburo is not listed in a publication but rather has to be placed together when individual members appear at public functions.

For Iraqis, mixing with foreign diplomats apparently is not without its drawbacks. Even the most "friendly" of embassies is surprised if more than one Iraqi shows up at a dinner, no matter how many were invited.

Professionally trained Iraqis wanting to go abroad for vacations or studies are required to post bonds to insure their return. In some cases the bonds are worth the equivalent of \$20,000 to \$30,000.

But Iraqis have learned to accept even the most authoritarian decisions.

Singed Out

Recently all single residents of Baghdad—bachelors, spinsters, widows, widowers, the divorced—were ordered to leave their homes. No official explanation was provided, but there were suggestions that the authorities were worried about reports of high living by army officers.

Despite its oil wealth—estimated at between \$7 billion and \$8 billion last year—the regime has spent little money on consumer goods and even vegetables and simple imported items can be in very short supply.

No one knows for sure whether the shortages are government policy—for there is a clear determination to avoid the excesses of other oil-rich states—or simply reflect transportation bottlenecks. But, in any case, for ordinary Iraqis chicken and other foods once reserved for the rich are now within their reach, even if the regime seems to have adopted Eastern Europe's unofficial form of rationing—long lines.

Spinola Leaves Zurich for Rio

BERN, April 11 (AP).—Former Portuguese President Antonio de Spínola has left Switzerland for Rio de Janeiro, the Swiss government announced.

It said the general, expelled for breaking his promises to abstain from political activity in Switzerland, left Zurich's airport Friday, accompanied by his secretary, Luis Oliveira Dias, who also was expelled.

The two were ordered out of the country after a Swiss federal police investigation revealed that the general, who had gone to Geneva after being expelled from France Feb. 7, gave aides there authority to obtain funds and supplies for the Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Portugal.

3 Filipino Hijackers Agree to Change Jets

BANGKOK, April 11 (UPI).—Three armed hijackers agreed during negotiations today to change to a larger jet for a flight to the Middle East.

But when a Philippine Air Lines DC-8 jet arrived in Bangkok tonight the hijackers said that they would wait until after dawn tomorrow before trying to switch aircraft.

The Philippines ambassador to Bangkok, Manuel Yan, said that the three Filipino hijackers had agreed to give up their suitcase of hand grenades and 10 of the 12 hostages they have held in the BAC-111 jet they hijacked last Wednesday in the Philippines.



AT THE WALLING WALL—South African Prime Minister John Vorster (left) and Foreign Minister Hilgard Müller during their tour yesterday of Jerusalem and vicinity.

U.S. Election Issues Stall Talks on Arms

(Continued from Page 1)

carefully isolated from any other Soviet-U.S. issue. The deadlock in the strategic arms talks has come as a disappointment to Mr. Kissinger and his closest aides, who have been struggling for 17 months to conclude the agreement that was sketched in outline at Vladivostok by Mr. Ford and Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, in November, 1974.

The disappointment has been heightened by the fact that in late January, after Mr. Kissinger's extensive discussions with Mr. Brezhnev, those favoring a strategic arms accord believed it was certain to come about.

Kissinger's Advice

But according to various officials, when Mr. Kissinger explained to Mr. Ford and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld what had been achieved and what was necessary to further the negotiations, the President, reportedly agreeing with Mr. Rumsfeld's advice, decided to take a non-controversial posture as possible. But it was also a policy that the Russians were sure to reject, and they did.

According to officials, what happened was this: Before going to Moscow in January, Mr. Kissinger was given a series of options to present to Mr. Brezhnev for overcoming the remaining problems.

Under the Vladivostok agreement, both sides were allowed to have a maximum of 2,400 long-range missile launchers and bombers. Of these, 1,200 launchers could be for missiles with multiple warheads that can strike at several targets.

However, after Vladivostok, the Americans began insisting over Soviet objections that a new Soviet bomber, known in the West as the Backfire, be included in the 2,400 total since under certain circumstances, such as flying below the speed of sound, it could hit the United States.

The Russians claimed that a new U.S. weapons system, the

Cruise missile, which flies at low altitudes and at slow speeds but is highly accurate, be included in the total if it had a range of more than 375 miles.

Mr. Kissinger's options were wide and in Moscow he settled with the Russians on a system by which air-launched Cruise missiles from bombers would be allowed with a range of up to 1,500 miles, but each bomber would be counted against the 1,200 multiple warhead total.

The Americans also suggested that the Russians then elaborate on a scheme to reduce the 2,400 maximum to 2,200. This would allow the Russians to have about 200 or so Backfire bombers and not count them in the total. This was seen as a face-saving device for the Russians.

The United States proposed limiting the submarine-launched Cruise missile to 375 miles and allowing 25 ships to carry 10 Cruise missiles each above the limit.

In Moscow, the two sides also agreed on definitions for "heavy" missile to insure that the Russians did not expand their already large force of 309 such land-based missiles.

But when Mr. Kissinger began discussing the new negotiating situation in Washington, he found that the Pentagon was resisting any further compromises.

Jackson and Reagan

In fact, Mr. Kissinger still insisted that the Backfire be included in the total ceiling. Otherwise, Sen. Henry Jackson, of Washington, a leading Democratic contender, and Ronald Reagan, would accuse the administration of giving the Russians an advantage.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also resisted constraints on the surface-launched Cruise missile, even though Mr. Kissinger insists that the Navy will never ask for funds to deploy such a system.

Finally, on Feb. 16, Mr. Kissinger gave Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin the "counter-proposal."

That proposal, similar to an op-

tion that the administration had discarded in January when Mr. Kissinger was in Moscow, was for the two sides to agree on what had been achieved and put aside remaining contentious issues. In effect, both sides would be free to develop the disputed weapons systems, the Backfires and the surface-launched Cruise missiles.

But the Russians, apparently more concerned about the United States' launching the surface-launched Cruise missiles, responded late last month with a message from Mr. Brezhnev to Mr. Ford repeating Soviet interest in an agreement but repeating Soviet opposition to any Cruise missile with a range beyond 375 miles.

Supersonic Speeds

In Vladivostok, the two sides had agreed on such a limit for missiles, but the United States claimed that this referred only to ballistic missiles that fly at supersonic speeds beyond the atmosphere.

In effect, the Soviet Union had rejected the U.S. proposal and asked Washington to come up with a new one. The "verification" panel, the inter-agency group that studies arms-control matters, has been meeting and is again studying new approaches.

But State Department officials said the White House inclination now is to postpone negotiations until the primaries are over in June.

These officials believe that any negotiations now would be interpreted as too political and that it would be doubtful that the Russians would make any concessions if they were uncertain who would be elected in November.

Soviet diplomats here, irritated over Mr. Ford's dropping of the word "détente" if not the goal of improved relations, have also been very sensitive to the emphasis on defense spending and the slogan of "peace through strength" now being used by Mr. Ford.

A Test With Few Conclusions

Israeli-Occupied West Bank Holds Municipal Ballot Today

By Thomas P. Lippman

JERUSALEM, April 11 (WP).—Walls, windows, taxis and utility poles throughout the Israeli-occupied West Bank are festooned with posters and banners of candidates seeking election tomorrow to the municipal councils of 24 towns.

Some of the candidates are radical leftists, some are conservative allies of Jordan's King Hussein, some represent the Palestine Liberation Organization, some are probably agents of the Israeli military government and some, as a prominent resident of Hebron put it, "are naive or innocent people who just want to give some service to their community."

The elections are being viewed here as a test of popular sentiment on the West Bank, an indicator of the strength of the PLO and its claim to represent the West Bank's people, as a referendum on Israel's military occupation and as a measure of how much the residents have become radicalized in the wake of the anti-Israel demonstrations of February and March.

It seems clear that the 305 winners will on the average be younger, better educated, more openly nationalist and less inclined to cooperate with Israel than were their predecessors. Whether the elections will justify any overall conclusions beyond that is doubtful. The local issues vary from town to town. No references to larger issues are permitted in campaign literature and many of the results will be dictated by the family ties and local traditions that transcend politics.

Defense Minister's View

Theoretically, international issues should have no place in these elections at all. "These are personal and confidential municipal elections and there is no sense in attributing to them any irrelevant issues," Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres said Friday.

But there is clearly more involved than voter supply and street paving. "We are for the PLO; we say it in our speeches and that is the issue," said Karim Khalaf, mayor of the important town of Ramallah, who is seeking re-election on a platform of opposition to the Israeli occupation. "In our public meetings people don't ask about fixing the streets or getting factories. They want to end the occupation."

Mr. Khalaf is running with a slate whose campaign posters are printed in green, black, red and white, the colors of the PLO flag. The Israelis, who regard the PLO as an outlaw terrorist organization, tore down and painted over some of the posters but new ones quickly appeared. "If they tear down 10 we put up 100," Mr. Khalaf said.

A similar slate is running and favored to win in Nablus, the West Bank's largest town. Elsewhere, however, the lines are less clearly drawn.

In the important southern town of Hebron, for example, Mustafa el-Natshi, a candidate on a slate that calls itself nationalist, said that the group was "nonpolitical." He said that "the issues here are electricity and service to the city." This slate was formed, however, after a relative of Mr. Natshi, who was expected to win a council seat as an outspoken nationalist candidate, was deported by the Israelis. Expert analysts of West Bank affairs say the anticipated victory of this slate will be a setback for the Israelis, who have been accustomed to dealing with Hebron's former mayor, the cooperative Sheikh Ali Ja'bsi.

Poles Set Up Emigré Plan

(Continued from Page 1)

and tourism. Hence, the appeal of private investment in Poland is explained by Polish officials, is permission for the foreign businessman to withdraw enough profits to make the effort worthwhile. However, since Polish salaries are not transferable into Western currencies, the company would have to earn a substantial portion of its income outside the country.

A factory producing women's handbags, for instance, could sell part of its output inside Poland to pay for salaries of employees and export the rest. The main benefit to the state would presumably be in the taxes levied on export earnings.

As for hotels and rest homes, these would doubtless be directed primarily at Western visitors "who pay their bills" in dollars, francs and other convertible currencies.

Whether the plan can work in practice is still far from clear. Some Western analysts here are skeptical that even businessmen of Polish ancestry would be anxious to get deeply involved in the country without guarantees that the political climate will remain amenable and that access to labor and markets will not be hampered by the requirements of an economy that is essentially state-run. These guarantees will be difficult to provide.

Polish trade specialists say they recognize these reservations. The message they convey is flexibility. The only firm criteria at this point, a senior official said, is that projects "be useful to the economy and good for the people."

who declined to seek re-election. Israel's policy on the West Bank is to adhere to the terms of the Geneva Convention on occupied territories, which requires that the laws and institutions of the former power be kept intact as far as possible. The municipal elections are being conducted under the terms of a 1955 Jordanian law, which specified that elections for local councils be held every four years. Similar elections were held in 1972.

Israel unilaterally departed from Jordanian practice to allow women to vote this year and 32,997 women are among the registered voters—the only female voters in the Arab world, the Israelis say.

Only taxpayers are permitted to vote. Anyone over the age of 21 who pays municipal property taxes equivalent to one Jordanian dinar is entitled to designate three other persons besides himself as eligible voters.

Voting is by written ballot. Literates are entitled to the services of a member of a group of scribes assembled at each polling place. The illiterate voter's vote is thus less than secret. Israeli experts also say some voters feign illiteracy in order to take the scribe in with them and thus be able to prove to a local family leader or political boss that they cast their vote as promised. Analysts say that these kinds of arrangements and the strong, extensive family groupings that dominate the West Bank often exert more influence on the results than do any issues. There are no political parties. There is no voting for the post of mayor. The law specifies that the mayor of the interior—now the military governor—will be elected by the council.

After the 1972 elections, Israel permitted members to nominate from among their ranks military government officials to commit itself to follow the same procedure this time. The winners in a given area are unacceptable to the military as potential mayors and could cause trouble in their own choosing and electing of them as mayors.



BEATING THE DRUM—A young Chinese in Peking, his approval of the recent changes in the government.

China Admits Violent Act In Provincial City Last Week

(Continued from Page 1)

for the decision to oust Mr. Teng and appoint Mr. Hua.

Ford Congratulates Hua

HONG KONG, April 11 (UPI).—Mr. Hua received congratulations from President Ford, who expressed confidence that "through our joint efforts relations between our two countries will continue to advance." The Chinese news agency said today.

The message was among many

run by the news agency

two from leaders of the South Vietnam.

After offering congratulations yesterday on Mr. Hua's appointment as Premier, the new reported, Mr. Ford said normalization of relations between the United States and the Republic of China is in the interest of the people of both countries, and I am confident through our joint efforts between our two will continue to advance.

At the moment, Italy

ped by a bitter dispute

tion law reform and

crisis. The lira, now

\$1, has lost 28 per

value in less than

appeal by President

VATICAN CITY, April

day on Palm Sunday in

St. Basilica, called on

people not to follow the

"force" and "oppression"

appeal was a clear refer

week of political violence

The Pope, 78, spoke to

of 20,000, most of them

as he led a procession of

Catholics throughout the

in Holy Week celebration

Civil Guard Dies Trying to Lower A Basque Flag

BILBAO, Spain, April 11 (Reuters).—A Spanish Civil Guard corporal was electrocuted as he tried to pull down a Basque Nationalist flag hanging from a street light cable here today, police sources said.

Corp. Miguel Gordo Garcia, 41, was with a Civil Guard unit called to remove the flag in the suburb of Baracaldo, where several flags had been placed overnight with slogans calling for Basques to support a "day of the fatherland" in the Basque country next Sunday.

He died after touching the cable in an effort to remove the flag, the sources said.

Corp. Gordo was the second Civil Guard to die in the Basque country this year trying to take down a nationalist flag. Another corporal was killed when he attempted to pull down a booby-trapped flag from a farmhouse near San Sebastian in January.

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White Resistance Also a Factor Change in S. Africa Slowed by Blacks' Alleged Abuses

By David B. Ottaway

CAPE TOWN, April 11 (UPI).—The pace of change in South Africa's internal racial policies is slowed by the abuse of some sections already granted to black and colored populations, a South African government official said here.

Senior and Information Minister Connie Mulder said that the government would like to "take place at a reasonable pace." But he refused to say any timetable for doing with apartheid, the segregation laws affecting the life of the country, and that it not make any predictions regarding what internal changes he expected here over the year to 18 months to make South Africa more acceptable internationally.

Mr. Mulder said that the reason of some persons among the black and colored population is that they are not accepting the changes instituted is a key problem.

Foreign observers say that the issue of what aspects of South Africa's apartheid policy should and can be discarded to make this isolated country more acceptable to the outside world is now a burning one inside the ruling Nationalist party. With the veritable (liberal) and veritable (conservative) wings at odds.

Whether there is really much change under way inside South Africa is as highly debated here as abroad and there is conflicting evidence even regarding the scrapping of apartheid, with a step forward in one area often seemingly canceled by a step backward in another.

"The whites think there is enormous change taking place while the blacks think it is all window dressing," a Western diplomat remarked. "What is clear, is that for the blacks the pace of change is unacceptably slow."

In towns and cities across the country, selected hotels, theaters and libraries have been opened to all races and sports are slowly being integrated. But these remain small cracks in the structure of apartheid.

The "big" changes anticipated this year are the independence of the Transkei and possibly the release from prison or restriction of the well-known black nationalist leaders Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Robert Sobukwe as part of the celebrations.

At the same time, there have been some startling refusals to accept even minor social changes. For example, the provincial Cape government recently overruled the vote of the town of East London to integrate its public library. And the Education Department has just ordered an end to concerts open to all races on the Witwatersrand University campus.

Obituaries

Phil Ochs, 35, a New Left 'Troubadour'

NEW YORK, April 11 (UPI).—Phil Ochs, 35, folk singer, poet and lyricist whose music had some of the strongest of protest in the early 1960s, died Friday morning in his home here, the family said.

He had been very depressed long time, a family friend said. "Finally, the words weren't coming anymore."

Ochs had been living with sister, Sunny Trautman, since 1964, according to a family friend. Mr. Ochs committed suicide by hanging.

At the time Mr. Ochs made his appearance in Carnegie Hall, he gained a reputation as a troubadour of the New Left. His voice is spare, his guitar playing is rudimentary, and the lyrics of his songs are erudite and brilliant and meditative. "The New York Times" called him "the first major voice of his generation."

His Rebel Stance: Mr. Ochs' appeal is in rebel stance, his iconoclastic his self-burlesque and his only literary way with words and philosophy. "The Times" said of the performer, "He is a major voice of his generation."

Early songs—"Nobody Buys from the Flower Lady," "My Heart, I Hope to Live," "Ballad of William Worth," "Side of a Small Circle of Us" and "The Bell"—established Mr. Ochs as a major lyricist. He sang with Bob Dylan, and with Bob Dylan, and stars of folk music, both his songs.

Ochs preferred to be called a troubadour rather than a folk singer. He broke into protest playing in cabarets in Greenwich Village. He had a story of more than 60 songs, all of which had a social line or question.

Ochs was born in El Paso, Texas. His father was a doctor who moved the family to upstate New York and then here. Mr. Ochs' lyrics soon began to surpass his reputation as a singer. He wrote "Changes," "Love Me, I'm a Fool," "I Declare the War," and "Talking Vietnam."

ROBERT E. THOMASSON, Editor and composer of the "New York Times" said.



Phil Ochs

Mr. Ochs died at New York Hospital Wednesday of cancer.


Mr. Ochs, a dancer at the Cotton Club before he married, was buried in Woodlawn Cemetery in the Bronx next to her husband, who died in May, 1974.

Hermann B. Hagen
BERLIN, April 11 (UPI).—The former director of the Ibero-American Institute, Hermann B. Hagen, 87, died in West Berlin on Friday, his family said.

Mr. Hagen built up a library of Mexican works in the German university town of Marburg in the mid-1920s, which was later taken over by the Ibero-American Institute in Berlin.

Saneatsu Mushanokoji
TOKYO, April 11 (AP).—Saneatsu Mushanokoji, 90, a novelist whose humanist-oriented works gained popularity among young Japanese, died Friday of cancer.

Soviet Ships in Adriatic
SPLIT, Yugoslavia, April 11 (Reuters).—A cruiser, a destroyer and a submarine of the Soviet Navy are visiting the central Adriatic port, official sources said.



MOSCOW SCENE—One of several log houses still inhabited in an area near the southern edge of the Soviet capital contrasts with high-rise apartment buildings.

Over Russian Presence on Spitsbergen

Norway Wins 'War of Double Beds' in Arctic

OSLO, April 11.—Norway has won the so-called "war of the double beds" at Spitsbergen airport in the Arctic Circle involving six Soviet ground crewmen, four wives and a question of protocol.

The Civil Aviation Board said that the Soviet airline Aeroflot had agreed that their six ground crewmen on the Norwegian territory could not be accompanied by wives unless their complement was reduced accordingly.

The date decided upon by the board and Aeroflot for the enforcement of this new agreement is June 1.

Norway last year accepted the six to serve a monthly Aeroflot flight to Murmansk, about 600 miles southeast of Spitsbergen, in the Soviet Union.

But trouble flared in December when the wives of four were flown in with four double beds. Norway protested formally saying this violated a contract stipulating that crew accommodation was for single persons.

The dispute was seen here as a test of Norway's determination to assert its rights under the 1920 Paris agreement placing Spitsbergen under Norwegian sovereignty.

The Spitsbergen archipelago is a barren, forbidding place. Since the signing of the 40-nation treaty in 1920, it has been recognized as a part of Norway but the same treaty, however, gave all signatory nations equal rights to Spitsbergen's mineral resources—its coal, and, more recently, its oil.

Only the Norwegians and the Russians—each with a coal-mining

community—have stayed on since the Great Depression forced out the Americans, the British and the Swedes.

Strategic Importance
Spitsbergen, guarding the Soviet Navy's channel between its base at Murmansk and the North Atlantic, also has strategic importance both for the Soviet Union and NATO.

Close to 1,000 Norwegians live

and work at Longyearbyen, while the Russians have nearly 3,000 in their mining settlements at Barentsburg and Pyramiden.

Despite this, the Soviet Union mines less coal than Norway, a fact that has frequently been taken to mean that Soviet interest lies elsewhere than in the minerals and hence the suspicion aroused in Norway by the sudden and unexpected arrival of the four wives in December.

Russians Accuse U.S. of Violations

'Phased-Array' Radar Creates New Difficulties for SALT

WASHINGTON, April 11 (UPI).—Although alleged Soviet violations of the strategic arms limitation agreement have held the spotlight, government sources said there have been less publicized accusations from the Russians about four U.S. violations.

The sources said an area in which each nation has been accused of violations—establishment of "phased-array" radar systems—is now under discussion at the SALT-2 sessions in Geneva.

The sources said the Soviet Union has challenged a U.S. phased-array radar system in Alaska, the placement of covers over new Minuteman-3 silo lids, the existence of 180 Atlas silos and potential violation of rules about the confidentiality of the SALT talks through news reports about Soviet violations.

Surplus Silos

The sources said the United States responded that the Alaskan radar was not illegal under the treaty, that the covers over the new concrete silo lids were normal in the harsh Northwest, that the Atlas silos have been abandoned and sold as surplus and that reports of Soviet violations were denied by administration officials.

Informed sources said early reports showed that the present SALT-2 sessions have covered phased-array radars installed by both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Unlike the familiar 30-year-old rotating radar antenna, phased-array radar systems use a number of radar transmitters, one after another. Experts say the

system is the only one which can track multiple missile warheads.

The sources reported the Russians complained last April that the United States had such radar on Shemya Island, Alaska, a few hundred miles from the Soviet Union, and that this was an ABM radar used outside of the approved test ranges.

U.S. representatives denied the accusation, the sources said, saying the United States had scrapped its ABM system and the Alaskan radar was part of the "national technical means of verification"—mutually approved spying—used to keep track of Russian activities.


Sadat Will Prolong Talks With Kreisky

VIENNA, April 11 (Reuters).—Egypt's President Anwar Sadat decided today to extend his private stay here in order to hold further talks with Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky.

Mr. Sadat postponed his departure for Cairo from tomorrow to Tuesday to allow time for a private talk with Mr. Kreisky and to attend a meeting of senior Austrian and Egyptian ministers to discuss bilateral issues. Mr. Sadat, who arrived yesterday, had dinner at Mr. Kreisky's suburban villa last night.

Greece on Summer Time

ATHENS, April 11, (AP).—Greece went on summer time today, putting clocks one hour ahead. The measure will be in effect until Oct. 10.



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
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
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On-Site Inspection

The Soviet Union has muted its public discussion of the ban on underground peaceful nuclear explosions of over 150 kilotons. There has also been only a mild reaction in the United States—in part because the explosive level is a high one—10 times that which destroyed Hiroshima—and in part because of the widespread skepticism about Soviet purposes, triggered by Angola and encouraged by campaign oratory.

That skepticism undoubtedly plays its part in the continued deadlock over the next step in the control of strategic weapons which has been rather carefully separated from the agreement on peaceful nuclear tests. It is easy, then, to play the latter down.

Yet there was one distinct forward movement in the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) agreement. That is the provision for on-site inspection to determine whether the tests are indeed peaceful. When one recalls the history of attempts to meet the critical dangers posed by the launching of the atomic bomb, this should be regarded as a major step forward. That it took so long, and will do so little, immediately to meet those dangers should not loom larger now than the fact itself.

After the Soviet Union had vetoed U.S. attempts in the United Nations to bring about international control of nuclear energy, Moscow struck a simplistic chord which is now being echoed by Peking: "Ban the bomb." It was echoed in many quarters and won widespread circulation in popular demonstrations. That it really meant "you

ban your bomb and trust us to do the same" was largely overlooked, and American insistence on some method of guaranteeing the ban, by mutual inspection, was taken as confirming the Soviet charge that the United States was guilty of both launching nuclear terror in the world and keeping its dark shadow intact.

During these fruitless debates, techniques for determining from a distance the size and location of nuclear tests, seismographically and chemically, were developed. So the first agreement between the two major nuclear powers for a ban on atmospheric tests—which had environmental effects that concerned the globe—could be reached without provision for on-site inspection. But underground testing has certain qualities, including the possibility that it can be used for peaceful purposes, which call for closer examination. The Indian nuclear explosion is an example of the ambiguity that can cloak a secret underground test. Hence on-site inspection is included in the Soviet-American arrangement.

To a degree, technology has diminished the earlier significance of allowing inspectors from one country to be in the neighborhood, and have access to information about underground nuclear explosions. But only to a degree. If nothing else, the present agreement reinforces the collaboration in space exploration that the Soviet Union and the United States have begun. Areas that were once wrapped in the deepest secrecy are being opened, and that secrecy was a source of fear and espionage that embittered relations between the two superpowers.

The Bonn Coalition

At a time when Helmut Schmidt's prestige abroad may be at the highest point of his two years as West Germany's Chancellor, little seems to be going right on the home front for his coalition of Social and Free Democrats in this election year. The substantial losses sustained by both partners in state legislative elections in Baden-Württemberg last week are only the latest in a series of setbacks for Schmidt's government. The governing tandem has now lost ground in 10 of the 11 state elections held since it won its unexpectedly decisive victory under Willy Brandt's leadership in the federal election of 1972. It is not unusual for a Bonn government to suffer losses in state elections during the four-year life of a Bundestag; but Schmidt's party cannot dismiss the impressive gains of the opposition Christian Democratic Union in many big cities, traditionally strongholds for the Social Democrats.

It is clear that voters are punishing the governing parties for the highest unemployment

and inflation since West Germany's postwar recovery, though the rates are very modest compared with those in other industrial countries. Voters may also be alienated by the frequent feuds, especially at state levels, between the Social Democrats and their much smaller partner.

The Baden-Württemberg results may tempt some Free Democrats to ponder breaking with the Social Democrats and reviving their old alliance with the Conservative Christian Democratic Union. The party's national leadership, however, seems solidly committed to the coalition.

West Germany's economy is now showing signs of recovery, with consumer spending up, unemployment dropping and wage settlements holding steady around 5 per cent—all of which suggests that Schmidt and his coalition may yet bounce back in time for the national elections to the Bundestag this October.

THE NEW YORK TIMES

Israel Aid Scrap in U.S.

The quarrel between Congress and the administration over the amount of aid for Israel this year is not a dispute over how much would be "enough" to meet Israel's needs; it is, rather, over the question of how much Israel was told to expect just a few weeks ago, and why President Ford then suddenly changed his mind.

Israel's needs can be defined in any number of ways, and honest men will have honest disagreements over whether those needs would be adequately met by the administration's proposal for \$1.8 billion in aid in the next fiscal year. Israel's supporters in Congress have been pressing to increase that figure by \$550 million, bringing it more in line with what the Israeli government had requested.

When the subject was discussed during Prime Minister Rabin's Washington visit in January, Secretary of State Kissinger specifically assured key legislators that the administration, while not requesting the additional aid, would not oppose a congressional initiative to increase the total. Mr. Rabin was reportedly given the same understanding, and Jerusalem's economic planning

proceeded accordingly upon his return home. It was with astonishment last week, therefore, that congressional leaders heard President Ford threaten to veto any measure that provided for the higher aid figure, a decision apparently reached only on the advice of the Office of Management and Budget. Secretary Kissinger was obviously overruled on the matter; there is even evidence that Mr. Ford scarcely even listened to the views of the secretary of state in reversing his administration's earlier signals.

For the long run, The New York Times has repeatedly argued that Israeli leaders should not delude themselves into counting upon the present high levels of American aid year after year. But what is involved now is an imputation of bad faith between the United States and Israeli governments. No good can come from letting such a dispute on a peripheral issue fester and poison working relationships when much more crucial diplomatic disagreements will have to be considered in the months to come. At the very least, the administration should acquiesce in congressional offers to strike a compromise figure.

THE NEW YORK TIMES

International Opinion

The Moslem World

The international Islamic conference . . . in London is an event without any exact precedent. In Western Europe the existence of a European Convention, Court and Commission of Human Rights has not eradicated abuses of human rights, but has helped to make them rarer. Some Moslems have suggested the creation of a comparable machinery for the Moslem world, and it

would be an excellent thing if the present conference were to take that suggestion up. Islam after all is a far stronger bond between people of different nationalities than the pale agnostic humanism of modern Europe. It is a moral force of great potential, which should be harnessed for the defense of the individual citizen against the anomalous product of two-acting cultures, the "Moslem" nation-state.

—From the Times (London).

In the International Edition

Seventy-Five Years Ago


April 12, 1901

VIENNA—At the Railway Officials' Club some interesting experiments were made today with the telephonograph invented by Dr. Roeder. The apparatus reproduces the human voice in loud, clear tones, and may be used to call out the names of railway stations when trains stop or to call out the names of the stations the train will stop at, before it pulls out of the station.

Fifty Years Ago

April 12, 1926

YOUNGSTOWN, Ohio—"Murder is the safest of all crimes to commit," according to Mr. P.L. Stratt, executive secretary of the Big Brothers here. "In 10 years there have been more than 100,000 homicides in the U.S.," Mr. Stratt said in defense of his claim. "In 1923 there were 10,000 and 11,000 in 1924, and less than 1 per cent of the 1924 crop paid the extreme penalty."



By James Reston

HILLSBOROUGH, N.C.—Ever since Jimmy Carter took the lead in the Democratic presidential scramble, his opponents have been trying to prove he was all shell and no peanut. If he talks in generalities, he is accused of being "fuzzy," and if he talks in specifics, he's accused of being dizzy.

This is the normal fate of the front-runner, especially if he's a newcomer and an outsider, and fair enough, too. The closer he gets to the nomination, the more we need to know about his character, philosophy and policies, but it seems to this reporter that he's now getting a bum rap on the "ethnic purity" issue.

By an unfortunate choice of words, he seemed at first to be defending the principle and practice of segregated housing communities, and refusing to use federal power to interfere with the "purity" of all-white, all-Irish or Polish or Italian districts, but he has now explained time and time again that this was not what he meant and he has apologized for the blunder.

Record Clear

His record in support of open housing—the right of anybody of any race, religion, or nationality to move into any neighborhood he chooses—is clear for everybody to see. "I don't think there are ethnically pure neighborhoods in this country," he said, "and it was a mistake to use that word."

Still, Carter did not support those who want the federal government to force the break-up of homogeneous communities. "I don't think," he insisted, "that government ought deliberately to break down ethnically oriented communities by injecting into them a member of another race. It seems to me this is contrary to the best interests of the community. It creates disharmony, it creates hatred, it creates an attitude of unwarranted government intrusion."

This still leaves room for honest disagreement and debate, for there are many honest and experienced people in this country who believe that the housing patterns of the nation will become more and more segregated into checkerboard communities unless the federal government does use its powers aggressively to create and even to compel integrated communities.

Carter's opponents, however, are not concentrating on this quite legitimate issue, but are suggesting that Carter is a segregationist, after all. Even Mr. Udall, who usually plays the political game on the level, has implied that Carter purposely raised this issue just when George Wallace was fading from the race in order to pick up the Wallace vote.

Rep. Andrew Young of Georgia, who is Carter's foremost advocate in the black communities of the North and South, was quick to condemn Carter's use of the word

"purity" because it suggested the right of total exclusion of outsiders, but he was also first to warn of the dangerous issue it was raising.

"A lot of people who said, 'You just can't trust a Southerner,'" Young observed, "are going to say, 'See, I told you so.'"

Carter's reply to this is that he would rather withdraw from the race than introduce racial controversy into the debate, but the stop-Carter movement is gaining strength and losing altitude, particularly in view of the critical Pennsylvania primary election late this month.

If Carter wins in Pennsylvania against the opposition of powerful labor union, and pro-Jackson, pro-Humphrey and pro-Udall forces, it will be extremely hard to halt his momentum and deny him the nomination. But if they do beat him badly in Pennsylvania, he is being Jackson and Udall, the chances are that Humphrey will get the nomination.

The question, however, is how they beat Carter. If they revive the "Southern issue," just when the nation was finally getting rid of it and giving a Southern candidate an honest shot at the presidency, the Democrats will not regain the South but lose it, and probably the election as well.

If they beat him on the fair issue of the use of federal power to compel integration, that is one thing, but if they beat him on the slip of the tongue and all phony charges that his record refutes, they will not only stop Carter but Humphrey as well.

Let's Hear It

Incidentally, it would be interesting to hear from Humphrey himself on this, and Jackson and Udall as well. Humphrey has lately been playing the role of the elder statesman, supporting Kissinger more consistently than many leaders of Kissinger's own team. But he has also fought all his political life to get rid of the

very sort of regional and racial bitterness this new controversy is raising. He should not, it seems here, want to be the beneficiary of a cheap shot at the man who has fairly won most of the Democratic primary elections.

Carter can perhaps help himself by spelling out in detail the policies he would follow on housing and the federal government's role on the integration question, but this will have to be done quickly, for strong forces that worry about his independence are determined to keep the ethnic purity issue alive, and particularly to use it to break his momentum in this month's important and perhaps decisive primary.

So far, this has been a fairly clean campaign, but it has taken an accidental and nasty turn, and it is in the interest of the Democratic party and the nation that the present issue be debated on the basis of the facts. It would be ironic if "purity" were turned into a dirty word.

NATO and the Leaning Tower

By C. L. Sulzberger

BONN.—NATO's biggest political problem—still more potential than actual—is what to do about allies who give Cabinet posts to Communists. The name of the game is Italy. Nothing has happened yet but how long can the leaning tower tilt leftward?

There have been loud, sharp admonitions, principally from the United States, that no partner can stay in the alliance if it has Communist ministers. This isn't true. Iceland, whose geographic position bottles up Russia's western fleet, and Portugal, each violated this rule and survived.

Washington sometimes shoots from the hip—as it did when warning that De Gaulle's withdrawal from the NATO organization (not the Atlantic Treaty) would wreck the coalition. Most unsolicited comments on Italy have proven counterproductive. Meanwhile, designated alliance experts discreetly study all aspects of the matter.

Schmidt View

One finds a reasonable, level-headed approach to the question here. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, a hard-nosed Social Democrat, recalls: "I advised against throwing Portugal out of the alliance when it had Communist ministers in its government."

"I told other NATO ministers that everything had been lost and that we should advise those Portuguese who are with us. Naturally I am not unimpressed by the Italian problem. But I am against premature decisions. First let's come to the bridge and then

see how it needs to be crossed." Former Chancellor Willy Brandt is similarly untroubled. "Brandy last year," he says, "the feeling was evident in the United States that Portugal was lost, that there were some Communists in the government already and they were gaining importance."

That didn't happen. Communist influence in the media and the unions has been reduced. They still have one Communist minister in the Cabinet because the military feels he is needed until this month's elections. But NATO members weren't discussed at regular Portuguese Cabinet meetings, only in special, limited gatherings.

"Had we set out a doctrine excluding allies with Communist ministers that would have been no good. It was necessary to adopt a flexible position on Portugal. The United States acceded. After the coming elections there will be no more Communists in Lisbon's Cabinet."

Italy presents a more complicated problem. The U.S. strongly opposes Communists joining Rome's government and I have sympathy for Washington's position. But you mustn't forget Russia doesn't want that either. Moscow suspects Italian Communists.

"The existing Christian Democratic Prime Minister consults Communists about many problems—mainly internal and economic. My guess is there is no imminent chance of a Cabinet including them."

"But public statements by foreign ministers cannot help. National

pride enters into the picture and such statements risk being counterproductive." Mr. feeling is that at least part of the Italian party will eventually move away from what we call "Communism"—but that might take a decade.

"Italy is much larger than Portugal but I like to recall that when Lisbon did have Communist ministers it relinquished active membership in NATO's nuclear planning group. My experience is that there are almost never entirely hopeless situations if they are not accepted as entirely hopeless."

And Moscow?

Schmidt's and Brandt's views on this complicated issue are similar and share a calm open-mindedness, the only way to contemplate countering a situation that may be faced. And one shouldn't forget that Moscow dislikes the independent attitude of Italy's Communist leaders already; how would it react to them as formal NATO supporters?

Enrico Berlinguer, the party boss, opposes a change in the present balance-of-power system, especially until Yugoslavia's fate is established. Mr. feeling is that it is possible Italy's Communists will be satisfied for some time to play an offstage role, sharing administrative burdens as associate members in a kind of governing council, which is more or less today's situation.

And even if they gain a formal Cabinet status some day, they could surely understand exclusion from vital ministerial posts like defense or foreign affairs while any Prime Minister would acknowledge the impossibility of concluding in the alliance's nuclear planning group.

Could such restriction be more damaging than the initial awkwardness caused by France's withdrawal from NATO's organization? Everyone now accepts Paris as a good ally, even if it remains the odd man out.

100th Time
No Less True
Than the First

By William Buckley Jr.

NEW YORK—Ronald Reagan's challenge to Mr. Ford in his recent nationwide television broadcast is here and there criticized (for instance, by White House spokesmen) as being "completely familiar, nothing new." That's true, of course, even as it is true that somebody who complains for the 100th time that termites are eating into the foundations of his house has not said something new in 100 public declarations, a commentary that has nothing to do with the progress of the termites—who are clearly at work in Washington, which is their headquarters, undermining the lovely mansion bequeathed to us by the Founding Fathers.

Mr. Reagan's domestic points are difficult to challenge. In fact Mr. Ford has made peace with the status quo—perhaps he has no alternative. It is however not a commentary on Mr. Reagan's capacity for repetition, but on the public's capacity for acclimating itself to statist presumption, that Reagan needs to remind us that as inflation continues: b) the unbalanced budget continues; c) the bureaucracy swells; d) the little engineers in Washington continue to dictate to us.

Too Kind

In respect of foreign policy, Gov. Reagan is correct in remarking the great reversals of the past few years. He is, however, far too kind to Congress in his distribution of the blame.

It is a historical truism that the names of the principal figures in any historical period is given to the events of that period, never mind the forces or forces primarily responsible for the significant historical developments.

Henry Kissinger is conveniently accepted as the principal sponsor of the defeats we have suffered at the hands of the Communists. Mr. Kissinger has never denied that the greatest risk in the rhetoric of détente is the undermining of the popular will to resist. He has, however, assumed that the popular will to survive would be sufficient to instruct Congress in grave matters involving the national security. When Gov. Reagan assigns the blame to President Ford and Henry Kissinger for the loss of Angola, anybody is called.

Isn't it true that Kissinger, and Ford, warned of the necessity to resist the Soviet Union and Cuba in Angola? Isn't it also true that it was Kissinger and Ford who asked for massive aid to South Vietnam when the hordes came thundering down from the north? Isn't it true that Ford and Kissinger asked repeatedly for protection for the Central Intelligence Agency against such publicity as would neutralize its effectiveness?

It Was Congress

It was Congress that said no on Vietnam. Congress that said no on Angola. Congress that has substantially neutralized the CIA. Mr. Reagan would be on sounder ground if he criticized Mr. Ford for failing to rouse the public to instruct the Congress on the necessity to resist. Mr. Ford, addressing Congress on the eve of the loss of South Vietnam, in a speech which will live in the annals of history, roused neither the Congress nor the American people, nor, for that matter, the grasshoppers. When Ford said that his administration would not permit the Soviet Union to "fish in troubled waters," what he meant was that he hoped the Soviet Union would not fish in troubled waters, but of course that is what the Soviet Union does, and does so in considerable part because Congress does not act when action might help—in Angola, for instance.

When Mr. Kissinger spent a thousand hours with representatives and senators in executive session, describing the tactical, strategic, psychological consequences of a loss in Angola, the American public knew where the pressure being put on Congress. But when Congress was asked to vote the necessary funds, Congress said: No. That is Reagan's issue. Why did Congress say no?

Was it because Congress, as representative of the American people, believes that the people do not understand the implications of the Angolan challenge? Or that they do not care? If so, then the fault is at least partly that of a President who is ineffective in causing them to understand. And if the President and his secretary of state cannot bring the people to understand why it is necessary to exert ourselves in order to survive, then Reagan must labor to make us understand.

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from revenue tax and other expenses. public ownership all oil and gas resources. According to Anthony

correspondent for the *Financial Times* and has been a consid-

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New Political Interests Are at Work, Indicating an Era of Change

(continued from Page 7)

self-government than its /life paper suggested. Even a not enough for some of A breakaway Scottish party has been formed, so Labor MPs have defect- it. The Scottish National must hug itself with pleas- it recalls how very recent that they were regarded matic fringe, an aberration ch no concessions need be though in fairness, they have to admit that it was ie to the brilliance of their ents than to the fortuitous y of oil in the North Sea. Scottish coast.

ever the detailed outcome devolution debate now rag- is certain that Britain on see an assembly sitting burgh, enjoying powers eld by a Scottish Parlia- since the Act of Union of and with the Welsh in pos- of a degree of autonomy m to their race since d I destroyed Llewelyn ap and made his own son of Wales 400 years before

only natural to expect having pushed the United an government as far as with the Scots and the Nationalists will reap an al reward from their grate- umrymen. So long as the do not, from hubris, press- at their underlying ambi- (complete and total inde- which would frighten of their supporters away— an hope to make inroads bor north of the border ship away more of the re- gory Tory total.

Other

IRA is taking place within the framework of direct rule from Westminster. Everyone agrees that direct rule, as it now stands, cannot continue indefinitely. For one thing, Northern Ireland, with only 13 seats at Westminster, is grossly underrepresented, but no non-Irish politician would want to see the number of MPs from the province increased to between 18 and 23, which is the number to which they would be entitled. Direct rule can fill only temporarily the vacuum created by the abolition of Stormont and the failure of the British government to persuade the Ulster politicians to accept some form of power-sharing between the Protestant majority and the Catholic minority.

A Solution

It may take a long time, but some solution will have to be found, perhaps in the form of independence for Ulster, or a union with the Republic, or incorporation in a federal United Kingdom system with Stormont restored, or simply a local agreement in the aftermath of a complete withdrawal by a war-weary government finding that the presence of the British Army in Ulster has become intolerable to the voters at home.

As part of the theme of change, which is not always apparent in the sterile exchanges of everyday parliamentary life, there is increasing agitation for reform of the capricious voting system. Again, this is an issue closer to the hearts of the small- or parties, who feel themselves discriminated against by arrangements designed to favor the big battalions.

But even within the Tory party there are advocates of proportional representation—or "fair voting" as it is more often called nowadays—and they have been trying to persuade businessmen who contribute to the party to make their contributions dependent on its agreement to adopt PR. There are still those who, though the evidence is circumstantially slim, believe that the Conservatives could have retained office in March 1974 if they had entered a coalition with the Liberals, whose price would have been the introduction of fair voting. On fact, this argument overlooks the likelihood that the trade

union movement, cock-a-hoop over the miners' strike that helped topple Edward Heath and his government, would have cried "Tilt!" and refused to accept any such arrangement on the grounds that it was denying the people's will.)

Hypocrisy

Nevertheless, it has been gleefully pointed out that by employing a series of exhaustive ballots in choosing their new leader, the parliamentary Labor party was guilty of hypocrisy. "First past the post" would have given the election to Michael Foot in theory, at any rate, though in fact the result of the first ballot might have been very different if it was known that it would be the only one. But the question remains: If fair voting is good enough for Labor MPs, why is it not acceptable for application to the electorate at large?

There is another interesting development in the heightened interest now being paid to the way in which parliamentary candidates are selected by the big parties. Left-wingers have embarrassingly focused attention on the undemocratic way in which MPs get the party ticket that takes them to the House of Commons by their campaign to oust men of the right like Reginald Prentice, the Minister for Overseas Development. Their activities were denounced at the last Labor party conference by Harold Wilson, who referred to left-wingers who capture the small local committees that choose the candidates as "self-appointed samurai."

However, more and more people are refusing to see such activities as mere inner-party squabbles which are acceptable so long as respectable Cabinet ministers are not deprived of their constituencies. The role of the caucus is being challenged as people come to realize that a tiny unrepresentative minority—whether of the left or the right—is immaterial—in the two-thirds of parliamentary seats that are safe for one or other of the big parties, are the political elite who are really choosing the MP. It is a fair prediction, as we peer into the future, that some modified form of the U.S. primary election system will be generally introduced in Britain some-



Mrs. Thatcher

time during the next decade. By bringing many more people into membership as the qualification for a primary vote, the parties might even be able to escape the dangers posed by their current flirtation with the idea of state subsidies for their political activities.

Reform

The itch for constitutional reform is also displaying itself at the very core of the British political system. Authoritative voices are being raised urging that for the first time since Magna Carta served that function, Britain should have a written Constitution with an entrenched, modern Bill of Rights. The argument, put forward by some of the judges and a few politicians, is based on the fear that the power of Parliament itself, together with the vast bureaucracies it has created, has become overbearing, and that the citizen needs protection from its apparently never-ending legislative production line.

The creation of the role of the ombudsman can be seen as a limited step towards meeting such criticisms, but his powers are strictly confined and he is, technically, a servant of the House of Commons, hearing only those complaints channelled through to him by MPs. Protagonists of constitutional change of this kind are now looking to the European Declaration of

The itch for constitutional reform is also displaying itself at the very core of the British political system.

Human Rights as providing the nucleus of a new British Bill of Rights.

While Parliament is criticized for having too much power, that institution itself is having to come to terms with the powerful trade union movement. Both major parties have attempted to reform the unions by legislation. Both have failed. Labor may have tipped a little too far in the opposite direction in carrying a whole cornucopia of pro-union legislation, but they did obtain in return a one-year commitment to a flat-rate incomes policy which materially assisted—though alone it would not be conclusive—the fight against inflation.

Loading the Dice

Some observers believe that by slotting the union bosses into the government's decision-making processes at a pre-Cabinet level—via a body known simply as the "Liaison Committee"—Harold Wilson has loaded the constitutional dice against the Tory party, which could not, and would not, continue such a relationship if they gained power.

The unions are delighted that Michael Foot, as secretary of employment, has restored to them the closed shop that the Tories took away in 1971, and in a strengthened form, as well as introducing a wide-ranging Employment Protection Act. This

makes dismissals and redundancies more difficult for management to impose, gives pregnancy leave to women, time off for shop stewards to carry out union duties, and makes wages and lay-off pay the first charge on a bankrupt firm—with the state picking up the bill if there's nothing left in the kitty.

Tory Attitude

If the camaraderie of the past two years gives way to bickering, the Conservatives will be well pleased. Jim Fryer, who is Michael Foot's Conservative opposite number, has promised not to get rid of the new industrial relations laws, though he has reserved the right to dicker about with some of the details. But electorally the biggest handicap the Tories have is their reputation for confronting the unions head on, as they did so disastrously with the miners in early 1974. "Who governs the country?" Edward Heath's war cry then, is a slogan the Tories prefer to forget. But the biggest gift they could have would be some signs of strain between the unions and Labor, if only to allay the fears of those voters who would be shy of voting Conservative if they were persuaded that it would mean a return to power cuts, shortages and the three-day week.

The Conservatives realize, however, that they would have to work out some *modus vivendi* with the unions if they again came to government. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, with her middle-class Mothers' Union image, has been assiduously cultivating the leaders of the big unions, meeting them over lunch and dinner, and assuring them that her intentions towards them are honorable. Her secret fear must be that come election time, these same union bosses might announce publicly that they would find it difficult to work with a government led by her—an announcement which, depending on its exact phraseology (put too brutally it might even persuade people to vote Conservative) could scupper her chances.

This consideration apart, Mrs. Thatcher has several advantages over the newly installed Mr. Callaghan. She has established herself unchallengeably as leader of her party, winning over some devoted Heath supporters in the

process. At 50, she is considerably younger than the 64-year-old Mr. Callaghan, who is, in fact older than Mr. Wilson, who found that enough was enough at 60. And she is a woman, the first ever to lead a British political party, at a moment in history when women are more determined to assert their independence and their political rights, and could well wish to identify with her.

Mrs. Thatcher is a shrewd publicist, with a keen sense of timing. Her sharp criticism of the Soviet arms program earned her the accolade of a direct personal attack by Moscow in the crudest terms, with street posters devoted to her in the Russian capital and counter-productive editorials in Pravda which should show a tangible return in votes when the time comes. And all this at a moment when an embarrassed Minister of Defense, Roy Mason, was being forced by Labor's economic retrenchment to bring in the third set of defense spending cuts in a year.

What of her weaknesses? The primary one is probably the old British bugbear of class. Although she is in fact the daughter of parents who ran a small grocery store, over which they lived, at Grantham, Lincolnshire, she herself conveys a more upper-crust impression. But personality apart, she does not lead a particularly high-powered team in the Tory shadow cabinet. Man-for-man (or woman) they do not attract much admiration or confidence, with Mr. Heath and a number of his senior colleagues, such as Lord Douglas-Home and Mr. Robert Carr having retired, and the most volatile Conservative vote-getter of all, Enoch Powell, having consigned himself to being MP for an obscure Ulster constituency, his reputation sbbing away in bafflement and frustration.

Labor Pluses

The Labor party, on the other hand, has a wealth of talent at its disposal. The abruptness of Harold Wilson's departure threw the ball to James Callaghan, but many people regret that Labor did not take the chance to elect a leader from its talented younger generation. Anthony Wedgwood Benn, at 52, was the youngest of the six contenders but unacceptable to the majority of his col-

leagues because of his way-out collectivist ideology. Waiting in the wings for next time round are people of the calibre of Mrs. Shirley Williams, Roy Hattersley, Merlyn Rees and Eric Varley—a line-up the Tories cannot match.

And what of James Callaghan himself? He is a man who has held all three great offices below the premiership: Chancellor of the Exchequer, Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary. The son of a navy petty officer, he became his widowed mother's support at 15 and had to leave school—he is said to be sensitive about his lack of a university education.

He gravitated to politics via the trade union movement, and for some years acted as a parliamentary spokesman for the Police Federation. This is one clue to Mr. Callaghan's politics: he is a law-and-order man, a great patriot, and he can appeal to the common man. He is not, however, a compelling orator, tending to ramble and to stay on his feet for too long.

Mr. Callaghan is not a profound thinker, preferring to act on instinct—what he thinks in his bones that people will accept—a populist. He stands on the right of the Labor party, certainly further right than Harold Wilson.

Nevertheless, he has made it. He is the chosen one, Labor—and the country—will have to learn to live with him. It may be that taking advantage of the honeymoon period people allow a new party leader, he will take the earliest opportunity to call a general election—perhaps this coming autumn, assuming always that some hope can be squeezed out of whatever economic indicators are at hand at the time.

Whenever the election comes, and whoever wins it, the big parties will have to begin to listen more intently to the whisper of the wind of change: change in the party set-up, change in the Constitution, change in the voting system. The mood is for reform, and victory will go to the party and the leader who takes account of it. The sad condition of British politics, however, is that thanks to the caution of Mr. Wilson during his long reign, and the blinkers imposed by years of economic failure and decline, James Callaghan may now have inherited the leadership of one of our two conservative parties.

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Campaign of Scots, Welsh for Autonomy Is a Top-Priority Problem

(Continued from Page 7)

general elections of 1970, but the SNP's foothold was retained by Donald Stewart, the provost (mayor) of Shetland, in the Western Isles. He is still there and is now leading a parliamentary group of 11 which includes Mrs. Ewing.

In the intervening period, the SNP has made progress on a scale more far-reaching than even its parliamentary successes. Between 1959 and the February election in 1974 (when seven SNP members were elected), the party doubled its vote at each successive parliamentary election. In October, 1974, its 11 MPs (compared with 41 Labor, 16 Conservatives and three Liberals) represented 30 per cent of the total Scottish vote. Recent polls suggest that this proportion is now about 36 per cent, with the SNP overtaking Labor as the leading political party in Scotland. This has been borne out by SNP successes in regional and district council by-elections.

In Wales, although the Nationalist vote stayed about 10 per cent in 1974, the February election returned two of their members to the House of Commons, to be followed by a third one, Mr. Evans, in the October election.

The two major parties have reacted in somewhat similar fashion to the Nationalist threat. The first wave in the 1960s produced a Royal Commission (the second in 15 years) by the then Labor government and the so-called Perth Declaration by Edward Heath, leader of the opposition, suggesting an elected assembly for Scotland, although not for Wales. (He subsequently appointed his own study group, led by his predecessor, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, which duly made its own devolution proposals, an indirectly elected assembly processing, but not passing, Scottish legislation).

The Royal Commission reported in 1973, proposing directly elected assemblies in Scotland and Wales which would deal with domestic legislation from start to finish. By that time, however, a new issue had emerged which was to fan nationalist flames, particularly in Scotland. It was the discovery of oil and gas in the North Sea, most of the oil being in the northern Scottish part.

The question of whose oil it

is ("It's Scotland's oil") was the main nationalist slogan in the 1974 elections has to some extent overshadowed the previous argument, which was about Scotland's economic backwardness, high unemployment rate, remoteness from the center of government and over-centralization of political and economic powers in the London area—all of which could be justified on factual grounds.

In fact, North Sea oil and its onshore spin-off is estimated to have produced about 50,000 jobs in Scotland so far, thus not only mitigating the effect of the current recession but reducing the ratio of unemployment from double in the early 1960s to about 1.5 times the U.K. average.

The wages and salaries gap which was about 10 per cent even 10 years ago has virtually disappeared in the same period. Moreover, it is being pointed out, those improvements could at least partly be attributed to regional development aid and other additional social benefits enjoyed by Scotland—as well as by Wales—both part of Britain's "assisted areas."

The SNP argument is that revenues from North Sea oil, including royalties, corporation and petroleum revenue taxes which may rise to up to \$2 billion (\$12 billion) by 1980 (the government's figure) or \$2 billion (the SNP estimate), would make Scotland one of the richest countries in Europe, if not the world. Scotland would therefore need no help from anybody and standing on its independent feet would be a distinct advantage.

Firm Line

The government has drawn a firm line on the question of North Sea oil. While it appears to be flexible on other matters, such as marginal economic powers to be devolved to the proposed Scottish Assembly or the reserve powers retained by the U.K. Parliament, it is adamant on North Sea oil and gas (much of the latter is off the east English coast) remaining a purely U.K. asset.

The White Paper spells it out thus: "Those who wish to reserve to Scotland oil or other revenues arising there are in effect demanding a separate Scottish state. The circle cannot be squared: It is not possible for

With an utterly fluid situation between, as well as within, the parties and an equally volatile public opinion in Scotland and Wales, what are the chances of a viable solution acceptable to most? There are at least 10 points of conflict...

Scotland—or any other part of the United Kingdom—to enjoy rights which can only go with separation yet not to have separation itself."

This was the line taken by government spokesmen during the four-day debate on devolution in January. "Devolution, not separatism" is the Labor party slogan in its current Scottish campaign.

Across Party Lines

While oil plays a major part in the devolution debate, it is complicated by other issues, some of which cut right across party lines. It has created divisions within the parties themselves and has recently led to the formation of the Scottish Labor party—a group of disgruntled Labor party members which now includes two MPs, Jim Sillars and John Robertson.

Mr. Sillars, 38, at one time one of the most determined opponents of devolution, and Mr. Robertson, 63, a former trade union official, want the assembly to have control over trade, industry and some taxation as well as a share of oil revenues. They also demand direct Scottish representation at the European Economic Community. These aims are not far short of the SNP's, the main difference being that Mr. Sillars, Mr. Robertson and the Scottish Labor party profess to be socialists, which the SNP are not.

The two men, both of whom have already been repudiated by their local party organizations, are in the curious position of remaining members of the parliamentary Labor group while, according to the Scottish party secretary, having "excluded themselves" from membership of the Labor party itself.

The clue to this apparent mystery lies in the Labor party's water-thin majority in the Commons. It cannot afford to lose even two MPs without upsetting

the balance. On the other hand, as the breach between them and the rest of the party widens, the possibility of legislation leading to the setting up of the Scottish and Welsh assemblies being delayed or even shelved grows, too. The Conservative party in particular, depending less on its Scottish and Welsh representation for parliamentary power than Labor, has gone noticeably cool on the devolution issue, reinforced by the skepticism of industry, including the Confederation of British Industry.

Both Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, the new leader, and her deputy, William Whitelaw (who is the chief opposition spokesman on devolution), have been noncommittal on the powers of the Scottish Assembly and have come out against having one in Wales at all. On the other hand, in Scotland itself, Scottish Conservatives have been fighting hard to retain credibility as a party still in favor of devolution. The official Labor party in Scotland, which was against devolution only a couple of years ago, has performed a complete about-face and now demands more powers and fewer restrictions for the assembly.

With an utterly fluid situation between, as well as within, the parties and an equally volatile public opinion in Scotland and Wales, what are the chances of a viable solution acceptable to most?

There are at least 10 points of conflict endangering such a solution. The first one is control of North Sea oil—the rate of exploitation, processing and access to revenues. As already indicated, it is the one on which the government and the opposition are least likely to compromise.

Flashpoint Two concerns economic powers. The White Paper says regional policies must remain the responsibility of the government, i.e. the U.K. Parliament. "It would not be practicable even

to leave particular areas to draw up their own schemes of economic support and assistance within an overall allocation, since divergences could easily distort competition in ways incompatible with a unified economy."

That is behind the proposal to split the new Scottish and Welsh development agencies, allocating their environmental and factory building functions to the assemblies while leaving development aid under the control of the secretaries of state.

On the other hand, the "maximalists"—the Scottish Labor Party, the Liberals, some official Labor men, a few Conservatives (especially young ones) and, of course, the nationalists—want the Scottish Assembly in particular to have control of not only the Scottish Development Agency but also all the economic functions at present or in future exercised by the secretary of state. These include regional aid, farming, fishing, forestry and manpower services.

Flashpoint Three involves domestic fiscal powers restricted by the White Paper to a surcharge on local rates, a most unpopular form of taxation. The maximalists argue that without independent revenue-raising powers, an assembly, dependent solely on a block grant from the Treasury, would have no "economic teeth" as most of the block-grant allocation would be preempted by the local authorities anyway.

Flashpoint Four concerns the status of the universities. The Scottish principals favor the status quo which makes the universities semi-autonomous within the U.K. system, and they are backed by the White Paper. On the other hand, the maximalists and most Scottish student organizations want the universities to be part of the Scottish education

system, which in turn will come under the jurisdiction of the assembly.

Flashpoint Five is the law, which in Scotland has retained its European common law origins and is quite distinct from the law of England and Wales. According to the White Paper, the courts would remain the responsibility of the Scottish secretary of state and the law officers while many prominent Scottish lawyers would prefer control by the assembly.

Flashpoint Six concerns the U.K. Parliament's reserve powers, to be exercised in the first instance by the secretaries of state whose future role has been compared to that of colonial governors-general.

According to the White Paper's proposals, the secretary of state would decide initially whether laws passed by the assemblies were *ultra vires*—in other words, beyond the powers granted under the Devolution Act—or whether they were contrary to general U.K. policy. The possibility of the latter could, of course, be enhanced by different parties having majorities in Parliament and the assemblies.

While it is generally acknowledged that assemblies created by an act of Parliament should on the whole keep within the limits of legislation, opponents of the White Paper argue that the legal debate should be left to the courts (or a supreme court, like those of the United States and Federal Germany) rather than a party politician or even a U.K. Parliament of party politicians. As for conflicts over policy, it is pointed out that such conflicts already exist between local authorities and governments of different political color, the former usually conforming to overall government policy on major issues, some of which—defense, foreign policy, general economic, tax-

ation, energy and transport policies—would remain with the government even in a devolved Britain.

Flashpoint Seven concerns timing. The government has abandoned its original intention to complete the legislative process this year; instead the full bill will not be introduced until the 1976-77 session, which means that assembly elections may not take place—at all—until 1978, which may well be a general election year.

Flashpoint Eight is over combining legislation for Scotland and Wales in which the pressure for both devolution and its scope differ widely. The Conservatives have already served notice that they want separate legislation for the two countries, with an elected assembly limited to Scotland.

Flashpoint Nine is what is generally described as the "English backlash" which is spread over both major parties and over the whole political spectrum. As it covers 80 per cent of the MPs in Parliament, it is a serious threat to the whole devolution process. Opponents of devolution include leftists from other "assisted areas" who fear that Scotland and Wales may gain unfair economic advantages, other leftists who regard it as being irrelevant to the working-class struggle, and men of the center and right who consider it as the "first step on the slippery slope" to a disintegration of the U.K. and a further loss of power and influence in the councils of the world. They are backed by influential industrialists who regard devolution as a disincentive to business confidence.

Finally, Flashpoint Ten is the danger of just this disintegration if devolution is postponed, shelved, or rejected. This prospect was conjured up by Edward Short, leader of the House of Commons and the man in overall charge of legislation in a recent radio interview. Referring to the possibility of the devolution bill being rejected, Mr. Short said, "I am firmly convinced if that happened it would inevitably lead to the break-up of the United Kingdom. It would be Ireland at the beginning of the century all over again."

Mr. Short's allusion was to successive Irish home rule bills introduced by a Liberal administration but frustrated by the Conservative Unionists.

On the other hand, Mr. Short defended the White Paper position to devolved economic and industrial powers. He saw competitive bidding by Scotland against other areas, such as Wales, Merseyside or Tyne. "I'm quite sure it would get through the U.K. Parliament," he said. "English members will never support it."

Of course, the smooth passage of a devolution bill based on the White Paper would mean more to the new Prime Minister James Callaghan, than more fiefdom, democratic and deepened government. What is much in their minds is the power, possibly for general if Scotland and Wales go to Labor, for it was only its prevalence in Scotland and Wales that enabled the Labor party to win four postwar elections, in 1950, 1964 and, of course, two elections in 1974.

That is why the government will do its utmost to avoid a confrontation with the nationalists, particularly in Scotland, where the clamor for "meaningful devolution" and "an assembly with teeth" is loudest. On the other hand, the government is also short indicated—scarcely aware the danger of major consequences particularly on the economic front, provoking an angry backlash (with some Scottish port, particularly from Newcastle) which in turn could precipitate the eventual breakup of the U.K.

In any case, no compromise likely on two fundamental issues: full U.K. control of North Sea oil and gas and the survival of the U.K. Parliament. The turn would rule out even a gradual solution, as advocated by Liberals.

At the same time, the specter of a nationalist majority in Scotland, whether in the Parliament or the assembly, haunts both major parties. Repetition of Mrs. Ewing's by-election victory during current session of Parliament could have a dramatic effect on the shape and extent of devolution, which is still very much in the melting pot.

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

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The Different Theorists' Forecasts of Boom, Doom Are Condition

(Continued from Page 7)
or morbidity in the British economy, even if the characteristic goal of the 1980s for a much faster long-term growth rate needed to be abandoned or at least postponed as unrealistic and perhaps no longer even particularly desirable.

Moreover, the optimists say, a was sensible and constructive to cushion the initial shock of 1975's sharp rise in prices and sharp deterioration in the foreign-trade balance. Thus it did no harm to allow labor for a while to restore some of its eroded living standards (so passing back to OPEC a part of the terms-of-trade loss) and to accept a large enough budget deficit to absorb some of the deflationary impetus of the trade deficit.

Excessive Deficits

It is true, the optimists admit, that the trade and budget deficits went rather further than was intended, as did some pay settlements in the heady final days of the Labor government's "social contract." But the fault for this was largely that of the governments of the pacemaker economies of the OECD world—the United States, West Germany and Japan—which did not reflate as fast as they could and should have done, and of the former Tory government for building automatic cost-of-living adjustment clauses into its pay policy for the year from the autumn of 1973.

By the summer of 1975, the argument runs, the time had come to grasp the nettle. A firm curb on pay increases (a mere 10 per cent a year) was voluntarily accepted and implemented by trade unions, while the exchange rate was allowed gradually to adjust to the difference between Britain's inflation rate and that in trading-partner countries.

Excessive and unexpected personal savings, as well as the tardiness of Washington, Bonn and Tokyo, caused the recession, the budget deficit and the payment weakness to continue rather longer and deeper than planned. But by the end of last year the corner was turned, inflation was coming down, the payment deficit had been halved, and the trough of the recession was passed.

It only remains, the optimists

now maintain, to resist temporary pressures for any undue new fiscal or monetary stimulus to the recovery which is already in the pipeline and will be well established by the autumn. At the same time it is necessary to persuade the trade unions to accept an extension from August of pay restraint on the basis of a formula which will insure a significant further deceleration of the inflation rate from rather over 10 per cent to significantly below 10 per cent.

Both these things are argued to be possible, indeed almost in the bag. Mr. Healey has shown that he is not the man to repeat the reckless reflation of his predecessor, Lord Barber, in 1972. Most of the £10-billion budget deficit of last year and of the financial year now beginning can be ascribed to shortfalls in revenue caused by the recession itself.

As economic activity picks up, revenue will recover quickly. After the government's announcement in its public-expenditure white paper in February that there will be no further increases in government spending (apart from debt interest) beyond this financial year, the budget deficit will progressively close itself over the next three years. There may have to be some moderate increase in the tax burden. But even this may be consistent with selective cuts in tax rates, because of the natural tendency for revenue to rise faster than national income under a system of "progressive" taxation.

Balance of Payments

As for the balance of payments, the prospective recovery in world trade, combined with restraint of home spending and the realistic downward floating of the pound's exchange rate, will insure that exports pick up rapidly enough to overhaul the headstart of imports. Any remaining tendency to deficit will be covered by actual or prospective oil import savings, and even exports, from North Sea oil production, which is planned to reach self-sufficiency by the end of the decade.

Thus the problems of unemployment, inflation and foreign deficit are well on the way to being solved on the basis of strict fiscal and monetary discipline, a floating exchange rate and a fair,

but firm, income policy. This will now liberate governmental energies to concentrate on the new industrial strategy under which faster long-term economic growth will be encouraged by re-deploying men and resources from declining or stagnant sectors to markets and enterprises which are judged to have a vigorous commercial potential, especially overseas.

That, at least, is the official line, and it is not demonstrably absurd. But it probably contains a stronger streak of sanguineness about the political process than even those economists who deny any fatal flaw in the British economy would be willing to accept. Moreover, the optimistic monetarists would reject much of the language in which it is expressed, preferring simply to say that, provided the money supply is geared to the long-run growth potential of the economy and the exchange rate allowed to float freely, market forces will deal with inflation and the balance of payments, even if not with all unemployment.

Others say the facts speak of much deeper-seated weaknesses than can be explained merely by the sins of omission and commission by the government's predecessors in office and by its opposite numbers in other capitals besides London.

Take first the Keynesian version of conditional pessimism. This has been set out most fully and subtly by the Cambridge Economic Policy Group in its annual "Economic Policy Review."

For them, the crux of the problem is Britain's weak performance over two decades in overseas trade, which has led to a permanent and progressive loss of export and home markets to foreign competitors. This competitive failure has generated a tendency to greater and greater balance-of-payments deficits at full employment, or, since only limited deficits can be financed, to higher and higher average levels of unemployment at comparable points in each succeeding economic cycle.

This thesis is combined with an unconventional theory of inflation culled directly from Lord Keynes's seminal work, "How to Pay for the War." According to this view, organized labor seeks

a particular real wage level which it believes at the time to be just. It then uses its collective bargaining power to set the money wage level which it expects to provide that real wage. Inflation occurs when the actual resources, in terms of real national income less profit incomes, available to justify that money wage level fall short. Labor costs rise, and prices have to be marked up.

Thus the Cambridge group states that "recession causes permanently higher inflation than would otherwise have occurred" (their italics). The Cambridge group believes that as a matter of fact organized labor would be satisfied with the level of real wages that the economy could sustain at full employment and with something like Britain's present terms of foreign trade. But, because of the foreign-trade weakness, the actual increase in output cannot on average even keep pace with the all-too-slow increase in the productive potential of the British economy. So the gap between the planned level of real wages sought by organized labor and the available product of the economy is created.

Present Arrangements

It follows from this analysis and from the group's denial of any permanent potency to income policies, that there is no possible combination of policy weapons which could restore a tolerable equilibrium and stability to the British economy within the confines of what it calls "present arrangements." These are defined as "the macro-economic instruments available to the government (fiscal and monetary policy, 'managed' depreciation of the sterling exchange rate, and price and income policy) and the institutional framework within which these are used."

"The most important characteristics of this framework," the Cambridge review explains, "are the commitment to free trade within the European Economic Community and, more loosely, with other industrial countries; free convertibility of sterling and Britain's obligations to creditors and the International Monetary Fund, and at home the system of wage determination through bargaining between employers and trade unions." Under these con-

ditions, the review says, it will be "impossible to achieve in coming years a reversal of the trend of loss of exports and home markets to foreign competitors and the slow growth in real income, rising unemployment and inflation which this entails."

Growth Rate

Specifically, the Cambridge Economic Policy Group calculates that output in Britain would have to rise by a good 5 per cent a year between 1975 and 1980 in order to close what it calls the "inflationary gap" between planned or desired real wages and available real wages. This rate would be sufficient to bring unemployment down only to 900,000 by the end of the decade.

It would also only just be enough to boost government tax revenues, at present rates of tax, by the 40 per cent in real terms which is necessary if the budget deficit is to be closed by 1980 even on the basis of the government's announced intention that there will be no rise at all in the public sector's expenditure on goods and services from 1975 onward.

There is the capacity for such an increase in output, the group estimates. But it calculates that such an output increase would imply an annual average increase in imports over the period of about 12 per cent a year, assuming strong growth in world trade and full preservation of the competitive boost which recent falls in the sterling-dollar exchange rate have conferred on British manufacturers.

To finance such a rise in imports consistently with balanced external payments by 1980—and after taking all credit for North Sea oil—would require an annual rise in export volume of nearly 14 per cent. This contrasts with an actual growth of 5 per cent a year achieved between 1965 and 1975. This, it estimates, would involve something like a 40-per-cent formal devaluation below the pound's average dollar exchange value in 1975, implying in turn a 20 to 30-per-cent cut in the dollar level of British labor costs.

It further estimates that this would mean a 10-per-cent cut in real wage levels between 1975 and 1977, with only a 5-per-cent recovery thereafter by the end of the

decade. That, on the Cambridge group's model, would be explosive inflationary. The maximum growth in output that could be reconciled with the best growth in exports that can be expected at any exchange rate consistent with labor's autonomous plans for real wages would be only about 3 per cent a year.

Such an output growth, it is projected, would mean a rise in unemployment to 1,500,000 (from the present 1,100,000) over the next four years. It would also mean that real wages by 1980 would be no higher than they were in 1973. That contrasts with the 3-per-cent annual increase achieved between 1965 and 1973, which the group sees as the minimal norm to which organized labor aspires. It would also mean that the government would have, even on the basis of its present severely restrained expenditure plans, to raise tax rates sufficiently to provide half of the 40-per-cent real rise in revenues needed to close the budget deficit by 1980.

Worst of all, this rate of growth would manifestly fail to close the inflationary gap. So the government would fall dramatically to achieve any of its employment, price and living-standard targets, though it might with luck secure a precarious balance in Britain's external payments. The Cambridge group therefore turns to the need for radical alternatives, and it finds them in a more or less indefinite general suspension of Britain's free-trade obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as well as under Britain's treaty of accession to the Common Market.

Specifically, by 1977 they want manufactured imports into Britain limited in volume by direct administrative control to the level of 1973, with a permitted annual increase thereafter of about 7 per cent. On this basis, if the international repercussions can be contained, they would expect a 5-per-cent-plus annual growth in British output as unsatisfied demand was diverted from imports to homemade substitutes.

That, they say, could be enough to bring unemployment down gradually and to provide sufficiently resources to limit the fall in real wages to less than 4 per cent between 1975 and 1977, to be

followed by a rise of more than 10 per cent over the following three years. This would close the inflation gap, as well as closing the budget deficit without higher tax rates. The stage would then be set, according to this approach, for "a transformation of industry and the economy in which the critical structural problems existing today could be resolved."

Kinds of Pessimists

Conditional pessimists of this variety are, as readers may be horrified to learn, but as will soon appear, much more optimistic than conditional pessimists of the other variety mentioned above, namely those monetarists who acknowledge the power of organized labor to set a monopoly price for labor through collective bargaining, a power which they expect to be exercised to the fullest extent that market conditions permit. The greater optimism of the Cambridge group consists in the fact that the condition under which it would be prepared to suspend its expectations of political and economic disaster—namely a general abrogation of free trade—is much less drastic than the condition under which the monetarist conditional pessimists would suspend theirs.

This latter view, partly developed and frequently propounded by the present writer, observes as a matter of theory that a political commitment to high employment based on fiscal or monetary (or even balance-of-payments-induced) stimuli to general demand can only coexist with monopoly pricing of labor at the price of accelerating an eventually explosive inflation. If the system is thus inherently explosive in one of its most important variables, it cannot be stable, and therefore the political order and economic prosperity which depend on its economic stability cannot be expected to last.

Recession Ending

It is clear from recent output, spending, employment and business-confidence indicators that the trough of the British recession was passed by the end of last year. Unemployment actually fell, fresh starts, last month, several months earlier than would be expected on the basis of nor-

mal time lags following put through in the mid-second half of last year.

Soon credit demand, live, and then the banks will face an unavoidable either they allow the satisfy it at the cost of more rapid rise in supply than the supply est 14 per cent impulse Healey's recent letter of tion for drawing fast cost of sharply boosting rates, crowding out spending and aborting economic recovery.

It is not within the the politically possible authorities should act now, any more than a willing even to congealing so when the same was presented in 1972. So one must expect the boom will be fuelled, a tendency to bring down to anything less point of the previous half a million), but sufficiently to fire the faster round of inflation, middle of 1978. It only personal savings behav cover by the autumn shock last year of a session to put the mat dispute even among economic forecasters.

So, dispensing with monopolies themselves, an inescapable necessity cannot be done by any attack, because, e were politically possible legislature, the law, d would not be enforced the industrial defiance unions. All that is left to pass beyond the tra as the natural protector in what the worker a capitalist world by giving the direct control and of all enterprises the minimal size. It would left to labor to sink of a market environment, the consumer would of be sovereign, the leader would be respectable nments would restrict to a properly moded of their role and caped

Peter A. Jay is the Editor of the Times of

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CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET		
	December 31, 1975	December 31, 1974
ASSETS		
Cash and due from banks	\$ 242,998,000	\$ 282,427,000
Time deposits	363,134,000	294,976,000
Investment securities—at cost:		
U.S. Government obligations	81,164,000	67,641,000
U.S. Government agencies' obligations	4,628,000	60,540,000
State and municipal obligations	132,385,000	107,320,000
Foreign government obligations	103,279,000	107,320,000
Other bonds and obligations	53,141,000	46,773,000
Corporate stocks	—	9,098,000
Total (market 1975: \$401,032,000; 1974: \$412,909,000)	414,797,000	441,078,000
Investment securities—at lower of cost or market:		
Corporate stocks (cost: \$7,509,000)	5,410,000	—
Loans and discounts, less reserves:		
1975: \$37,000,000; 1974: \$31,200,000	1,431,509,000	1,205,689,000
Accounts receivable and accrued interest	66,533,000	74,123,000
Land, buildings and equipment—at cost, less accumulated depreciation: 1975: \$9,027,000; 1974: \$9,125,000	20,248,000	14,569,000
Customers' acceptance liability	100,450,000	105,549,000
Other assets	38,076,000	27,919,000
	\$2,683,183,000	\$2,446,322,000
LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY		
Customers' deposits and credit balances:		
Demand	\$ 759,891,000	\$ 664,919,000
Time	1,357,806,000	1,196,559,000
Total	2,117,697,000	1,861,478,000
Special deposit liability to U.S. Government	35,000,000	35,000,000
Borrowed funds	25,128,000	59,077,000
Due to American Express Company and subsidiaries	95,595,000	88,489,000
Drafts outstanding	66,341,000	48,313,000
Acceptances outstanding	100,882,000	109,723,000
Accounts payable	52,444,000	55,687,000
Other liabilities	39,107,000	26,653,000
Shareholders' equity:		
Capital stock:		
Preferred—5% cumulative; authorized and outstanding 25,000 shares of \$1,000 per value	25,000,000	25,000,000
Common—authorized and outstanding 60,000 shares of \$100 per value	6,000,000	6,000,000
Capital surplus	7,205,000	7,205,000
Net unrealized losses on marketable equity securities	(1,469,000)	—
Retained earnings	86,265,000	82,537,000
Total shareholders' equity	132,001,000	120,742,000
	\$2,683,183,000	\$2,446,322,000

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كتاب من الأدب



Labor Seeks New Nationalizations in Drive for Economic Control

From Page 7

nationalized concerns is one better than that of state-owned industries. Productivity and profitability by no means as good as those of the private sector, suggest, have not been the source of pride to the British public.

By far too cautiously, or its main advocates beginning to take a new look at those commanding The National Enterprise as been established to a state to buy its way of the profitable and areas of private enter-

inings have not been. Its chief, Lord Ryder, industrialist, has had at £200 million of his £1 billion for the plant and group, and had to put up more or other "lame ducks" of Herbert, the machine. In addition, he has a portfolio of govern-

ment and possessions. In 1971, the prime minister took over, conservatives when they range of sinking under £3-211 engine com-

mercial inspiration for the well be the Italian per la Ricostruzione of its antecedents must be Labor's own Indus-

triation Corp., a body Labor in the 1980s to mergers (Leyland was products) and even Churchill's acquisition late some 50 years ago

re-cent holding in Brit-ann. In fact, this im-look of shares has been not to the NEE, but to st recruit to the na-ector, the British Na-1 Corp., which is busy g for state participation dings of the North Sea

tion companies.

Shelf of Politics

has stepped up public the theory and prac-ite intervention in in-ter a long period in ad been pushed some-ic rear shelf of politics, the take-over zeal was ing the first two Harold governments (1964-68. The halcyon days of ere often evoked, but ned little anxiety, ex-er left, to emulate them. he party was still too e of the Clause TV risk reopening newly und. precariously small ma-one or two rebellious ers who regarded the s a waste of time, Mr. id his Cabinet had a ough task in rena-the steel industry, 1 first been bought up lee government in 1951 ply denationalized by lous forces in 1953. ult of the exhaustion an both parties in-geed parliamentary tag-steel, an unwritten compact came into that virtually insures an industry has been state ownership, it here. erefore, from the first steps being taken by and there is no doubt possibilities have been stified since the heady people like Anthony Benn, its political god- s talking of it taking 0 largest companies in hat are the boundaries stions of the state sector 77 Excluding the health rich is a big resource- hardly qualifies as an ate ownership extends arkiely wide range of ing and service ac-

re seven large nation- dries: Coal, elec-eration and supply, gas, ads, British Airways, the post office. More dozen smaller boards e bus lines, hotels, age, a parcels service f which is the govern- ything like a monopoly, nals, hydro-electricity, d, airports and North

cial performance is the heavy debt burden carried by each of the industries as a result of modernization, deficits run up as a result of price controls and repayments to the government of compensation for the former owners (it was not paid directly by the coal industry, for example, because it was feared that the miners would resent the impost. So the coal owners were paid in government stock and the miners—who could read, too—still resented it).

It has become standard practice occasionally to write off part of these debts, presumably on the theory that every now and then an industry needs a new start. Since 1962, well over £3 billion of debt has been eliminated, including more than £1.7 billion for railroads, £200 million for coal, £250 million for steel and nearly £200 million for the post office.

Considerable Debt

Remaining long-term debt, however, is considerable with interest charges often wiping out trading profits and giving these industries the reputation of being chronic loss-makers. In fact, the latest available figures (for 1974) show that the publicly-owned in-

dustries earned a gross trading surplus (before allowing for depreciation or appreciation in the value of stocks) of about £3.4 billion, which suggests a crude return on assets employed of around 12 per cent—a figure seldom, alas, achieved on a net profit basis. An analysis (based on pre-1974 figures) published by the merchant bankers Fraser & Neave, Ltd., pointed out that the "moderately successful" group of state industries—electricity, gas and the post office—manage a return on invested capital that is only two thirds of the average achieved by private industry. Neverthe-

less, this study singled out the state airline business as performing rather better than the average private enterprise, conceding attributing this to the relative freedom from government interference enjoyed by a business strongly exposed to international competition. The study was completed before the Concorde airliner was imposed on British Airways.

Where, perhaps, the critics are often unfair to the nationalized industries, however, is in their assumption that they could be just like private enterprise if they had not somehow toppled into the grasping hand of the government and been ruined. If only they could be run on purely commercial lines, all would be well. What this line of argument omits is the reality that several of the basic industries came into public ownership simply because they could no longer continue within the framework of private ownership.

Indecent Eagerness

The coal owners sold out their interest to the state with an almost indecent eagerness after half a century of losses, and no country in the Western world has discovered how to run a railroad and still keep private shareholders happy. How could private owners, without massive strife and huge subsidies, have run down the labor force in coal from 705,000 to its present level of 246,000 and the railroads from 873,000 to fewer than 200,000?

The real complaint against the existence of Britain's large public sector is that with such an accumulation of economic power in their hands, governments are reluctant to leave managements to get on with the job of running the state industries. They continually interfere at every decision point—managing, investment levels, pricing policy, planning strategy, wage fixing. Arguably, as politicians they are bound to do so, having been presented with such a powerful instrument, but the system they have devised for intervention owes more to private arm-twisting than to public accountability.

In the end, the executive gets more power at the expense of the House of Commons (MPs are strictly confined in the questions they may ask about state industries) and consumers (whose interests are supposedly safeguarded by lapdog "consumer councils"). Under the nationalization statutes, ministers have the right to lay down policy by issuing a directive to a chairman. It is a device that is rarely used and is fraught with political danger, for the chairman may challenge the minister by publicly expressing his disagreement. Govern-

ments prefer other, more subtle pressures to get their way. For example, the "national interest" may be invoked, as it was by the Heath government between 1970 and 1974. In return for subsidies, the state industries passed their prices during a period of rapidly accelerating inflation. The consequence has been a string of enormous deficits, followed by massive price increases—rail fares, for example, have doubled within two years—as the succeeding government scrapped that policy, ran down the subsidies and ordered a swift and painful transition to reality. Another notorious case concerns British Steel. The corporation has been unable to carry out its much-needed modernization

The real complaint against the existence of Britain's large public sector is that with such an accumulation of economic power in their hands, governments are reluctant to leave managements to get on with the job of running the state industries. They continually interfere at every decision point—managing, investment levels, pricing policy, planning strategy, wage fixing.

program because the government, backing the apprehensive trade unions, who stand to lose 40,000 jobs, has stepped in to halt the closure of many antiquated plants. On a 10-year program, delays of two years or more postpone implementation to a point where the planning assumptions themselves are no longer valid, which means that the industry must return to square one and start all over again.

The plight of the steel industry illustrates another trait among

politicians. Plans for new installations have to be made not simply on the board's commercial judgment but on social-political grounds as well. Thus, Scottish and Welsh MPs exert pressure on ministers to ensure that their regions get a "fair" share of new investment, and the allocation of a £200-million investment might well turn on the governing party's prospects in an election.

Again, the chairman of the nationalized industries are appointed by their "sponsoring" min-

isters. Sir Monty Finniston, the peppery chairman of British Steel, has had several public fights with ministers. As his five-year term of office draws to its end, it has been announced that he will not be reappointed. Sir Richard Marsh, chairman of British Rail and himself a former Labor minister of transport, has fought most of his battles with the government behind closed doors.

But he can read the writing on the wall and has announced that he will not be seeking reappointment when his term ends in Sep-

tember. Sir Derek Bora—becoming chairman of a nationalized industry is a certain way to a knighthood—who is chairman of the National Coal Board, has just had the humiliating experience of learning from a press leak that Mr. Benn had been seeking advice from the mining union and other interests on who should succeed him. In the event, Sir Derek was reappointed, but for three years, not five.

It is easy to see why the chairmen are becoming increasingly rebellious toward their political

masters. Tricked by a government decision to hold down their salaries to a point well below the rewards available in private industry—presumably to encourage their workers in the ways of wage restraint—they have recently agreed to hand together for protection. In time, if they stick together, a countervailing power to that exercised by governments might come into being, but most observers doubt that they will achieve the desired unity. For one thing, they have their own internecine disputes, with coal vigorously lobbying for electricity to be forced to build more coal-fired power stations, electricity complaining that gas prices are held artificially low and the railroads perennially quarreling with coal over demurrage charges on rail wagons.

For a subject that has been debated for so long and so intensely, there are remarkably few new ideas for the future of the nationalized industries. Mr. Benn, while conceding that it is

a subject that is unlikely to inflame passions across the land, wants a national discussion around the framework of decentralization, worker participation in management, a bigger say for the consumer, and more openness in the relationship between ministers and the chairmen who run the industries. Michael Heseltine, the Tory spokesman on industry, unlike some of his predecessors and, indeed, contemporaries, accepts the need for government intervention in industry, even for "social" reasons. What no one seems able to do is reawaken the idealism of 30 years ago, when these industries were to give a new, modern Britain, cured of the bitterness of the past.

Maybe the commanding heights have been conquered, but up here on the summit everybody seems rather bemused, and not a little disappointed.

Peter Paterson is a political and industrial commentator.

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
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New Chairman Girds Stock Exchange for Political-Economic Crisis

By Andreas Whittam Smith

Editor, Investors Chronicle
LONDON (IHT).—The London Stock Exchange has a new, young chairman. I place this item first, because the personality and abilities of the chairman are very powerful influences on Stock Exchange policy. Also because what the financial community in Britain needs now more than anything else is good leadership since it confronts an economic and political crisis.

The new man is Nicholas Goodison. On his appointment, he announced that his main long-term aim was to educate the public in what the Stock Exchange role is in the economy, how vital it is to encourage savings and to insure that the central securities market cooperates as widely as possible with other parts of the capital market.

In other words he sees that regaining public acceptance for the key role which the Stock Exchange plays at the heart of a free market economy is the most important task.

This is why the first big policy matter that comes up in Mr. Goodison's reign is a difficult one. It concerns proposals to set up an exchange for trading in options, modeled on the lines of the Chicago Board of Options Exchange. There is only one disadvantage. The creation of an options market would make the Stock Exchange appear to the man in the street as more speculative, more frivolous than it actually is.

The whole issue is a complex one. By the end of May the Council of the Stock Exchange will have to decide whether to join forces with the Dutch authorities, who have proposed a two-floor European exchange, with Amsterdam and London as the twin centers, or whether to go it alone—or do nothing. The expectation is that London will form a partnership with Amsterdam.

London jobbers, in particular, are keen to see such a market for it would, they believe, create a great amount of new business. It is not every day that a London jobber finds an opportunity for expansion. In the same way the brokers would benefit, and so

would the big investment institutions for an options market would allow them to hedge part of their often large and unwieldy holdings of stock in individual companies. There would be some technical problems to be resolved. How exactly would the clearing house which would issue the options operate, particularly in regard to currency fluctuations? How would the tax authorities treat the capital gains on options?

There is another question, however, which throws into focus the question of public acceptability. Would the establishment of a market in traded options in any way improve the mechanisms for financing industry and trade? The answer, of course, is that such a market would add very little to the sheer efficiency of the capital market. If you are to have a good primary market, you certainly need a decent secondary market. But that is all. You do not need an options market as well.

If the establishment of a market in traded options is seen as one of the most promising ways of increasing the amount of business transacted by member firms of the London Stock Exchange, the question of the scale of commission charges looms almost as important. A new tariff has recently been agreed upon

not only after a period of considerable discussion within the Stock Exchange itself but also following a difficult encounter with the Price Commission, which in Britain has to review all price increases.

Stock Exchange members were surprised to find that their price rises needed approval in the same way that, say, a manufacturer of dog food does; but it is so. At all events, the Stock Exchange

sent in its application to the Price Commission only to be told to come back with more elaborate and up-to-date figures. Finally the Price Commission gave approval for revised commission charges providing that there was no increase in excess of 25 per cent in the commission scale for gilt-edged securities. The overall effect of the changes will be to give brokers just over 9 per cent more revenue on average, of which

just over half will come from increases in commissions, and the remainder will arise out of savings on commission sharing. To some, the incident with the Price Commission and a subsequent episode in which there was a rushed reshuffle of some of the exchange's senior public and press relations staff give an impression of inefficient management. This, I believe, is an unfair conclusion. Ever since a

full-time chief executive was appointed at the beginning of 1974, the exchange has been steadily modernizing its procedures. Mr. Goodison, who added impetus to the effort, is no longer an ex-club, existing solely for the benefit of its members, but a modern market

Mining Venture's Failure May Reflect Euromarket's Maturity—or Past Mistakes

By Christopher Fildes

LONDON (IHT).—It is typical of the Euromarket's luckiest year that its major casualty should have fallen outside the markets and among the clients. That short straw was drawn, four months ago, by a group of the world's biggest mining and exploration companies—they include Standard Oil of Indiana, Anglo-American, Mitsui and Charter Consolidated. The markets have made them say *au revoir*, if not goodbye, to \$200 million.

These were the partners in a huge new copper mine. Tenke Fungurume, and the \$200 million was what they had sunk in it when, in January, they agreed to suspend development. In fact, they had no choice. To bring the mine into production was going to require at least another \$400 million, and that in turn meant tapping the markets. The partners' bank—one of the world's big three—set off to raise a \$227-million credit. It could not be done.

There was, of course, nothing wrong with the bank, or with the mining partners. There was nothing much wrong with the mine—costs were over-running, the political background was darkening, the copper price was looking flat, but mining companies and those who finance them have lived with such troubles before. What sank Tenke Fungurume was an accident of place. It happened to be located in Zaïre, and by the time the Tenke Fungurume credit was offered around the market, Zaïre had used up its credit.

That was as near as the mar-

kets came to a unanimous verdict. There was enough trouble over Zaïre's existing loans without buying another \$227 million worth. But in drawing a moral from that verdict, bankers are divided. What might be termed the approved moral is that Tenke Fungurume shows how the markets have matured; what the controller of the United States calls "a new generation of prudent bankers" stepping back from a cliff when their predecessors would have walked on. The alternative reading, to be heard argued with equal force, is that it is a disgrace to the Euromarket not to be able to finance a good project because of the legacy of bad financing in the past.

Another Fall?

To choose between those schools of thought is, in effect, to pass judgment on the market's year. Busy and prosperous it has certainly been, beyond all expectation. But how has it been a soundly based recovery, and how near is the market to riding to another fall?

It is something to be able to ask that question; few would have forecast it, back in the early days of last year. The markets were then trying to pick themselves up after a series of banking losses and failures, of which Herstatt was only the most spectacular. With the world heading for the trough of its worst post-war recession, the best that the markets could hope from their customers was that most of them would survive.

But if the demand for money looked poor, the supply (so ran the conventional wisdom) would be good to the point of embarrassment and beyond. Were after-wave of oil money would flow resistlessly into the banks, overwhelming their capital bases. U.S. Treasury Secretary William Simon had been telling the International Monetary Fund that the banks could handle what they would get and, old market hand as he is, was dubbed impractical for his pains.

The conventional wisdom was promptly made to look foolish. The demand for oil proved, after all, to be price-elastic; and the producer states showed an ability to spend their enhanced incomes worthy of a private citizen. Indeed, Iran has become a major and popular borrower in the Euromarket, while Oman has met a serious cash-flow problem and had to call on London merchant banking advice to sort matters out.

It is also fair to say that the oil states' fund managers have shown a responsibility and a sophistication to which the market pays tribute. Fears that their surpluses would simply mount up as cash money on the banks of a few huge banks, or wash wildly round the market, have proved unfounded. In fact, oil money is out at a wide range of maturities; and its managers' nerve has held on occasions when others' has faltered. Still, it was clear from the start that, with savings ratios high all round the world, the markets faced problems not of supply but of demand. What astonished most observers—and participants—was the pace at which demand picked up. In the early months of last year, the market took fire,

and it has been blazing ever since. Recent figures from the Kreditbank of Luxembourg—by some yardsticks the most active Euromarket of all—suggest that the first three months of this year broke all the international bond market's records.

Who, then, came to the markets for money—at a time when big corporate borrowers were over were holding low inventories and cutting back investment? Answer: those who needed the money most—the countries which the current jargon labels "non-oil-producing LDCs" (for less developed countries).

Morgan Guaranty Trust figures show these borrowers as having taken 41 per cent of Eurocurrency lending in 1975 and 37 per cent in the first quarter of 1976. Why they need the money is apparent. It is they who, in effect, are having to finance the oil states' surplus. For it is the industrialized economies which have gained from the dramatic increase in the oil states' imports, while the primary producers have stood helplessly by. There seems no limit to what a newly rich country can spend on civil engineering or on defense—but to rice or coffee and, in the short run, to metals, this does not apply.

Worst Risks

But if it is clear why the LDCs should want the money, it is less clear that they can all of them afford to borrow it. There has been no default. But the market has found itself faced with requests for "rescheduling." Interest payments have run late, or have been, perforce, "rolled up" by the banks. And now Peru has

suggested that at the UNCTAD conference in Kenya next month, the world's 70-odd poorest countries should consider jointly declaring a moratorium on their foreign debt. If that does not, so far, look like practical politics, the mere mention has been enough to send shivers through the market.

The positions of LDC borrowers vary widely. If Zaïre and Argentina are the names which most frequently cause bankers to cross their fingers in public, they may not necessarily prove the worst risks. After all, Zaïre, if its domestic financial affairs are in a muddle and its communications blocked or menaced, is still genuinely rich in resources; and lenders to the country have the satisfaction of knowing that the international agencies are in there with them.

Again, if Brazil may have to repeat its last year's borrowings simply to finance the interest and repayments due this year, it has sufficient financial sophistication and control over its economic destiny to do so.

Not all borrowers, though, could be paid either class of commitment. And there are others again, possessed both of financial sophistication and of real resources, which represent a risk of another kind—a political risk. With some the threat is internal—examples, perhaps, in North Africa; with others, external—as in southeast Asia. These are the hardest risks of all to assess, though the Euromarket, dauntlessly preparing the most elaborate checklists, do their best.

So the market, in effect, now faces the consequences of its willingness to increase its exposure

to the risks of lending to LDCs. Its two other major areas of exposure have been with it through-out this last year. They are real estate and shipping.

It is a long time since the Euromarket's exposure to either. They have been hanging on and hoping for better things—so far, without much reward for hope. The trouble with real-estate finance echoes the continuing troubles of U.S. banks on their domestic lending, and it remains more of a threat inside the United States than outside. But a number of credit arrangements of real estate investment trusts (REITs) have reached the point of "rescheduling" or "rescheduling" in the Euromarket, and much bitterness has followed. To be plain, some banks in Britain and Europe are now accusing their transatlantic opposite numbers (and financial partners) of using their local knowledge to go while the going was good—of being content to pull up the ladder and frame gestures of regret to those caught below.

Many bankers, though, regard this REIT exposure as being past the worst. They would like to say the same about shipping—but the fact is that no one (except, possibly, a handful of central bankers) has any idea what the market's exposure on its shipping loans is. Little of this finance was done in the form of published and syndicated credits. Instead the bankers took it on, one ship at a time and often one bank at a time.

Any one bank, asked about this now, will happily call it someone else's worry. "No, we don't have

any tankers, we only in best names, we only in cargo, we have full access credit is so constrained a buck stops with the ship down."

It is apparent that the of the shipping market coincided with the last run up new banks or banks in London. There is evidence that some of banks, for fear of having the bank, suffered the misfortune of meeting it. Agers have moved, but have been revealed, and But the figures are not. That seems a good sign. But even those assurances a long way to go—given of building capacity which hangs the tanker market, given, too, that the ship have plenty of capacity of their own before they get the way of the independent whose fortunes the better.

The hopeful elements of market say that in this is the shipping and real-estate have been recognized and, as possible, contained—that is a process which we go on. As to the LDC, we said that when the world trade really picks up those which can be how guerrilla warfare between mines and the port—whole economic base of loans will change for the and meanwhile the market shown it knows where a

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Handwritten signature: J. Eckman



The Domestic Bankers Feel Their Worst Crisis Is Over

By Anne Segall

LONDON (IHT)—Two years or it first started in 1974, the worst financial crisis in Britain's history is still its way through.

In the last few weeks alone, major British property Amalgamated Investments, has failed. A group of about 50 and foreign banks a £124 million not all of which are confident of recovery. The luckless First National City Bank, having won the wooden spoon £144 million of provisions, £110 million that the clearing banks have lent it the money to at are in turn having to possible losses on P&O million. That is just one factors causing a 15-percentage fall in the 1975 profits of the Big Four following the 8-per-cent year before plus special of £158 million over-year period.

Despite the latest instalment, this seemingly endless woe, the Crown Agents to ask the British to top up the £200 grant received in 1974 James Guaranty, another financial concern, has ut into liquidation in at dubious circumstances. Then are the British banks arguing that the over? They have two in their favor. The first is that the domino effect many feared could engulf the British banking system, the clearing banks, is avoided. The second, keeping the whole situation down, London's reputation as an international financial center and the Bank of England's authority have not been damaged unduly, a fact which by the high proportion of currency business which is conducted in the City.

foreign banks, except which actually got their burned, are ignorant of just how serious the ally was.

Credit, Blame

for that goes to the England which, if some blame for allowing the to exist that ultimately the crisis has at least itself by preventing its ally from disastrous consequences. In December, 1973, the collapse of the "fringe" of concern London & Securities, subsequently of fraudulent practice in the of Trade and Industry, caused a run on many banks, the Bank and promptly launched a rescue operation, for at times known as the "lifeboat" operation.

against their will, it did the clearing banks to

provide those applicant banks which appeared to be viable with the funds necessary to keep them in business. Ultimately, the "lifeboat" put up £1.3 billion for around 30 institutions, with the Bank of England chipping in 10 per cent of that and taking on any extra burden itself.

The trouble is that while the Bank of England has managed to stave off the worst consequences of the British banking crisis, it has not been able as yet to eliminate its root cause, the collapse of the property market. Not only are property values stubbornly refusing to recover, except at the very high quality end, but the time element is becoming a serious problem in itself because many property owners and developers are clocking up interest charges in the meantime.

With interest costs mounting up at an average of 12 per cent a year since 1973, the equity cushion which some companies have managed to retain in spite of massive write-downs of property values is being continuously eroded.

Insufficient Assets

Even where property companies have already gone into receivership or liquidation, the difficulty of actually off-loading the properties involved means that bank creditors are having to fund loans which not only have insufficient assets to cover them but on which they are receiving no interest either.

There are other problems. For while the "lifeboat" operation has been a clear success in some ways, in others it has not. Thus, what was at first expected to be a short-term operation with little risk involved has turned out to be an extremely protracted and costly affair. Many of the candidates which seemed healthy when they were originally accepted into the "lifeboat," like FNFC, Burston Group and Triumph Investment Trust, were found much later to be suffering from a serious deficiency of assets.

These firms had to be either put into receivership or liquidation or, as in FNFC's case, have been virtually taken over by the clearing banks and are being run down gradually over a period of years. It is estimated that the clearing banks may have already lost about £150 million on the "lifeboat" operation and some of them feel, not without an element of bitterness, that their own financial health has in consequence been somewhat undermined.

It is certainly the case that over the last few years the clearing banks' retained profits have not kept pace with the growth in their deposit liabilities, so that in spite of "rights" issues by Midland Bank and Lloyds, their capital ratios have tended to deteriorate. This could make it difficult for them to meet the upturn in demand for industrial loans when it eventually comes, especially as they still have about £200 million

stied up in the "lifeboat" operation, and could do so for several years to come.

That, perhaps, is the most disheartening aspect of the "lifeboat" operation. Originally, the authorities hoped that by showing their determination to prevent depositors from losing any money, they would restore confidence to the money markets, so enabling banks to raise funds independently once more. They even helped a worthy "lifeboat" client, the finance house Bowmaker, stage a very showy, although somewhat artificial "recovery" in order to boost general morale, by converting a large chunk of its support money into a medium-term commercial loan.

The tale, while no doubt a happy one for Bowmaker itself, did little, however, to restore general confidence and it is beginning to look as though some companies, for example United Dominions Trust, which owes the "lifeboat" £450 million, will never be able to stand on its own feet again.

Attempts to find large outside buyers with easy access to deposit funds have also been surprisingly unproductive. Hardly any foreign banks, not even the U.S. banks which were at one time so keen to develop retail banking operations in Britain, have shown much interest in picking up ready-made companies, even at what would be pretty knock-down prices.

The only exception is Algemeine Nederland of Holland which bought up Northern Com-

mercial Trust, though only after it had managed to discard Northern's troubled property portfolio. Chase Manhattan also wanted to buy half of FNFC's reputedly sound consumer credit subsidiary, but gave up when the necessary consent of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank was withheld.

The failure of the money markets to recover, coupled with the much tougher regulatory environment which now exists, means that the eyes of secondary banks is well and truly over. In some ways that is a pity because a reasonable measure of competition is healthy for any industry, the banking industry not excepted. Fortunately, the competition from U.S. banks like First National City Bank and First National Bank of Boston, which have developed their own retail banking networks, through so-called "money shops," will insure that the clearing banks do not fall back altogether into the sleepy oligopolistic ways for which they were so sharply criticized in the 1967-1978 Monopolies Commission Report and also by the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries in its first report in 1970.

Even more worrying, perhaps, than the demise of the secondary banking sector is the damaging effect which the events of the last two years or so have had on the merchant banking fraternity. Almost every merchant bank, with the possible exception of Warburgs and Rhea Brothers, was taken in to some degree by the euphoria of 1971-3.

The clearing banks, on the other hand, have remained aloof, the

Midland having already bought Samuel Montagu and the Dreyfus Corp. as the basis of its merchant banking operation three years ago and the others still insisting that they prefer to build up their own in-house merchant banking capabilities. They have done so, moreover, with a surprising degree of success.

For all its less happy aspects, however, the banking crisis of the last couple of years has had some salutary effects, particularly on the clearing banks. The spirit of competition, once awakened, will probably not die and is showing signs of being diverted into more productive pursuits.

The clearing banks are, thus, now taking a genuine interest in the whole question of providing British industry with medium-term finance for investment purposes. They have agreed to channel £1 billion to industry through Finance for Industry, a lending institution which they own jointly with the Bank of England. And while industrial lending generally has been very slack over the last year, medium-term lending has apparently increased considerably, so that it now accounts for about 30 per cent of all clearing bank advances to the manufacturing sector.

Barclays, which has been particularly active in this area, claims that if one counts export credits made available under the government guarantee system, it alone has provided £1 billion to industry by way of medium-term finance. The clearing banks have also supported the Bank of England's controversial proposals for an Equity Bank, a bank which

would collect £500 million from British investing institutions, such as the insurance companies and pension funds, and would then channel it to industry in the form of investment capital.

Too Dominant

If anything, the real danger at the moment is that the clearing banks could become too dominant in the British banking system. That would not only be bad for the system itself but could make them increasingly vulnerable to doctrinaire calls from the British Laborites for nationalization. Another such call was in fact made a few weeks ago by the Labor party Home Policy Committee.


On the other hand, if the Laborites could be made to appreciate the folly of direct nationalization and concentrate instead on building up a public sector alternative to the clearing banks, the system as a whole would be well served. For one of the developments which has gone largely unnoticed over the last couple of years but which could be of great significance long-term is the surprisingly successful development of Giro and the Trustee Savings Banks, both publicly owned financial institutions.

Equally significant has been the growth of the banking arm of the British Cooperation Movement, which could in time provide the third leg of a strong but, at the same time, competitive tripartite British banking system.

Anne Segall is Banking Correspondent for The Economist.

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
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CHURCHILL

The City's Prosperity in International Finance

By Hamish McRae

LONDON (IHT)—One of the things that astounds observers of the City of London is the way in which London's international banking business has continued to flourish despite (perhaps even because of) the gradual relative decline of British industry, and the chronic weakness of the pound sterling.

To its competitors for international business, London's financial service industry is an efficient provider of competitive products—be they Eurocurrency, international insurance or shipping services. In Britain, the City appears in a rather different light—hence current discussions as to whether the stock exchange raises sufficient funds for industry, whether British banks offer adequate medium-term credit, or whether British insurance companies offer the customer at home as good a service as they extend to foreigners.

This debate about the role of the City and its relevance to Britain's economic problems touches international banking in two places: the wisdom of the rapid and expensive move of the

clearing banks into international business over the last few years and the costs to Britain of allowing the City to continue as an off-shore banking center, isolating all its Eurocurrency business from pound business. Put crudely, the first point boils down to the question: "Why should the clearing banks spend money on building up services to Californians when British industry needs money to re-equip itself?"

The corresponding question on the second point is: "What good does it do Britain to have the Eurocurrency based in London if it siphons off the best talent into making loans to build steel mills in South America?"

Blunt Answers

There are of course equally blunt answers. One can point out that international banking now requires a network of foreign offices. To be able to offer domestic customers a good service you have to have branches in the main financial centers around the world. One can look at the invisible earnings of banking—the latest available figures, for 1974, show that the balance of payments benefited by a net £183 million thanks to international banking earnings. Or one can simply point out that the biggest single borrower on the Eurocurrency market was none other than the British government.

These facts will probably insure that international banking will be continued to be allowed to grow in the relatively free environment it has enjoyed up to now. But it would be wrong, when looking at the way the business has weathered the recession, not to be aware of the political background to its present relative success.

Of its shape at this stage of the recession? Well, there have been a number of casualties, but it is fair to say that the international side of banking is not only now in far better shape than it dated to hope, say, 18 months ago, but that the casualties have been less spectacular than those of domestic banking.

There are two separate branches of the international banking business, the overseas activities of British banks, and London-based business, mainly, but not entirely, on the Eurocurrency market. The main themes of the first during the last year or so have been the continuing absorption of the old British Overseas Banks into the mainstream of British banking and the gradual expansion of the clearing bank overseas interests.

The main interest of the second has been the vigorous way the Eurocurrency market has recovered and the more muted performance of the syndicated loans market.

Anachronism

The British Overseas Banks have long been something of an anachronism, for they were set up to provide the empire (and some other areas of British commercial interest) with retail banking services. Most of these retail branches still exist, providing the basis for a worldwide banking network. But they are, from a commercial point of view, now in the "wrong" places, the rural Third World rather than the cities of the industrial West.

Faced with this, the overseas banks have had the choice of re-

maining independent but staying outside the mainstream of international banking, or losing their independence within a clearing bank. The old Barclays DCO was wholly absorbed into Barclays as Barclays Bank International. Bank of London and South America became Lloyds Bank International. National Westminster put its rather smaller Westminster Foreign into International Westminster and all three banks have been slogging away building up branches in the "right" places—particularly in North America and Europe.

There are now three main question-mark overseas banks: Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp., Standard and Chartered Bank, and National and Grindlays.

Hong Kong has remained independent to the point of transferring its headquarters from London to the last British colony and its future is inextricably tied to the future of Hong Kong. Standard and Chartered is still attempting to digest the merger about 7 years ago between Standard Bank and Chartered Bank, but the main question mark here is the bank's relationship with Midland Bank.

Increased Stake

Midland increased its stake in Standard and Chartered last year from 4 per cent to nearly 16 per cent, a move which—to outsiders at least—only made sense if Midland intended ultimately to take control. Midland has suffered from its lack of direct overseas offices; it has a 21-per-cent interest in European-American, the largest foreign bank in the U.S. But its policy of carrying out international business through its relationship with its European-American partners has not brought it the benefits of the foreign offices of, say, Barclays International.

And finally there is the peculiar position of National and Grindlays Bank, 49-per-cent owned by Citibank, with Lloyds holding 44 per cent of the holding company that in turn has the other 5 per cent of the bank. The sad tale of Grindlays—massive losses over the last two years—points to the inherent problems the overseas banks can face if they continue to operate independently.

Retail Services

In fact, it has been problems in London-based business that have caused the trouble, for Grindlays' overseas operations, mainly in India, have continued to be profitable. Whether the bank would be viable simply providing retail services to the Indian subcontinent is another matter.

As for the Eurocurrency, the success story first: At the end of 1974 it was conventional wisdom that the Eurocurrency market was finished, or at best that though it might carry on in some limited form it would never recapture the exuberance of the late 1960s. There were a host of reasons advanced for this: The poor secondary market, the competition from New York now that the IET had been lifted, the fact that investors no longer wanted bonds, the international shift away from personally provided funds to bank-sourced funds, and so on.

All predictions have been utterly confounded. Total issues went from \$3.5 billion in 1974 to over \$12 billion last year—this in the worst depression since World War II. The quality of borrowers remained high. New York was beaten off, the secondary market boomed. For London, there was only one trouble: the Eurobond market gradually slipped out of the City's grasp.

With British investors denied access to the market except through the dollar premium, it has always been surprising that any British underwriters should remain among the leading Eurobond issuers. But whereas five years ago there would be at least three London-based issuers among the top 10, last year one just squeaked in. Secondary trading collapsed, but there is anecdotal evidence at least that London-based traders lost ground to Continental ones.

Minority Opinion

There are two views in the City as to whether the loss of ground in Eurobonds matters. The majority opinion seems to be that it does matter a great deal and that the ground lost will be lost for good. The minority view—and the fact that it should be minority is itself a comment on the City—is that Eurobonds were always peripheral and that maintaining the syndicated loans mechanism is much more important.

The loans market, which is still solidly in London, fell from a record \$29 billion in 1974 to rather over \$20 billion last year. If this was disappointing, perhaps more worrying has been the relatively poor quality of borrowers, relative, that is, to the bond market. Non-OPEC developing countries increased their share of the loans from 21 per cent to 41 per cent—a welcome contribution to the problems of the Third World, but some cause for concern among bankers.

Tacit Assumption

This year at least spreads have widened somewhat and the ESC-backed Italian credit has brought the market back into the "balance of payments lending" game. But the tacit assumption of most Eurocurrency bankers is that the market will have to content itself with project finance rather than the massive credits to industrial countries that followed the OPEC price rise. Maybe that is no bad thing.

Finally, it has to be admitted that last year was the first year when the number of foreign banks in London actually fell. This is largely because of amalgamations and the total of 244 banks with direct representation in the City compares with 170 in New York. But the City does rely massively on the foreign banking community to provide the international services. Nearly 74 per cent of foreign currency lending is by foreign banks.

Perhaps the important figure for critics of the City both in Britain and outside is that one-third-quarters of the splendid international banking industry is foreign. It will doubtless stay in foreign. It will doubtless stay in London while London welcomes it. So far the Bank of England has made sure that London does, but in the future?

Hamish McRae is Financial Editor of The Guardian.

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Aerospace Industry Is Thriving in the Air, Has Woes on the Ground

By David Fairhall

LONDON (IHT).—An aerospace industry that can help produce the world's first supersonic airliner, its only operational jump-jet, a three-shaft turbofan as beautifully conceived as the Rolls Royce RB-211, or an electronic package as efficient as the Marconi-Elliott head-up sight is evidently not lacking ingenuity. And its competitive strength is demonstrated by the fact that the last three products are currently being exported to the toughest market in the business, the United States, helping to bring total exports for last year to more than \$800 million.

But over the next few years, the British industry is facing some structural and managerial problems of a kind it usually finds harder to solve than purely engineering ones. The immediate question is how to reap some benefit—if there is any to be had—from the nationalization of its major airframe and missile groups that will be imposed on it later this year.

The underlying problem has been around for a long time: how to find a stable relationship with other aerospace industries in Europe and the United States as the vast scale of modern airframe and aircraft engine programs makes collaboration increasingly necessary, if not always desirable. Both issues—nationalization and the pattern of international collaboration—are complicated by the urgent need to find successors to the civil aircraft that are cur-

rently occupying a large part of the work force.

The Concorde supersonic airliner alone employs more than 20,000 persons in Britain, but that production line could come to an end in 1978 when the 16th aircraft is completed. The subsonic One-Eleven and Trident airliners are also nearing the end of the line, at least in their present form.

Indifference, Opposition

The government's proposal to nationalize the main airframe and missile companies has been opposed from the start by the representative Society of British Aerospace Companies, even though the possibility of a commercial merger was already there. Individual management reaction has varied from gloomy indifference to bitter opposition. Some of those most annoyed by the takeover are component suppliers who are not immediately affected but fear that they will sooner or later be swallowed up by the state-owned giant or squeezed out of business by its monopoly.

Trade union leaders have reacted variously, according to their political commitment, the way they see reorganization affecting job security, and their belief in the industrial democracy on which Anthony Wedgwood Benn (the left-wing architect of the nationalization plan) set so much store.

The right sort of rationalization might help the industry at this stage. But perhaps the most fundamental argument used to support state ownership is that

...Over the next few years, the British industry is facing some structural and managerial problems of a kind it usually finds harder to solve than purely engineering ones. The immediate question is how to reap some benefit—if there is any to be had—from the nationalization of its major airframe and missile groups...

an industry so heavily dependent on public finance—through military programs, through Concorde export revenue and the stimulus which advanced aerospace technologies give to the rest of the economy. What worries many is

usually benefited from the government's levy on profits, through export revenue and the stimulus which advanced aerospace technologies give to the rest of the economy. What worries many is

the prospect of day-to-day managerial interference from civil servants in Whitehall.

Mr. Benn expressly denied any such intention when the bill was being drafted. The government

was merely concerned, he said, to exercise the sort of strategic direction that its financial commitment warranted and to inject national priorities when occasionally appropriate. But leading

manufacturers, notably Sir Arnold Hall, chairman of Hawker Siddeley, evidently do not believe these assurances. Indeed no one with experience of the clumsy way some—though by no means all—nationalized industries in Britain have been run would take them simply on trust. Experience will tell over the next few years, when the new corporation faces hard choices between competing projects, between job preservation and efficiency, and between potential partnerships abroad.

Among the most solid rocks on which the restructured industry can be founded is the collaborative program to build more than

800 Tornado Multi-Role Combat Aircraft with West German and Italian. It is managed by an international consortium in which the British participate.

In military terms, the deal is a compromise. U.S. firms are to break up the consortium in the early stages made up of this apparent weakness. But recently the U.S. government not its industry, has raised the value to NATO of its program on this scale and off the dog. In spite of awkward snags with the deal, specially built RB-199s and full production is already authorized.

The Tornado's design is an attempt to create even broader partnerships: half a dozen NATO air forces following cancellation of the TSR2 long-range bomber, and the decision by France to pull out of the SEV. French project that was closely resembled the Tornado.

In fact, France seems to have found the cost of going to military aircraft more prohibitive. The hope particularly since it failed off the "arms deal of the year" with its Mirage, it will be prepared to join Germany in future collaborative ventures. The RAF is thinking about the possible placement of the Harrier Jaguar ground attack aircraft with a design that can cope with the role and the air combat which the Tornado's air variant has insufficient and agility. For political industrial reasons, it will look to Panavia, preferably French participation.

The Jaguar is itself the product of successful Anglo-French cooperation, which has also been fruitful on the helicopter between Westland and Agusta. The Harrier vertical off aircraft is built by Hawker Siddeley, which in this and military programs (the N maritime reconnaissance is the Hawk trainer) has run somewhat aloof from Europe.

When the A-300 European bus was proposed, however, plunged wholeheartedly into collaborative venture only left stranded—although it profitable sub-contract to build the wings—when British government pulled out. There are still hopes on this of the English Channel. British participation may be achieved by installing the Rolls Royce RB-211 in a B-10 version this beautifully engineered seater.

Industry Prospect

On this civil side, the industry's prospects are much clearer now as encouraging as military one. BAC is still the short-haul One-Eleven, but with limited for its development. Short the new SD3-30 commuter craft, as usual skilfully to the Belfast firm's Lynx helicopter attractive civil applications apart from the A-300B. Hawker Siddeley has the Trident building for the rapidly edging Chinese airline—and an active jet with good maintenance in the United States the new project on which it planned many hopes the jet feeder liner, is no more a mock-up under a dust sheet the corner of the Hatfield.

It might not even be the for a feeling that since the design formula was right that the nationalization could be looking for new projects it might be revived one worst of the inflationary oil which killed it had passed. It is dusted off, it may well be posed as a collaborative jet with the new Rolls Royce RB-211 engine, that has just come its first highly promising test runs. This is the engine that was to have been jointly developed with Pratt and Whitney, with the JT-10D, until the Justice Department ruled against it.

But if the government got Europe with such a pact will face a dilemma: that bedevilled similar negotiation the past: by the time the manufacturer has been allowed to Britain, the work sharing leaves precious little for sections of the British industry. Last, but by no means least, there is Concorde, which both BAC and Rolls Royce are heavily committed with. One in 10 British space workers are currently involved in this massive time keeping over while the deal is debated internationally by engineers, scientists, noise-sensitive politicians and even a few operators. It could survive as a compromise of a deal, which could be brought to a halt, which case a big gap will opening up in British aerospace around the end of next year.

David Fairhall is Defence Correspondent for The Guardian.

The Construction Sector's Recovery Fight

By Victor Keegan

LONDON (IHT).—Britain's \$23-billion construction industry is feeling mildly aggrieved. At the end of last year, the government proudly announced a new industrial strategy under which 30 sectors of industry—representing about 60 per cent of manufacturing output—were to be given special attention. The aim of the exercise was to expand the country's shrinking industrial base. Every industry which counted for anything was included in the list—except for one: construction.

Not surprisingly, this angered the elders of the industry who pointed out that if ever an industry needed to be involved in a government planning exercise

it was construction since, more than almost any other, it had been subjected to the whims of the government as a means of regulating the economy.

When the economy is expanding so fast that it is becoming overstretched, the first thing that the government does is to cancel public building programs. This forces an artificially large recession in the industry, forcing it to shed tens of thousands of employees. Thus, when the next upturn comes, the industry, stripped of a large part of its labor, finds that it runs into production bottlenecks even earlier than in the previous cycle.

Following representations from the industry, the Minister for Housing and Construction, Reg Preeson, assured the industry that

although it had not been selected as one of the 30 special sectors, its "integral role" would be taken into account.

Such consoling words served only to convince the industry of the Cinderella image it has with the government in spite of the unprecedented recession it is currently suffering. In official government statistics it is classed neither as a "manufacturing industry" nor as a "service" industry. It is lumped together with the mining industry—for no apparent reason—in a category of its own.

The extent of the present recession—the worst for 50 years—is reflected in the latest government figures showing a decline of 6 per cent in output last year (by volume) following a 10 per cent decline the previous year. It is expected that there will be a further decline of 3 per cent this year followed by a smaller decline next year. Therefore, there is little hope of a substantial upturn since half of new construction work is directly dependent on the public sector (government and local councils) whose expenditure has been frozen by the Treasury until 1979 as part of the government's battle against inflation.

To date, the present recession, which began in 1974, has claimed over 200,000 jobs (nearly 17 per cent of the work force) and more will disappear this year. According to calculations made by the National Economic Development Office (which brings together leaders of government, unions and employers) the trend suggests a continued recession at least until 1978 and it adds that the outlook for employment is "grim."

Depth of Chasm

Although in general terms activity in construction looks more like a chasm than a recession, the depth of it varies from sector to sector. One area which is surprisingly buoyant in the circumstances is house building. Last year, against the downward trend of the economy, building was started on 320,000 dwellings compared with 282,000 in 1974. The number of completions rose from 265,000 to 310,000. Most of the rise in completed houses was due to increased construction by local councils. This in turn reflected the sharp rise in public expenditure which the government is now trying to bring under control.

Forward projections suggest that, under the increasing constraints of public spending, building by local councils will fall back this year and next year while private house building will recover slowly from last year's 145,000 starts to 150,000 this year and 160,000 next year. This will still be below the level of 215,000 in 1974 before the collapse of the era of property speculation, but it is considered to be quite reasonable progress given the near-stagnation of the economy as a whole.

Elsewhere the outlook is much gloomier. Publicly financed (that is, by government and local councils) construction, apart from housing, is expected to show no improvement over the next two years following a steady decline over the last four years. Privately financed building for industry, which fell by 3 per cent last year, is expected to drop by 9 per cent while private commercial construction will fall by 15 per cent this year in spite of a fall of 18 per cent last year.

The slump has already taken its toll of basic supplying industries like brick-making where over 60 factories have closed down since the recession started—20 per cent of capacity—and some of them will never reopen, thereby leaving the industry less well equipped to meet the next upturn, if and when it comes.

There is little doubt that the industry deserves a better deal from the government, its largest customer. No one denies that successive Labor and Conservative governments have used the industry as a convenient means of regulating the economy.

When the going has got tough, roads, schools, libraries, hospitals and houses have been pulled out of the program at absurdly short notice, causing widespread disruption. Equally, when it has suited governments to expand the economy rapidly (often before a general election to vote new MPs into Parliament), public contracts

prospects at home, it is not surprising that British firms are intensifying their efforts to win more contracts abroad and especially from oil producing countries. According to the latest statistics, new orders won by British contractors abroad in the latest available 12-month period were almost 90 per cent above the previous year and the value of the country's order book had almost doubled over the same period. More than half of the orders came from Asia where most of the leading oil producers are situated.

The government estimates that the whole of the construction industry (including architects, surveyors and engineers but excluding materials) contributed about \$400 million to the nation's balance of payments last year, an increase of over 10 per cent on the previous year. There are signs that more and more overseas business is being won by the larger British firms, many of whom now report that over 50 per cent of their work (and often a higher proportion of their profits) is done abroad.

Exports Board

Last August, the government announced the formation of the Construction Exports Advisory Board, whose main task will be to provide a focus for British construction exports and to assist in bringing together the industry's resources to take advantage of overseas opportunities.

More recently, the National Enterprise Board, a body set up by the Labor government to improve the country's industrial performance, has indicated that it is prepared to put together large consortia in order to bid for foreign contracts.

Overseas business is extremely useful, but will not provide a substitute for a strong domestic base, so it is unlikely that the industry will lessen its protestations to the government. Nevertheless, since everyone accepts that the government is constrained in what it can do, the existence of considerable overseas demand for construction work provides an opportunity for British firms to win their own counter-cyclical orders.

Unfortunately, the scope for calling in the New World to redress the balance of the Old is almost inevitably confined to larger firms with the resources to bid for large contracts. For smaller firms in Britain, there is not even a flicker of light at the end of what looks like being a long and foreboding tunnel.

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John Smith

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Gro Chemicals Field Anticipates Steady Growth With North Sea Oil

By Peter Rodgers

ON (HRT)—The British chemical industry is now in a fortunate position of any industry. It is a large and secure supplier of oil on the doorstep, and it is not a light oil that is petroleum chemicals and which is likely to be exported at a price to other chemical producing countries.

First reaction of the industry to the North Sea's promise was euphoric, with comments of back-of-the-envelope estimates of massive expansion in the North of England and Scotland, where the main oil centers already are.

When they get down to it, it quickly became clear, and economic and business that while North Sea oil is likely to stimulate expansion, they will not see a chemicals boom—just a relatively small market—most of the growth will come from exports already being produced.

Little point in following Middle East custom of investment for the sake of it, if that investment does not make for a profit, an aim made forcefully by BP.

Its main plant at mouth, in Scotland, is placed on the east coast of North Sea oil, but it is not a recent thing that it had been worth of investment.

Effect of the North investment is likely to be by 2 or 3-per-cent rise in rate, projected other about 7 per cent annual—years to 1980 on present plans, which and the government want up.

Would not be high by past growth rates, but set British existing industry the fourth in the Western world—a lot of new construction, and generation of high-tech in many related industries.

Effects will be greatest on chemical building blocks to the oil raw material, ethylene. In the last Britain's share of Western ethylene capacity has risen from 30 per cent to 40 per cent, a graphic illustration of the faster growth rates.

One and its oilfield and derivatives will be the aid of a government.



Rowland Wright

encouraged attempt to arrest the decline of the heavy end of the industry—which it must be said is not due to a falling of British companies, but to a restricted home market growth and a tendency among large and successful companies (of which there are quite a few in chemicals) to invest nearer their overseas markets.

Contrary to initial hopes, there is no chance that the North Sea will bring cheaper raw materials for chemical companies through mechanisms like petroleum tax relief. This absence of special treatment is already assumed by all companies, including the North Sea oil majors—like Shell, BP and Esso—which have chemical subsidiaries, and by ICI, which has 18 per cent of the big Ninian field.

Stimulus

The stimulus to investment must come from the security and proximity of supply and from industrial advantages over Continental Western Europe due to a large number of construction sites near deep-water harbors. The long coastline and strong tides may subject to a drawn-out argument about harmonization of pollution regulations with the rest of the EEC—bring a significant economic advantage. The government has accepted conditions make it less necessary to spend the kind of money needed, say, on the Rhine to purify chemical effluent. But the European Commission sees that point of view as an erosion of the principles of equal trading opportunities.

There is another important unknown which will influence the future of the industry. The government has not decided its oil-depletion policy.

This will determine how much longer the oil will flow after 1990, well within the planning period of major new chemicals investment. It is conceivable that continued economic crisis might force a quick draining of the reserves, and an early end to the assured supplies on which chemical plant investment has attracted into the country would be based.

Planning Period

One of the reasons for recent caution about the stimulative effects of the North Sea on chemicals is the unexpected failure of EEC membership to spur additional investment. The chemical industry was among the most vocal proponents of EEC membership on the grounds that a larger market would stimulate investment. But while an enlarged market had that effect among the original Six, it has not yet happened to British chemicals, and nobody has yet explained why.

Is it some insidious British malaise, along the lines of the devastating analysis of the British economy presented last month by Morley Safer, the CBS-TV reporter? He showed a film of Britain which began with an 1870 textile mill clanking away in a pathetic attempt to fill export orders.

That Dickensian view of Britain is not true of the chemical industry, which is one of the strongest performers in the whole economy, dominated by a multinational and successful British-based giant, Imperial Chemical Industries, which accounts for 40 per cent of United Kingdom chemicals production. ICI was briefly the biggest consolidated chemical company in the world a couple of years ago, but the fall of sterling knocked it from its pedestal.

For the past two decades, British chemical output has grown twice as fast as the manufacturing industry as a whole. Net output per head is nearly double the national average, and the trade balance is positive and growing. A \$560-million surplus in 1974 and \$770 million last year, with exports of \$2.3 billion and imports of \$1.4 billion. The industry employs 5 per cent of the British labor force, but supplies three times as high a proportion of investment.

There has been marked success in coping with the disastrous fluctuations in investment which

bedeviled the European industry as a whole in the 1960s, with massive new capacities, ordered in boom times, brought on stream right in the middle of each slump. The British industry increased investment in the slump last year and plans further steady growth this year and next instead of wild fluctuations.

There are however obstacles which the Chemical Industries Association says make the investment future look "distinctly fragile." The chemicals business is extraordinarily sensitive to inflation of plant costs, and cash flow to pay for them was severely hit in recent years by the government's prices legislation, which for technical reasons badly squeezed margins during the boom two years ago.

According to a survey of companies other than ICI, returns on capital averaged nearly 15 per cent in 1974 and 24 per cent in 1975. The public saw a picture of soaring profits. But recalculated on an inflation-adjusted basis, the 1974 return became 4.3 per cent, dropping to 2.4 per cent in 1975.

However, last year the industry benefited from the biggest tax concession ever made by a British government when relief was introduced for stock appreciation in industry as a whole. This helped keep up the planned growth rate. The investment forecast is £2.8 billion over the next three years.

The industry, which because of its success tends to have the ear of government (though nobody will admit it), now sees Britain's high inflation rate as the worst

obstacle to growth, with price controls next.


Prices legislation is likely to be modified in a manner which will help chemicals. During the last boom it was making most of its profits from exports, which are the main target for any additional expansion generated by North Sea oil—but the government realizes that the price squeeze can equally push multinational investment overseas.

That leaves inflation, which in cash terms is expected to triple plant costs between 1970 and 1975. If the rate continues to fall, growth plans will go ahead, and if not, many are likely to be cancelled. It's as simple as that—a decisive point has been reached this year, and companies such as BP Chemicals, Shell and ICI are holding up their spending plans until midsummer to assess the next stage of the anti-inflation policy.

Rowland Wright, the new chairman of ICI, says, "The cross we have to bear as an international trading company is the British rate of inflation."

ICI was particularly squeezed last year by a pretax profit drop of 28 per cent to \$327 million on a turnover of \$2 billion—not because it was badly hit in the slump, except in fibers, but because of the home inflation effect on working capital, which went up \$100 million—and investment costs. Many other European chemical companies did worse in profit terms.

The industry has one other problem which cannot be forgotten, an output-per-head over 20 per cent less than in other EEC countries and half that of the



An oilfield plant of ICI Petrochemicals at Wilton.

United States. Wage differences offset these low levels so the United Kingdom is trading slightly ahead on manpower costs per unit of output. An interesting recent comparison with West Germany showed that the productivity gap did not widen in the 10 years to 1972, while it has with many other British industries. Since the main EEC chemicals competitors are forecasting a fall in growth rates at a time when

Britain has a new growth opportunity because of the North Sea, there is a real and rare chance of catching up on productivity. ICI's planned 30-per-cent reduction in its 15,000 synthetic fibers work force is a case in point. The British chemical industry as a whole is keeping up its record as an innovator with recent successes which include at least two commercially attractive processes for making oil-based or

gas-based proteins for animal feeds, and in pharmaceuticals, new anti-allergy drugs. Income from licenses alone is £40 million a year. Chemicals is an industry which contradicts the folklore about Britain being good at inventions but bad at selling them—and it also happens to be nearly free of strikes.

Peter Rodgers is Industrial Correspondent for The Guardian.

75 an Unusual Year in Insurance

By Richard Redden

ON (HRT)—A few weeks ago Christmas, Continental Union's Nathan Wentworth, speech at a London conference on world insurance, concluded himself "intrigued and amazed" by the amount money Britain's insurance industry had raised from shareholders in 1975 to underwrite their business in spite of the year it proved to be a race generally.

Continental Union's 1975 new share issue in 1974, new capital raised £230 million. This was fiercer than the insurance in the United States, Mr. Wentworth said, there is a very little appetite for capital commitments.

Some financial groups have actually switched out of insurance, but at the highly unusual year of 1975, the question is asked in British industry: how far the new money thrown after how far it really does not a genuine injection of for consolidating and ex-

the strength of Britain's "ties." The issue is still very in doubt. Only at the end of 1974, 10 per cent of shareholder capital percentage of premium income was at dangerously low. Whereas a decade earlier, companies had frequently 100-per-cent "solvency" shareholder capital was to below the 30-per-cent many cases at the operation last year. This was a U.K. minimum requirement of 10 per cent and a Common Market minimum per cent.

Effect of accelerating in premium income plus deep dive in investment meant the capital base eroded at either end, the need for new capital, rising stock prices and effect of lower rates of interest investments to restore the capital base year were on. By the end year, most of the companies had margins of around the cent level, in spite of British record inflation for the year per cent. But the signs of erosion were still there. It helped also was the fact Britain was about the only underwriting profitability heavy losses were reported the world's other leading

territories. Although most figures are not yet in for last year, it is estimated that Britain's seven major stock-exchange quoted general insurers—Commercial Union, Royal, General Accident, Sun Alliance and London, General, and Phoenix—will record a marginal surplus on U.K. underwriting of £1 million. Contrast this to the United States, where some \$4.5 billion is believed to have been lost last year.

But for several British companies, their U.S. business ranks in volume terms with their British business. In fact, two companies, Commercial Union and Royal, do much more of their business in the United States than here. In Royal's case it is twice as much and in Commercial Union's case, 1 1/2 times as much. Three of the other quoted companies also have a big involvement—General Accident, Phoenix through the Continental's business pool, and Sun Alliance, partly through the Chubb pool.

Underwriting

The British companies have historically had worse underwriting records in the United States than their U.S. counterparts. This is partly due to their administrative fragmentation and partly to their geographical spread of business, which is too concentrated in the Northeastern states. But while they suffered last year, they seem to have come out rather better than average. Only one company, Commercial Union, had an absolute disaster, with some \$100 million of underwriting losses, not including another \$30 million set aside for the ruthless pruning it is now conducting of its U.S. operation. Royal lost \$68 million and General Accident \$24 million, but in these cases, the year showed a steady improvement and loss-and-expense ratios were contained at or below the average. The others have yet to report, but it is estimated that total British losses in the United States may approach \$200 million, against \$115 million in 1974.

Worldwide, the anticipated underwriting loss of the British companies last year was around \$140 million, or 4 per cent of premiums. More importantly, in terms of safeguarding the capital base, retained earnings after dividend payouts were only about \$25 million, or 8 per cent of premiums. This year will be better, but by how much? Even the most optimistic figures sug-

gest that the underwriting loss can only be reduced to 1 per cent, which would mean that retained earnings would finance only about 30 per cent of premium growth—again not enough to maintain the capital base. But perhaps all things are relative. It is still much better than the U.S. situation. And after all, Britain's insurance industry—the companies, Lloyd's of London and the brokers—still remain the country's leading net earner of invisibles.

The capital-base problem is also making itself felt at Lloyd's, which settles its accounts three years in arrears. The problems of the U.S. market have led to a strong flow of transatlantic business into Lloyd's, which admits it is now facing problems in handling it all.

One area where British and U.S. insurance do not mix is life insurance, although U.S. financial groups such as ITT own some of the new and often smaller, British life companies. But now one giant U.S. life insurer, Prudential of America, is dipping into the British market through the acquisition of a 9 1/2-per-cent stake in one of the most blue-blooded of London merchant banks, Hambros. The significant thing is that Hambros is the controlling shareholder in the Hambros Life company, which last year showed the biggest rise of all in British life insurance premiums—76 per cent. Hambros Life is run by South African lawyer Mark Weinberg, one of the entrepreneurial whiz-kids of British life insurance. It could be that Prudential wants to get a slice of the action. Certainly, British life insurance proved its strength last year by recovering spectacularly from the investment crash. In spite of the recession, it is doing record business, with premium growth outstripping Britain's inflation rate. It may well be that some of Prudential's U.S. competitors are also casting fresh eyes on the British market.

Britain's Department of Trade has conducted a big and much-needed legislative cleanup after a string of minor life-company collapses in the investment slump. But the effect means that no small company will ever have enough capital to start up a life insurance operation from scratch because of the stringent asset-valuation laws. The way is wide open for the thriving overseas group.

Richard Redden is Insurance Correspondent for The Guardian.

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Steel's Struggle With Management, Labor and Production Problem

By Peter Rodgers

LONDON (IHT)—Even the strongest British supporters of nationalization are beginning to feel a touch of schizophrenia when they contemplate the series of crises which have afflicted the steel industry over the last 18 months.

Until a year or two ago the British Steel Corp. had powerful excuses for the continuing problems of weak finances, slow modernization, high costs, strikes and inability to deliver enough steel which have dogged it since it was set up in 1967.

Labor and Tory governments repeatedly interfered in the corporation's modernization and closure plans, which were called in for review and rewriting. They also used steel prices as a tool of economic management to such an extent that the retiring chairman, Sir Monty Finniston, was driven in January to claim that unrealistic pricing imposed by the government had cost £750 million between nationalization and British entry to the European Economic Community.

At one stage in 1974 British industry was getting an indirect subsidy through taxpayer support to the BSC of up to 35 per cent on steel bills—the extent to which steel prices were held down at a time when demand was booming.

The boom sucked in large quantities of imports because underinvestment in sensitive areas was compounded by the understandable problems of the miners' strike and the three-day week from which the corporation recovered surprisingly quickly. Shortage of capacity allowed Japan to slip in and supply much of the large-diameter pipe for bringing North Sea oil ashore, while the motor industry kept running into supply problems with one of its most basic materials, steel sheet.

Poor Legacy

Nevertheless the corporation was barely six years old and many of its failings could be forgiven. The take-over of 14 privately owned steel companies had been a difficult task for which the history of steel this century left a poor legacy, diminished further by a totally ineffective and quickly reversed nationalization in 1949.

Prof. John Vaisey, author of "History of British Steel," called it an unconsummated marriage by rape. The companies became extraordinarily cautious about their investment programs during the 1950s and did not foresee the car and consumer booms. Steel ended the decade "without adequate entrepreneurial leadership: with a major lack of competent managerial personnel except in certain firms like United Steel; a relative lack of scientists and engineers; a group of plants which were already well out of date compared with those built in Europe and the United States, and a labor force which had been protected from the industrial logic of the mergers which had rationalized many other industries."

It was not even a case of British postwar decline, because the steel industry in Britain has consistently lagged behind the United States and West Germany since late Victorian times. The task of the new corporation under its first chairman, the late Lord Melchett, was awesome.

Modernization

It was made worse because within two years the new Conservative government of 1970 played with the idea of returning the corporation to the private sector and splitting it up at a time when modernization plans were beginning to take shape. The Conservative idea was dropped but reviews of the corporation by ministers and civil servants delayed publication of the 10-year, £2,500-million development plan (now costing over £5,000 million) until 1973. This was not without some good effects, because in their original form the production targets were too ambitious and could have led to disaster.

Then when Labor returned to office in 1974, one of the first actions of the new secretary for industry, Anthony Wedgwood Benn, was to suspend the closure of elderly high-cost steelworks, to which much of the modernization program was linked. The results of this second review led last year to revivification of several plants for some of the older plants, largely concentrated in run-down areas of high unemployment and particularly in Wales.



Sir Charles Villiers



Sir Monty Finniston

employment and particularly in Wales.

The final stage of the review has not been announced even yet. This concerns the town of Shotton in North Wales, which presents a heart-rending and typical problem, because its economy is largely steel-based. The corporation wants to close steel-making leaving only

finishing works, with the loss of 6,600 jobs, and make up the production at a new plant at Port Talbot in South Wales. Shotton workers have produced an impressive defense brief, acknowledging that 2,000 jobs must go anyway, which has won substantial support. It is based on the overall cost including welfare payments of the drastic change involved for the town, together with an attack on the BSC's own estimates of the savings from closure (which is not due to take place before 1980).

Meanwhile, the new investment for Port Talbot is held up.

This illustrates the dilemma, or if you like the schizophrenia, which is affecting supporters of state ownership. The BSC is Britain's dominant steel producer, with only the Sheffield-based special steel companies left largely in private hands. There was strong logic behind nationalization. But since then the corporation has behaved like a giant private corporation, trying to integrate disparate units and modernize itself, with the inevitable threat to jobs in areas of high unemployment. The dilemma is felt strongly even though the corporation has behaved far better than any private-sector employer in its social policies, giving a minimum two years notice of closure and now—through government action—up to six years. It has also set up with admirable foresight special units to attract new industry into areas where steel plants are being run down.

Saving Jobs

However, because state ownership amplifies the social and political pressures on the corporation, particularly when many threatened jobs are in Labor constituencies, the government has been forced to intervene to save jobs. That very intervention, which in some respects has proved justified, has compromised the objective of nationalization—stated again recently by management and unions together as to transform it into a "profitable, high wage, high productivity industry comparable to its major European competitors."

It is against this chaotic backdrop that the events of the last 18 months have been played out on two closely related fronts, production and labor relations.

The BSC has been unable even in the slump to supply all its customers, particularly in the motor industry. Worse, the corporation won £70 million in government support last year for a special 800,000-ton counter-cyclical stockpile to keep up employment in the slump, which was due to be provided by the end of March. In the event it has only managed half of that, confirming union claims that the original BSC plant closure plan might have left industry short of steel in the next boom. That claim can backfire on the unions because while the steel industry invested 2 1/2 times the national average a year per employee in the decade to 1973, its manpower productivity has been rising more slowly than average—which confirms that even the existing plant is poorly used and overmanned.

On the labor relations side there has been a tragedy-comedy, which led last month to the fall of Sir Monty in favor of a new chairman, City banker Sir Charles Villiers, who in the 1960s ran Labor's Industrial Reorganization Corp.

Basic Problem

Most agree that one of the corporation's basic problems is overmanning, with a work force of nearly 230,000 which should be 40,000 or 50,000 smaller. Real net output per head rose only 20 per cent from 1963 to 1973, half as fast as manufacturing industry generally, not surprising in view of the inheritance from the private sector. Some successful big new investments such as the £240-million Scunthorpe steelworks (actually conceived before nationalization) were coming into production, but they were not enough to make up for the old plant which includes a large proportion of ancient open hearth furnaces.

A year ago, Sir Monty was frustrated by the delays to the closure program and by losses which eventually rose to £8 million a week, with a financial year loss of about £250 million expected to be announced this spring. He suddenly said he wanted to get rid of 20,000 workers in a year, and the same again as soon as possible afterward.

There was bedlam. Mr. Benn intervened and told off Sir Monty publicly. Within weeks



British Steel plant at Redcar under construction.

Sir Monty came away from a series of union meetings without the sackings but with an agreement designed to reduce labor costs by £100 million a year.

A second round of talks followed when the promises were not met, and more concessions were secured from the unions, who all along made it plain that they were as anxious as the corporation management to secure a viable future for the industry—but they did not take kindly to surprise tactics.

In November Sir Monty started the country by coming back yet again with a complaint that savings were only running at £75 million a year, and he said that the target would also have to go up to £170 million. There was almost disbelief when once again he said that he

wanted 40,000 layoffs over two years.

A month later he threatened to introduce unilaterally everything which—because of plant-level resistance—the unions had been unprepared to concede.

In marathon talks over six weeks, held on the brink of a national steel strike, the two sides eventually settled on an overall cut of 23,000 over two years, little more than half the target.

Bluster

The bluster of these negotiations, against the background of a pay dispute which delayed operation of a new blast furnace at Llanwern in South Wales for nine months, strained the corporation's public credibility to the limit, and

lost it many of its natural friends, with a much less modernization plan and a dereliction of union respect and suspicion. It faces a real steel boom which will test its managerial limits. Steel production in the last boom was seriously national bottleneck was actually lower than at time of nationalization.

Eric Varley, the new secretary for industry, said recently: "I don't want to underestimate difficulties in the steel industry are great and it will be a long time before we get the internationally competitive industry that we all want."

More than eight years nationalization it is no good enough to harp on the difficulties or on the chaos there might otherwise have been.



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Assembly Is Sore Spot of Generally Healthy Automotive Field

Victor Keegan

(IHT)—If had public an accurate barometer, then Britain's industry would have to be the worst in

British Leyland, the vehicle manufacturer, is a third of the U.K. to be nationalised. A £1-billion (about \$1.2 billion) rescue operation, which will cost as much as £160 million, owned by General Motors, would have found it survive without the parent company.

Yet such bad news has obscured the fact that although assembly gets 90 per cent less than 20 per cent industry as a whole, up most clearly in balance-of-payments areas imports of passenger cars exceeded exports of £31 million.

rest of the industry, commercial vehicles are extremely successful. As a result, the overall surplus jumped to £15 million.

ment on the previous year. As one cynic, if only the rest of industry had performed as well as the auto industry, the country had an enormous surplus in record deficit.

mentation

ons behind Britain's automobile manu- are contained in the of the world industry last five decades, most other countries, the United States, the firms in the 1920s a economies of scale

and became the dominant firms of today, in Britain fragmentation continued until very recently. British Leyland, Vauxhall and Chrysler are all amalgamations of a large number of smaller companies whose identities have still not been buried. British Leyland has no less than 37 plants, and because of fragmentation, has never earned enough money to lay down large new plants which would enable it to reap large-scale economies. Instead, the old factories of companies like Austin, Morris, Triumph, Rover and Jaguar continue producing under the banner of British Leyland.

Although industrial disputes and bad utilization of existing machinery are acknowledged constraints on the short-term performance of the assembly side of the industry, there is little doubt that lack of capital investment is the biggest long-term problem. Recent figures show that value added per man and fixed assets per man were four times as high at General Motors in the United States as at British Leyland. Other figures (which have been strongly disputed) showed that the per-capita production rate in Japan was 37 vehicles a year and on the Continent of Europe 12 vehicles; yet in Britain the comparable figures were six for British Leyland and only nine for Ford U.K., generally considered the most efficient British manufacturer.

During a recent investigation by a committee of the House of Commons, British Leyland was said to have the oldest plant of any large manufacturer in the world.

Much of the machinery at Ford's Dagenham plant was said to be over 40 years old. In some cases, toolmakers were still using antiquated presses and equipment imported from Detroit during the 1930s. Predictably, the committee concluded that inadequate investment and the lower productivity of older plants "have been the greatest contributors to the poor profitability of the mass-production car side of the industry."

It was partly for this reason that the government stepped in last year with rescue plans for British Leyland and Chrysler U.K. In both cases, the injection of state funds is dependent on the companies showing signs of increased efficiency. The Chrysler rescue involves the group increasing its capital expenditure and reducing its work force from 25,000 to 17,000. British Leyland's money, which is aimed at expanding investment, is currently being held back by the government until industrial relations have shown signs of sustained improvement.

By contrast, the government has not been forced to put any money into the rest of the automotive industry, which is continuing to strengthen its position this year. The latest figures show that in the first two months of the new year, despite a £10-million deficit on automobiles, the balance of payments of the automotive industry rose 28 per cent to £288 million. Exports of commercial vehicles (where Britain moved into the European lead last year ahead of France and Germany) rose 37 per cent in January-February compared with a year earlier and exports of components and accessories went up 25 per cent.

The main reason for the success of the component industries may also be structural. Unlike many of its overseas competitors, the British auto-parts industry is not nearly so vertically integrated. As a result, strong independent companies like GKN, Joseph Lucas, Dunlop and Automotive Products have been able to develop a separate existence, enabling them to utilize large-scale economies. In the past, the vehicle assemblers have actually encouraged the development of a strong components industry, which has enabled them to rely on "bought out" components at a cheaper price than would have been the case if they had relied

on in-house production. Thus, whereas GM in the United States buys out only 46 per cent of the material cost of a car, its British subsidiary, Vauxhall, buys out 85 per cent. The British industry, except for Ford, even relies on outside suppliers for forgings and castings, which are almost invariably an internal activity abroad.

The independence of the U.K. supplying industry has also enabled it to form independent judgments about future trends in the market and on diversification toward exports in order to insulate itself from the "stop-go" economic policies of successive governments. It is perhaps more

than a sign of the times that GKN (which admittedly has other interests, as well as motor components) made £19 million pre-tax profit in 1974, which was more than eight times the entire profit of the motor-assembly industry. Indeed, in each of the last five years, GKN has made more profit than the combined total of Ford, British Leyland, Vauxhall and Chrysler. The only British motor assembler which has consistently improved its profit record over this period is Rolls Royce, for which the energy crisis produced a bonanza in the form of rich oil sheikhs anxious to acquire status symbols in keeping with their new wealth.

Britain's commercial-vehicle industry last year doubled its balance-of-payments surplus to nearly £3.5 million. This was partly due to traditional U.K. expertise in making all except the heaviest trucks, but also reflected the fact that three of the multinational truck exporters, General Motors, Chrysler and Ford, have concentrated many of their activities in Britain. Last year may have been an exceptional one in that the worldwide recession tended to favor sales of the less heavy type

of vehicle rather than the larger type that is mainly made on the Continent.

So, Britain faces the rest of the year with its automotive industry doing well on most activities except the final assembly of automobiles. This is in spite of the fact that economists are raising their predictions of home-market auto sales from 1.1 million units at the beginning of the year to 1.2 or 1.3 million units now. British Leyland, which made an operating profit in January and February (compared with a loss of over £12 million last year) had a relapse at the end of last month when a strike of less than 24 carmaker workers brought most of the operations to a near standstill and even caused a run on sterling. This has given fresh credence to some minority forecasts that Ford, which normally takes around 25 per cent of sales compared with British Leyland's 33 per cent, might actually become the market leader by the end of the year. Ford is greatly helped by the arrival of its new "mini" model at a time when lack of capital has prevented British Leyland from launching a replacement for its own "Mini" range, which was for over a decade the market leader.

Automobile imports are expected to continue to capture around 33 per cent of sales. This compares with a penetration of only 5 per cent less than 10 years ago. Although importers are often selling superior products at a competitive price, one of the reasons for their success is also the inability of the domestic manufacturers to expand their production to meet demand. Importers have much higher stocks and are able to make cars available when domestic shortages emerge.

Meanwhile, the big four manufacturers, British Leyland, Chrysler, Ford and Vauxhall, are fighting each other for a domestic automobile market that most observers think is too small to sustain profitable operations for all four. Their fight for survival will doubtless continue to dominate the headlines while the rest of the industry will go on being quietly efficient, making enough money to offset the losses made by the assemblers. There must be a moral somewhere.

Victor Keegan is Business Editor of The Guardian.

...Bad publicity has obscured the fact that

last year was unquestionably one of the

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Good Beginning

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By Clive Woodcock

MANCHESTER (IHT)—Last year was a year that most of the engineering industry in the United Kingdom would prefer to forget. Unfortunately, prospects for the industry make it impossible to say that this year will be a good year.

The latest sales and order figures show that at the end of last year the order books of the industry were at their lowest level since 1971. Domestic order books fell during the year by 25 per cent and export orders outstanding by 19 per cent.

New orders came in at a rate lower than in any year since 1969. The one bright spot was that in December orders in hand for export were still higher than the low points recorded in the 1971-72 recession. Orders from the home market were the worst for eight years.

Most engineering sectors do, however, seem to have reached

the bottom of the trough but equally most of them are faced with staying in that position for most of this year.

There have been reports that volatile sections of the industry such as machine tools and fork lift trucks have seen small recovery signs but these are unlikely to be very firm.

Machine Tools

The first half of the year in fact looks like being very difficult for the machine tool sector, taking into account the announcement earlier in the year by British Leyland that it was suspending all capital spending for at least three months.

Added to this has been the chilling realization that Chrysler will probably be closing down plants as part of the rationalization program aimed at bringing that company back to viability. The planned reductions in public spending are also likely to have a ripple effect on machine tools,

with the lighter end being most affected.

Companies at the heavier end, particularly the specialist manufacturers such as those supplying the coal and oil industries, are expected to fare rather better and business for them should not be too bad.

The best prospect open to machine tool makers is in export markets, where they can take advantage of the fall in the value of the pound. This sector has in the past actually been a successful exporter in spite of the problems which occur when demand builds up to a peak. Last year, for example, exports rose by a third to reach a record of £160 million.

Machine tools is a sector which the government is trying to help with aid to bring forward investment and modernization projects.

Another key indicator of the health of the engineering industry is bearings, a sector which has invested heavily in capacity for volume output and needs to

be working at close to 70 per cent of capacity to break even. The firms which are currently managing to reach 60 per cent are doing well in comparison with others.

Little improvement in this sector is anticipated before the end of this year and possibly not even until the start of next. The first half of the year could well see more people losing their jobs.

Even within this sector, however, there are contradictions, with cases being reported of differences inside a single plant with the general engineering side depressed and facing redundancies while the section producing bearings for the aerospace industry is heavily loaded with work.

The recession is also hitting the heavier end of the engineering industry with, for example, fewer process plant manufacturers with work for more than a year ahead. The process plant sector expects lower home demand this year and for the early part of next year

than had previously been forecast.

Most firms in this sector have work for the next six months but that percentage is dropping. Some companies have been experiencing a drop in overseas orders, especially from the Middle East and Eastern Europe.

One of the reasons for this could be that British companies do not appear to be taking part in joint ventures in countries in the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, a course followed by several overseas competitors. Such consortia have been successful in winning a number of orders recently.

Process plant companies whose production is aimed at the chemical and steel industries, the energy development program, or for export to OPEC countries and some other areas are, however, likely to remain busy this year

and probably for the early part of next year.

Those which depend on public authority spending face tight order books in the near future and will probably not be able to expand production until recovery in the world economy becomes more firmly established.

A recent report on mechanical engineering in general suggested that although aggregate statistics showed an order book stretching several months ahead, this masked the serious position in which some manufacturers were now finding themselves.

It also ignored the distribution of the remaining workload between departments within individual companies. Hope is also expressed that if the British Leyland re-equipment gets off the ground soon, benefits will accrue from that.

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(Continued on Page 20)

Engineering, After Bad Year in 1975, Keeps Grim Outlook

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
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
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Competition by Imports Takes Heavy Toll on the Textile Industry

By Clive Woodcock

MANCHESTER (INT.)—The recovery of the United Kingdom's textile industry from the worst recession it has suffered for 30 years cannot yet be said to be under way, but it is clear that the long grind along the bottom of the cycle is nearing its end.

The most encouraging signs so far this year have been improvements in production reported by the upstream sectors of wool, cotton, and man-made fibers in January—the latest figures available—and the indications are that progress has continued since.

In that month, for example, single-yarn output in the cotton and allied sectors reached its highest level since June of last year, while stocks of yarn held by spinners fell. In addition, the volume of unfilled orders showed a sizable growth for the second successive month.

In spite of these indicators of better things to come, the most

prominent news of the last two months has been that some of the bigger companies in the industry have run into difficulties. The length and depth of the recession, combined with pressure from imports, has taken its toll.

Workers Laid Off

The recent announcement by ICI one of Britain's largest companies, that its fiber division will reduce its work force by as much as 30 per cent shows how severely the textile decline has hit synthetic fiber producers. Another fiber producer, British Bakalon—63 per cent owned by the Dutch group AKZO—has reduced its labor force by 25 per cent in the last year.

Most fiber producers have been operating at about 70 per cent of capacity, some at as little as 30 per cent, for some time. Although the break-even point of highly capital-intensive fiber plants has been reduced in recent years,

working close to capacity is still necessary to make profits.

But though companies such as these have suffered severely, they have a basic strength which enables them to ride out the storm more successfully than medium-sized and small companies. The smaller firms have borne the brunt of the recession, and many have gone out of business, further reducing the size of the British industry, though it remains the largest in Europe.

It has been the medium-sized firms that fell by the wayside in the last two months. Though some of their problems have been of their own making, there is no doubt that continued heavy pressure from imports has played a significant part in their downfall, along with the recession.

Pleas by the industry last year for import controls were largely ignored by the government, and the action that was taken was regarded by the industry as grossly inadequate. Some of the sit-

Although exports from Britain were declining as a result of the recession, imports...

were holding up well, thus increasing their penetration of the market.

uations now arising appear to fulfill warnings given by the industry.

A factor which particularly worried the industry was that although exports from Britain were declining as a result of the recession, imports into Britain were holding up well, thus increasing their penetration of the market.

One of the reasons for this situation was and is that Britain not only still has what is probably the most liberal import policy in the world for textiles, especially from developing countries—though

West Germany is not far behind in this respect—but also, the structure of the market in Britain lends itself to easy penetration.

The producer who wants to sell into the United Kingdom finds one of the most concentrated and highly developed channels of distribution and retailing in the world.

As a result, orders can be secured for national distribution simply by a salesman making a relatively small number of calls in London. To achieve compar-

able coverage in the far more fragmented markets of countries such as France, many times as many calls would have to be made in different centers around the country.

The effects of this centralization are to some extent shown by the balance-of-trade figures for the British textile industry last year, which resulted in the largest deficit ever recorded, a figure seven times worse than that of the previous year.

In cash terms the deficit rose from £22 million to £224 million, though the situation did show signs of improvement in the last quarter of the year. Not until 1973 had the British textile industry recorded a deficit in its balance of trade. Until then surpluses had been healthy.

The sharp increase in the deficit last year arose almost entirely from the slump in exports. In 1975 Britain sold \$963.5 million worth of textile goods to the rest of the world, a fall of 14 per cent from the figure of \$1.12 billion for the previous year.

At the same time imports registered an increase of 3 per cent, taking import penetration from 21.15 billion to a record high of \$1.19 billion.

Clothing Weak

Within the industry figures, the main point of weakness is the clothing sector, where imports rose by more than 25 per cent to a peak of \$505 million. Exports by this sector also rose sharply, by 15 per cent, to reach \$365 million. Overall the trade deficit was an abysmal \$239 million, a rise of 39 per cent.

In the last quarter of the year, clothing imports actually rose by 50 per cent compared with the corresponding period of the previous year. It was only because the rest of the textile industry was able to earn a small surplus of \$15 million that the overall deficit was held to \$234 million.

This deficit in the clothing trade is of long standing, and it has for some time been the performance of the rest of the textile industry which has either held the trade balance in surplus or cut back the deficit.

The problem of the clothing sector over a long period has been of low investment leading to low productivity, resulting in low profits, which means that the

cash has not been available for the capital spending needed to break out of the circle.

Some improvement in this situation has been evident in the last year, and the rise in exports is an indication of this.

Government Loans

In an attempt to put the clothing sector on a sounder footing, the government last year made available £30 million in grants and loans for approved schemes of rationalization and investment. The companies who qualify for government money will still have to find the major part of the finances required to carry out the plans they put forward.

There has been a considerable response so far, and the scheme could have a significant effect on the performance of the clothing sector in the years to come, though whether it will affect performance in the upswing to come is debatable.

A similar scheme was started for the wool-textile sector a few years ago and has been so successful that it was extended last year. The clothing scheme is based on it. Wool textiles, however, have always been strong, exporting more than a third of their £700-million-a-year sales.

This is not to say that the British textile industry has been slow in investing in recent years. In fact, the trend in capital spending over the last decade has been strongly upward, averaging \$145 million a year since 1970. The textile industry has invested proportionately more than the rest of British industry.

As a result, the industry now has a high-technology, capital-intensive base, though there are still exceptions such as clothing. Furthermore, the output rate of textiles compared with the rest of the manufacturing industry has been rising sharply. Since 1968 the output rate in textiles has risen by 7.1 per cent, compared with 4.3 per cent for the manufacturing industry as a whole.

In spite of that, the industry has been running up an increasing trade deficit and still finds it difficult to withstand the pressure of imports. One factor in this situation is the political pricing of some imported goods, either for the purpose of obtain-

ing foreign currency or giving a foothold in the market.

Countries such as Taiwan have come in for criticism from the industry. Paradoxically, countries which have their own textile industry in the hands of British firms.

In fact the success of British textile-manufacturing in regularly meeting its balance-of-payments obligations seems to have a direct ship to the pressure on textile manufacturers from imports. Big imports from Turkey, for example, have a year or two after it chases by those with British textile machinery.

EEC Action

The limitations on imports posed last year by the Economic Community's plan to bite this year, which manufacturers' space in which to gear up next boom.

In addition, exporters have to start withdrawing to more profitable markets. This change will mean sharper cuts for British exporters to regain their previous port levels.

The United Kingdom has not yet regained its unemployment is still in trend. Consumer spending is more than 1974 level, real earnings are likely to fall throughout. These are the factors which hold any major recovery until later in the year.

Output levels should improve in the year. The price rises imposed by the manufacturers seem to be. But the industry will not really take off until the quarter of the year.

Recovery is, however, be strong when it does because of the low level. It will probably be led by the synthetic-fiber sector. It will see the recovery strength, and the peak cycle is expected in 1978.

Clive Woodcock is the *International Herald Tribune* Manchester Correspondent.

Engineering Industry Is Seen Facing Another Grim Year

(Continued from Page 19)

marked effect on order levels for the industry as a whole.

One worrying factor which affects the export opportunities for British industry is its poor reputation for delivery. This is pushing up the cost of export business because overseas customers are increasingly demanding bid and performance bonds and back guarantees, the cost of which of course is paid for by the British exporter. This, however, is a situation of Britain's own making and one which only Britain can remedy.

In spite of this problem, however, engineering industry sales to export markets last year were higher than in any year since 1969. In fact there was a rise of 40 per cent in the surplus in exports over the previous year in value, an increase which cannot be explained even by Britain's painful rate of inflation during the year. Clearly there was a substantial increase in volume as well.

Major contributors to this surplus on the engineering balance of trade were wheeled tractors, internal combustion engines, con-

struction and mining machinery and textile machinery. This last sector achieved a record surplus of \$147 million, in the process probably adding unintentionally to the problems of textile manufacturers.

But looking ahead, there are further problems in that although Britain's rate of inflation is slowing substantially it is considerably more than that of its major competitors and even the fall in the value of the pound is not sufficient compensation.

This causes difficulties for sectors whose business involves them in anticipating cost increases for contracts where delivery is spread over a period of years. Last year these companies often added an inflation allowance of 1.5 to 2 per cent a month in their tenders for long-term contracts. The result was that the orders went elsewhere.

Delivery and price are therefore two factors which make exporting an uphill struggle for British companies. But there is a third factor which is of major importance and is probably a significant reason for the performance of the engineering industry in export

markets last year. And that factor is technology.

Those firms, and they are far from being few in number, which can show a technological lead have been able to obtain orders around the world even in spite of the recession. On the other hand there are instances where firms have won through on price and delivery rather than technology.

Tipper Gear

An example of this is Eibro, a manufacturer of tipper gear for trucks, who have won domination of a number of markets around the world or else a very large share of the markets for a product in which technology is probably in third place in the list of important factors. Competitive price and delivery have instead given them the edge.

Although the engineering industry is bumping along the bottom of the trough, its leaders are looking ahead at the recovery and becoming increasingly concerned that some of the problems which affected the performance of the industry in the

last boom are going to be repeated.

Already looming in their minds are the shortages of raw materials, components, and skilled labor as well as working capital which could materialize as recovery gathers momentum.

Liquidity and cash flow problems which had eased in recent months are even now starting to reappear. In the last boom, engineering companies were sometimes forced to turn down orders simply because they were reluctant to build up additional bank debts. Foreign competitors were the beneficiaries.

One interesting facet of the recession has been the lengths to which companies have been prepared to go to retain skilled labor. The tendency has been instead to make redundancies among staff and indirect workers while holding onto production workers.

Skilled Workers

Engineering companies have learned the hard way that redundancies among the skilled workers not only cause bad feel-



ing among those who remain but also make it virtually impossible to recruit the people who were dismissed when demand begins to revive.

The scale of the problem becomes evident when in a growing number of areas firms find it difficult to find sufficient skilled workers to meet their needs even when conditions are depressed. Shortage of skilled labor has become a problem second only to shortage of orders.

It is very easy in the space of a short article to overemphasize the problems which face, and the gloom which surrounds, many sectors of the engineering industry. But there are areas where business has been running strongly throughout the recession and looks like continuing—such as agricultural equipment and mining machinery, to name but two.

The industry shares the problems of Britain as a whole but they are far from insoluble. In fact the weather forecast for engineering could be described as: "The rain has stopped and the immediate outlook remains cloudy with patches of sunshine which will spread later."

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Index of Summary of Sonnenfeldt's Remarks on Eastern Europe

TON (NYT). — Here is the State Department summary of remarks made by Sonnenfeldt, counselor to the deputy assistant secretary in Europe.

pressing the emergence of the as a superpower on a global will be a long-term process. That is just beginning in as the Soviets are just now of their continental mold. They developing modalities for carry a global policy.

why it is possible for the United States to have a policy that will allow us to cope with the Soviet power is regularly. It is subject to flaws remnants which in some cases de world can meet.

as an imperial power comes at after the period when the last Germany, made the plunge, comes at a time when different receptions apply. The Soviets have not been able to attract to their conquests. They fight the ideological, legal, cultural, organizational and other skills that characterized the and German adventures.

Pressures, Tensions. There are serious underlying tensions in the Soviet system

from which imperialism asserts dous problems in the economic stors. There are also internal vups which are growing. Non-omunist groups in Russia are disproportionately faster rate, d to these tensions in the base s Soviet imperialism.

s have been particularly unding viable international struc- have nothing approaching the munity or the many other tern institutions. In Eastern ularly, the single most impor- force is the presence of sheer y power. There has been no of a more viable, organized, the last 30 years have inten-



Helmut Sonnenfeldt

sified the urges in Eastern European countries for autonomy, for identity. There has been an intensification of the desire to break out of the Soviet straitjacket. This has happened in every Eastern European country to one degree or another. There are almost no genuine friends of the Soviets left in Eastern Europe, except possibly Bulgaria.

'Sheer Power'

The Soviets' inability to acquire loyalty in Eastern Europe is an unfortunate historical failure, because Eastern Europe is within their scope and area of natural interest. It is doubly tragic that in this area of vital interest and crucial importance it has not been possible for the Soviet Union to establish roots of interest that go beyond sheer power.

It is, therefore, important to remember that the main, if not the only, instrument of Soviet imperialism has been power.

The reason we can today talk and think in terms of dealing with Soviet imperialism, outside of and in addition to simple confrontation, is precisely because Soviet power is emerging in such a flawed way. This gives us the time to develop and to react. There is no way to prevent the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower. What

we can do is affect the way in which that power is developed and used. Not only can we balance it in the traditional sense, but we can affect its usage—and that is what détente is all about.

It is often asked how détente is doing. The question itself evades the central issue we are trying to pose, that is, what do you do in the face of increasing Soviet power? We will be facing this increased power if our relationship with the Russians is sweet or our relationship with the Russians is sour. The day when the United States could choose its preferences from two alternatives is over; That is, turning our back on the world—usually behind the protection of another power like the British Navy—or changing the world.

Choice Is Gone

That choice no longer exists for us. There is too much power in the world for us to ignore, not just the Soviets, but other industrial powers, raw material producers, and even the combined political power of the dwarf states. Nor do we today have enough power to simply overwhelm these powers.

So the Soviets will be seen and heard on the world stage no matter what we do. Therefore, the question of whether or not détente is up or down at a particular moment is largely irrelevant. We Americans like to keep scorecards, but the historic challenge of the Soviet Union will not go away and the problem of coping with the effects of that growing Soviet power also won't go away.

We don't have any alternative except to come to grips with the various forms of power which surround us in the world. We have to get away from seeing détente as a process which appeases or propitiates Soviet power. We have to see our task as managing or domesticating this power.

That is our central problem in the years ahead, not finding agreements to sign or atmospheres to improve, although those have some effect. Our challenge is how to live in a world with another superpower, and anticipate the arrival of a third superpower, China, in 20 years or so.

Trade Strategy

The debate in the United States on détente is illustrated by comments that Soviet trade is a one-way street. It seems that today you can't just get payment for the goods you

sell—you must get Jewish emigration, or arms restraint, or any number of other things.

Our European friends have extended considerable credit to the Soviets and Eastern European countries, while the U.S. does not extend lines of credit but, rather, approves financing on the basis of each project. That feature gives us some control over the direction of Soviet economic development. The Europeans have surrendered on this point. While not falling into the trade trap, we have seen trade as a set of instrumentalities to address the set of problems we face with the Soviets. We have to find a way to develop a coherent trade strategy that goes beyond the commercial views of individual firms.

The grain agreement is a good but narrow example of what I am talking about. The Soviets were forced to accept that they need substantial imports from the United States. That gives us leverage, but only if it is done within a coherent framework of policies to achieve certain objectives. MFN [most-favored-nation] treatment has been considered a concession to the U.S.S.R., and in a sense it is. The Soviets don't like paying interest—they prefer to earn their way as they go.

If this is an accurate assessment, then with MFN and credit policies we can get the U.S.S.R. to be competitively engaged in our U.S. markets. If done skillfully, this forces them to meet the requirements of the sophisticated U.S. market. MFN entry into U.S. markets can have an impact on Soviet behavior. This is not a trivial matter.

Consumer Choices

It is in our long-term interests to use these strengths to break down the antichain nature of the U.S.S.R. There are consumer choices being made in the U.S.S.R. that, although more below the surface than those in the United States, can be exploited.

This is just one illustration. There are many assets in the West in this area and instead of looking at them as just commercial sales, we need to be using them to draw the Soviet Union into a series of dependencies and ties with the West. It is a long-term project.

When we lost the MFN battle with Congress, we lost our ability to impose a degree of discipline on the Soviet Union, as we were able to do in the case of the grain

'So, our policy must be a policy of responding to the clearly visible aspirations in Eastern Europe for a more autonomous existence within the context of a strong Soviet geopolitical influence.'

deal. This is the real tragedy of losing that trade issue. In the long term, we have suffered a setback.

With regard to Eastern Europe, it must be in our long-term interest to influence events in this area—because of the present unnatural relationship with the Soviet Union—so that they will not sooner or later explode, causing World War III. This inorganic, unnatural relationship is a far greater danger to world peace than the conflict between East and West. There is one qualification to this statement. If Western Europe becomes so concerned with its economic and social problems that an imbalance develops, then perhaps the dangers to the United States' interests will be endangered by the simple change in the balance of power.

So it must be our policy to strive for an evolution that makes the relationship between the Eastern Europeans and the Soviet Union an organic one. Any excess of zeal on our part is bound to produce results that could reverse the desired process for a period of time, even though the process would remain inevitable within the next 100 years. But, of course, for us that is too long a time to wait.

Social Experiments

So, our policy must be a policy of responding to the clearly visible aspirations in Eastern Europe for a more autonomous existence within the context of a strong Soviet geopolitical influence. This has worked in Poland. The Poles have been able to overcome their romantic political inclinations which led to their disasters in the past. They have been skillful in developing a policy

that is satisfying their needs for a national identity without arousing Soviet reactions. It is a long process.

A similar process is now going on in Hungary. Janos Kadar's performance has been remarkable in finding ways which are acceptable to the Soviet Union, which develop Hungarian roots and the natural aspirations of the people. He has conducted a number of experiments in the social and economic areas. To a large degree he has been able to do this because the Soviets have four divisions in Hungary and, therefore, have not been overly concerned. He has skillfully used their presence as a security blanket for the Soviets in a way that has been advantageous to the development of his own country.

The Romanian picture is different, as one would expect from their different history. The Romanians have striven for autonomy, but they have been less daring and innovative in their domestic systems. They remain among the most rigid countries in the internal organization of their system.

We seek to influence the emergence of the Soviet imperial power by making the base more natural and organic so that it will not remain founded in sheer power alone. But there is no alternative open to us other than that of influencing the way Soviet power is used.

Finally, on Yugoslavia, we and the Western Europeans, indeed, the Eastern Europeans as well, have an interest which borders on the vital for us in continuing the independence of Yugoslavia from Soviet domination. Of course we accept that Yugoslav behavior will continue to be, as it has been in the past, influenced and constrained by Soviet power. But any shift back by Yugoslavia into the Soviet orbit would represent a major strategic setback for the West. So we are concerned about what will happen when Tito disappears, and it is worrying us a good deal.

So our basic policy continues to be that which we have pursued since 1948-49, keeping Yugoslavia in a position of substantial independence from the Soviet Union. Now at the same time we would like them to be less obnoxious, and we should allow them to get away with very little. We should especially disabuse them of any notion that our interest in their relative independence is greater than their own and, therefore, they have a free ride.

Henry Kissinger on Managing the Emergence of Russia as Superpower

TON (NYT). — Here is the off-the-cuff Department non-verbatim remarks made by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at a meeting in December of U.S. ambassadors

of our age is how to manage the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower. In today's circumstances neither a strategic advantage that can into political utility. A per- gap would have only mar- benefit. However, the pre- made in the mid-fifties, wrong then, is true now—that balance provides increased op- regional pressure. In these our task is to find ways to deal with the emergence of a new superpower, an historical, need a foreign policy that we over time, not one geared to end cycles of crises.

forces are, today less impor- balance gain more signifi- but a U.S. consensus, it will be anti-Soviet power. We need a conception of our national conception that is not based relations between leaders, nor drawn from previous periods, as that the Soviets should have changes in their domestic

since off Soviet power around with a combination of political, economic means. In the Far East (People's Republic of China), of our political calculations, the East we must not separate in the dominant political con- must pursue there a policy regional balance.

As in Vietnam

States public must see its is being interested in the settle- ments. Truculence toward the everyone hearing his chest, a situation in which opinion youth would say that we are expanding peace. This would of debate that paralyzed us in war. We need a United States would make it impossible even eastern European parties which to describe the United States is a threat to peace. Accord- we made efforts at conciliation, UN special session with regard countries.

contain the Soviets and prevent ion either through Western through the application of mili- To do this we must achieve port for a long-term concep- al interest. We must draw the into relationships which are e and practical and we must aximum incentives for a moder- ource. The Soviet system has fundamentally. It is an amal- eology that cannot resist move- gola and a bureaucracy that n with persistence. But the also subject to imperatives, for ad economic situation, a failure logical adherents, and pressure st. In such circumstances, for engage in fratricidal conflict ly.

U.S. Discomfort

sal of what has gone wrong is al of détente or of Soviet policy, e Portugal and Italy. The prob- e, Turkey and Cyprus are in it of domestic paralysis in the Angola represents as much a y the Soviets of the domestic the U.S.—as much a reaction lences investigations—as it does policy.

'Western Europe continues to be the backbone of our foreign policy. We are doing extremely well. Both the frequency and context of our mutual consultations are improving. There is presently a greater degree of real exchange of views than there has been during the past decade and a half.'

Our discomfort is at having to conduct foreign policy by relative means rather than by unilateral declarations. The fact is that, with the Soviet Union as an emerging superpower, we are doomed to coexistence. Thus to sum up détente is not an amelioration or tone. Détente is the improvement of long-term relations with an emerging superpower. And that is a problem which will confront any American president no matter who he is.

Western Europe continues to be the backbone of our foreign policy. We are doing extremely well. Both the frequency and context of our mutual consultations are improving. There is presently a greater degree of real exchange of views than there has been during the past decade and a half.

The period in which Europe was attempting to define itself is at least temporarily over. We are now closer to the Atlantic partnership that we envisaged with the Year of Europe in 1972. But at the same time, the world has become even more interdependent and there are now new problems which must be addressed within the Atlantic context. This interdependence is the dominant fact of our international relationships. We have not yet achieved the degree of cohesion in our relations with our European allies that is required in crisis situations, but we are making progress.

What is most worrisome is not the foreign policy of nations in Western Europe, but their domestic evolution. The growth of left-wing policies threatens to undermine the security relationship and defense policies on which the alliance has been constructed. And this growth is bound to affect the relations between Western Europe and the United States. In Italy, Spain and Portugal, and maybe even France, we are witnessing the rising influence of Communist parties and we are facing the question of what we should do. The intellectual community in the United States is trying to resolve a paradox. We are accused of being soft on Communism and hard on Communist parties. We are asked to be tough with Moscow but to have a dialogue with Communist parties in the West.

Unacceptable

One thing is clear, however, the dominance of Communist parties in the West is unacceptable. This has nothing to do with the reasonableness of these parties. Or with the degree of their independence from Russia. It is hard to imagine that, if one or the other of these parties takes control of a Western government, it will permit the democratic process to operate and thereby face the possibility that it may itself be removed from office.

A Communist party taking control of a government would find itself on a specific point in its line of development, regardless of what it may claim. It is unlikely to turn back the clock. More likely, once it is in power, it will seek to change the

objective conditions of society so that the democratic process can no longer operate. We must do our utmost to assure the survival of democratic processes and to preserve the Western political orientations of Western European countries.

Finite Capacity

Secondly, we can have fruitful relations with Titoist Yugoslavia; we are prepared to improve our relations with that sort of government. But it is another thing to say that we could have a Titoist Italy in NATO without fundamental changes in the alliance or in the U.S. perception of NATO. Irrespective of other factors, the primary appeal of Communists to the electorate has to do with their position on social and economic problems that bother the people of the country. Security issues would undoubtedly be low on their priority list if they came to power. This would have effects on the balance of European power and would in turn cause a reaction in the United States. We cannot encourage dialogue with Communist parties within NATO nations. We understand them and their aims, and we doubt they can be moderated by their dealings with the United States. If Communists get into power they will deal with us on the basis of their necessities at the time.

It is not our job to manipulate domestic policies. Our capacity is finite. But it is

inevitable that the United States could maintain ground forces in Europe if there is major Communist participation in Western governments. The foundation of our Atlantic security would therefore be eroded.

There are those who think we are too intransigent in our attitude toward these Western European Communist parties. But we cannot encourage the progress of these parties, nor permit the setting of a precedent in which by our inaction we have facilitated the success of a Communist party. The extent to which such a party follows the Moscow line is unimportant. Even if Portugal had followed the Italian model, we would still have been opposed. It is not just because Cuba is a Stalinist that we are in opposition. Even the impact of an Italian Communist party that seemed to be governing effectively would be devastating—on France, and on NATO too.

It is difficult to see how we could continue to have NATO discussions if these various Communist parties did achieve control of Western European governments. We could, as with China, perhaps have parallel policies. But the alliance as it is now could not survive. The Western alliance has always had an importance beyond military security. The United States would be alone and isolated in a world in which we had no relations by values to other countries.

As for Socialists, we will continue to support them. We do so in Portugal. We must do so in Italy, although the Italian Social-



Henry Kissinger

ist party will be unreliable until the Christian Democrats can organize themselves. We have good relations with the SPD in Germany. In Spain there must be an evolution toward democracy and better institutions without eroding the strengths of the country and producing another Portugal. Political demonstrations in Spain will mean

bloodshed and the Spanish, at least historically, are not used to resolving their differences peacefully.

The Soviets are not the key element that is producing the present instabilities that we now face in Western Europe. A Communist Western Europe would be a headache for the Soviets as well. They probably prefer not to see Communist powers taking over in Western Europe. But in the final analysis their ideology requires them to assist in these efforts. The U.S.S.R. has probably not been a decisive element in Portugal, but we cannot reasonably expect it to do nothing.

If Communist parties take power in several Western European democracies, there would be a shocking change in the established patterns of American policy. It could result in a situation where the United States would be an island in its own value, and thereby be forced to manipulate various Communist centers of power against each other. The United States could probably survive this situation, but only through the use of a ruthless balance of power policy. If we were to have to do this, we would have lost the moral foundation we have operated on for our entire history.

There is an inconsistency perceived in the United States between our opposing Communist governments in Western Europe and our talking to them in Eastern Europe. We must overcome this problem in the public's mind.

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Consolidated Trade Of NYSE Listing			
	Week Ended	April 8, 1974	April 15, 1974
		Gain	Loss
StarLine	1,367,908	12	14
Generators	1,324,660	72	673
Executec	1,188,400	38	4
Energy	1,063,200	10	10
Texaco Inc	846,000	27	23
Citicorp	811,500	36	29
Energy	784,000	10	10
Chrysler	648,200	31	18
American	625,200	27	28
Energy	604,000	10	10
SouthernCo	600,500	12	10
Porditor	611,900	3	3
Energy	596,000	10	10
AlcanCorp	578,800	21	4
Energy	550,300	25	2
Merrill	548,000	10	10
GenCorp	529,400	24	29
GM/E	523,800	35	51
Go to Kodak	512,000	10	10
RCA	512,000	21	21
Advanced	508,000	20	20
changed:	230		
New Issues:	202	new	lost
Values			
This week		108,225	
Previous week		108,225	
1973 same week		1,045,800	
1972 same week		1,045,800	
1971 to date		1,045,800	

[illegible]

market

A Flood of New Issues Expected
Immediately After Easter Holiday

By Carl Gewirtz

Oil (11 ET)—The pessimists, at this point, are clear. The market is falling—not surprising after the record volume of the first three months of the year—and that the anticipated post-Easter volume will be difficult to absorb.

"The market is thoroughly saturated," says one of the pessimists, "and it needs a breather." The behavior of the market last week was certainly confused and offered no clear guidance as to which of the conflicting views is correct. The most striking development was the poor performance of Brazilian International's six-year notes. The size of the loan was increased to \$30 million from \$25 million initially indicated and it was priced at par, but it subsequently traded at a sharp discount of 98 1/2-99 3/4 offered.

Canadian Market
In the Canadian-dollar market, the \$25-\$30 million loan for Canadian Pacific Securities fared little better. Priced at par with a coupon of 9 1/4 per cent, the seven-year paper was quoted at 98 1/4-98 3/4.

The public issues for the SEC also continue to languish in the secondary market and represent another potential weak point if banks should decide to unload the paper they have been left sitting with. The problem here is not creditworthiness, but rather too much paper at one time.

By contrast, such recent issues as Alcan and Newfoundland & Labrador are trading at hefty premiums over their issue price. The new issue market is also marked by increased investor selectivity. Budd Automotive, for example, had a hard time winning

Economic Indicators

WEEKLY COMPARISONS

	Latest Week	Prior Week	1975
Commodity Index	197.3	197.3	
*Currency in circ.	\$85,735,000	\$85,154,000	\$78,355,000
*Total loan	\$118,304,000	\$118,738,000	\$129,659,000
Steel prod. (tons)	2,588,000	2,592,000	2,563,000
Auto production	192,524	175,117	130,898
Daily oil prod (bbls)	8,146,000	8,049,000	8,379,000
Flight car fdngs	467,478	425,232	
*Bus. Pwr. Kw-hr.	36,022,000	36,012,000	36,484,000
Bus. failures	194	304	257

Statistics for commercial agricultural loans, carloadings, steel, oil, electric power and business failures are for the preceding week and latest available.

MONTHLY COMPARISONS

	Mar.	Prior Month	1975
A-Employed	86,692,000	86,319,000	84,110,000
A-Unemployed	7,027,000	7,136,000	7,770,000
A-Indst Prod	119.9	119.2	111.2
B*Personal Income	\$1,328,000,000	\$1,315,000,000	\$1,203,200,000
A*Money supply	\$296,800,000	\$295,300,000	\$281,900,000
C*Price index	167.1	166.7	157.2
A*Consumer price	170	163	140
A*Wholesale price	147,204,000	147,030,000	151,194,000
A*Exports	\$8,800,100	\$9,103,400	\$8,754,400
A*Imports	\$8,940,900	\$9,176,000	\$7,927,000

Commodity Index, based on 1967=100, the consumer price index, based on 1967=100, and employment figures are compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Industrial production is Federal Reserve Board's adjusted index of 1967=100. Imports and exports are compiled by the Department of Commerce. Money supply is total currency outside banks and demand deposits adjusted as reported by Federal Reserve Board. Business failures compiled by Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. Construction contracts are compiled by the F. W. Dodge Division, McGraw-Hill Information Systems Company.

R-Revised.
A-Seasonally adjusted.
B-Seasonally adjusted annual rate.

supporters. "It's not a riot," insiders admit, but the \$20 million of seven-year notes carrying a coupon of 9 1/2 per cent will be done.

Professionals Surprised
Better-known names, however, are having no trouble. This was the case for Norsk Hydro, despite the rather long 12-year maturity on the 100 million D.M.s, which sold at 99 1/2 with a coupon of 8 per cent and Austria's 100 million

D.M.s of 10-year bonds sold at 99 3/4 with a coupon of 7 3/4 per cent. The same is true for the 10-year loan for International Harvester Credit Corp. of Canada, which is offering a coupon of 9 3/4 per cent on its \$25 million loan.

The continuing pace of issues denominated in Canadian dollars continues to surprise many professionals since the currency (Continued on Page 25, Col. 1)

The U.S. Economic Scene

Tough Agenda for Probe of Business Corruption

By Richard E. Mooney

NEW YORK, April 11 (NYT).

President Ford's new Cabinet-level task force on corrupt business practices will meet tomorrow for the first time. Its work is formidable.

The task force will address the critical question of what should be done about the bribes, kickbacks, inflated commissions and other forms of deception that appear to have become an accepted element of selling U.S. goods and services to foreign customers. There is, at this time, almost total disagreement on the proper remedy or remedies and considerable skepticism that there even is such a thing as a remedy.

The creation of the task force itself was greeted with skepticism. The President did not show any real concern for the corruption issue until the list of companies that have made payoffs—and finally admitted them under pressure—became too long to ignore. When he did eventually acknowledge that this was a national problem, it appeared that his study-group approach might only be an election-year contrivance, designed to create the impression during the campaign season that a Republican president is not soft on big business.

Mr. Ford has put Secretary of Commerce Elliot Richardson, a man with a well-earned reputation for probity, in charge. There will be interim reports but the project still has the built-in cushion of not having to produce final conclusions until after election day.

As of now, more than 80 corporations have acknowledged publicly that they made questionable payments overseas. Early reports seemed to show a pattern of payoffs by aerospace and pharmaceutical companies in particular, but it is beginning to look

as though no industry is entirely clean. Moreover, the wide range of the dollar amounts admitted to so far has raised a question among insiders. Some of the admitted payments are so small they create doubt as to whether full confessions are being made in all cases—and, indeed, some companies assert they have had difficulty in measuring all they are being asked to report.

Last week, about 1,200 large corporations received an unwelcome questionnaire from the commission of internal revenue which should elicit a lot more information about misadventures at home as well as abroad. It begins:

"Did the corporation, any corporate officer or employee or any third party acting on behalf of the corporation make, directly or indirectly, any bribes, kickbacks or other payments, regardless of form, whether in money, property or services, to any employee, person, company or organization, or any representative of any person, company or organization, to obtain favorable treatment in securing business or to otherwise obtain special concessions, or to pay for favorable treatment for business secured or for special concessions already obtained?"

The next question is whether any such payments were made "to or for the benefit of any government official or employee, domestic or foreign." There are 11 questions in comparable detail. The final query, in effect, is whether there is anyone else, inside or outside the company, who knows what has been going on and should be questioned.

Tax law appears to offer one effective means for catching some of the corporate culprits. Bribing a foreign customer may not violate any U.S. law, but deducting a bribe—foreign or domestic—as a business expense does violate the tax code.

To date, the principal avenue of federal enforcement in this spreading scandal has been the Securities and Exchange Commission's requirement that a company whose stock is publicly held must disclose all "material" financial facts about itself. The SEC has been the most effective agency in bringing out what is known so far about the payments in question. But there is still no consensus on what constitutes a "material" fact, or how much detail must be disclosed, or what needs to be done about the payments once disclosures have been made.

Beyond stronger enforcement of laws that are already on the books, the proposed remedies fall mainly into two areas—new law and new codes of conduct.

New law might stiffen the penalties for corporate misbehavior and outlaw some practices. The aim, of course, would be to stop corrupt practices. In the eyes of some businessmen, it would instead stop business. In the eyes of some others, it would only create new barriers to be maneuvered around—and the maneuverers would find a way because payoffs are "a fact of life."

New York Stock Market

NEW YORK, April 11 (NYT)—The New York Stock Exchange started last week with a burst of enthusiasm, generated mainly by settlement of the nationwide trucking strike, but then the rally fell apart amid pessimistic predictions by a leading analyst.

"What it really proved," one broker said at the end of the week, "was that the market finally was ready to correct some of the substantial gains made earlier this year."

On Monday, the Dow Jones Industrial average soared 12 1/2 points to finish at 1,004.09 as market leaders such as International Business Machines and General Motors rose to their best levels since 1973. This put the market within striking range of its 36-month closing high of 1,009.21 reached on March 24.

The rally thereupon ran out of momentum and by midweek the pullback was pronounced as the 1,000 area once again proved something of a magnet.

For the full week, the blue-chip average lost 23.30 points as it closed at 988.28. Volume of 106.23 million shares compared with the previous week's 88.83 million shares.

Eckson Gould, regarded as the "dean" of technical analysts, started Wall Street at midweek with his forecast that the Dow could drop 100 or more points in the relatively near future. The downturn in trading volume since the peak levels of January and February was cited by Mr. Gould, who remains bullish for the long-term outlook, as a key reason for current pessimism.

Investors and traders took his words to heart—or, at least, used them as an excuse to sell stock—because of Mr. Gould's past successes in calling market turns.

Meanwhile, the bond market posted higher prices and lower yields—during the week.

Over-Counter Market

This announcement appears as a matter of record only.



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North Carolina National Bank The Royal Bank of Canada International Limited

Banco Hispano Americano Bank Mees & Hope NV Banque Arabe et Internationale d'Investissement (B.A.I.I.)
Banque Commerciale pour l'Europe du Nord (EUROBANK) Banque de Commerce et de Placements S.A., Geneva Banque Rothschild
Barclays Bank S.A. Gaspard Overseas Bank Limited County Bank Limited Coutts and Co.
Credit Suisse—London Branch R. van Lanschot Bankiers Grunig Bank GMBH, Furth
Handelsbank N W, Zurich Investitions- und Handels-Bank AG, London Branch Kuwait Pacific Finance Company Limited
Landesbank Schleswig-Holstein Gironzentrale Manufacturers National Bank of Detroit Midland and International Banks Limited
National Bank of North America, Nassau, Bahamas N.V. Slavenburg's Bank Scandinavian Bank Limited
Société Bancaire Barclays (Suisse) SA The First Pacific Bank of Chicago

The Riggs National Bank of Washington, D.C.—Nassau Branch

Agent Bank

BANCO DO BRASIL S.A.—LONDON BRANCH

led from Page 23)
at a hefty 2-per-cent
over the U.S. dollar.
second of the market.
last year the Canadian
at a 4-per-cent dis-
the U.S. currency.
premium is said
accounted for the poor
of the Canadian Pacific.
Other explanation for
formance was that its
sent coupon-paying
cent, preferably with
per cent offered by
whose 10-year bonds
average life of 7.94 years.
test of where things
its sector will be made
with the Union Carbide
td., offering of 8-can
split offering between
cents carrying a cou-
1/4 per cent and 10-
a carrying a coupon
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parent company is not
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notes will no doubt
competition for the
million of five-year
to offer from In-
ceptance Corp., which
try a coupon of 9 1/4
cents still on offer in

is once again picking up in the Middle East. Meidensha Electric Manufacturing Co. of Japan is floating a five-year loan of \$10 million with a coupon of 9 1/4 per cent. Guaranteed by Sumitomo Bank, this paper is reportedly being placed with Mideast investors.

This is also true for the notes being floated by Mexico's Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios Públicos for 6 million Kuwaiti dinars. The notes have a maturity of 10 years but are redeemable after five years at the option of the noteholders. A coupon of 8 1/2 per cent is being offered.

Another Mideast loan currently on offer represents a new departure, a redeemable floating-rate loan with a progressively higher rate of return to investors. The borrower is the National Bank of Hungary, which is raising \$25 million for four years.

The coupon on the notes, to be set every six months, will be the London interbank offered rate for six-month Eurodollars, which is currently around 6 per cent.

The notes, designed for institutional investors, will be sold in denominations of \$100,000 and will be issued at a discount of 97—meaning investors put up \$97,000 for each \$100,000 face-valued security.

are also collecting an additional fee for assuring the nonredemption of half the issue.

The loan is a fraction of the size of the syndicated bank loans the National Bank has arranged in the Euromarket, but it is also cheaper.

The bank loans cost Hungary 1 3/8 per cent each year for five years; here it is paying 1 1/4 overall for four years.

The new loan is being offered to Arab institutions, aiming to tap idle short-term pools of funds that would otherwise not be drawn into the normal medium-term lending market.

Two other loans drawn up along these lines are said to be near. The name of the next borrower has not been revealed, but the third borrower will reportedly be for Poland, presumably its Bank Handlowy.

April 7: 8.55 %; March 31: 8.56 %
Industrials
(5-7 years)

April 7: 7.13 %; March 31: 7.49 %
Industrials
 (7-15 years)
 April 7: 8.69 %; March 31: 8.70 %
Market Turnover

	April 9	April 2
Cedel	\$529.3 mil.	\$732.3 mil.
Euroclear	\$791.9 mil.	\$848.6 mil.

LONDON, April 11 (AP).—Peter Hain, 28, a former leader of the Liberal party's youth organization, has been acquitted of a charge that he stole £490 pounds (\$901) from a South London bank last October.

Mr. Hain, who gained national prominence with campaigns against South Africa's racial segregation policy of apartheid, claimed as he left London's Old Bailey Criminal Court Friday that the Pretoria regime used an agent who looked like him to commit the theft in an attempt to discredit him.

Mr. Hain's supporters cheered the verdict delivered by a jury of seven women and five men at the end of a 10-day trial.

HELSINKI, April 11 (AP).—Finnish seamen ended a two-week strike last night after reaching a settlement on better compensation for Sunday and night work.

[illegible][illegible]

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et 22 Avril, enregistrées
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champagne
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Australia (air).....\$	146.00	81.00	Morocco (air).....\$	62.00	34.50
Austria (air).....Sch.	975.00	525.00	Nepal (air).....\$	114.00	63.00
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China (air).....\$	136.50	75.00	Philippines (air).....\$	136.50	75.00
Cyprus (air).....\$	59.00	33.00	Persian Gulf (air).....\$	114.00	63.00
Czechoslovakia (air).....\$	59.00	33.00	Poland (air).....\$	59.00	33.00
Denmark (air).....D.Kr.	319.00	176.00	Polynesia (F.) (air).....\$	97.50	54.00
Finland (air).....F.M.	188.00	105.00	Portugal (air).....Esc.	1,425.00	787.00
Ethiopia (air).....\$	114.00	63.00	Romania (air).....\$	59.00	33.00
France.....F.Fr.	206.00	112.00	Saudi Arabia (air).....\$	85.50	47.00
Germany.....D.M.	139.00	75.00	Spain (air).....\$	136.50	75.00
Great Britain.....Est.	16.50	9.00	South America (air).....\$	114.00	63.00
Greece (air).....Dr.	1,556.00	862.00	Spain (air).....Pts.	3,300.00	1,818.00
Hong Kong (air).....\$	136.50	75.00	Sri Lanka (air).....\$	114.00	63.00
Hungary (air).....\$	33.00	33.00	Sweden (air).....S.Kr.	232.00	127.00
India (air).....\$	114.00	63.00	Switzerland.....S.Fr.	150.00	82.00
Indonesia (air).....\$	136.50	75.00	Thailand (air).....\$	136.50	75.00
Iraq (air).....\$	85.50	47.00	Tanisia (air).....\$	62.00	34.50
Iraq (air).....\$	85.50	47.00	Turkey (air).....\$	59.00	33.00
Iceland (air).....\$	59.00	33.00	U.A.R. (air).....\$	85.50	47.00
Iran.....Est.	16.50	9.00	U.S.S.R. (air).....\$	59.00	33.00
Iran (air).....\$	85.50	47.00	U.S.A. (air).....\$	97.50	54.00
Italy.....Lire	37,500.00	21,000.00	Vietnam (air).....\$	136.50	75.00
Japan (air).....\$	136.50	75.00	Yugoslavia (air).....\$	59.00	33.00
Korea (air).....\$	136.50	75.00	Zaire (air).....\$	114.00	63.00

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Boyd Wins Masters Golf

Overpowers Drysdale Final of WCT Tournament

Hunt Triumphs In Formula-1

bres, Ma

Canadiens, Maple Leafs Gain NHL Quarterfinals

run in the fifth and struck out five.

A's 6, Angels 2

At Anaheim, Phil Garner hit a double and a triple, drove in two runs and scored another to power Oakland to a 6-2 victory over California.

Poland, Soviet Union Win in Hockey Tourney

The Finns opened today's game with speedy drives for the net

ABA Pacers Tie Playoff Series, 1-1

short-lived hope of an equalizer from Finland's Jorma Vehmanen, but again Tretyak threw out the puck and the Russians went on to make it a 2-0 lead in the 23d minute.

Finn Henry Lappes, almost in desperation, tucked the puck home in the 34th minute to give his team its only goal but from then

Frazier to Fight Foreman in N.Y.C.

The pacers, outscoring the veteran Kentucky team, also received 37 points in relief from Dave Robisch and Billy Keller, the latter also connecting for two three-point field goals.


Arts Gilmore led Kentucky with 26, but the defending league playoff champions were never a factor after Indiana threw in 10 straight points late in the third period for a 77-73 lead with 12 minutes left to play.

NBA Results

Friday's Games
 19. Golden State 103 (Brown 18; C. Johnson 28; Bar-
 100 Chicago 88 (Steele 17.
 15. Johnson 23. Marin
 99. Houston 88 (Mar-
 100. Moore 14; Murphy 18.
 106. Boston 100 (Dand-
 22. Harlick 23. Ne-
 112. Kansas City 108
 88. Carter 34; Hansen 23.
 116. Atlanta 108 (Porter 22.
 23. Hudson 341.

Saturday's Games

29. New York 84 (Chones
23. Monroe 30 Haywood
12. Seattle 85 (Adams 18.
Gilliam 22. Banton 14).
110. Detroit 99 (Murphy 24
117. Trapp 22 Porter 14
123. Philade phil 109 (Drew
nger 27. Bryant 22. Nor-



Saturday

Orioles' Holtzman Delivers in Debut

Tigers 3, Indians 1
At Cleveland, Willie Horton smashed a two-run homer and veteran Joe Coleman pitched six shutout innings to lead Detroit to a 3-1 victory over the Indians.

Horton, the Tigers' veteran designated hitter, slammed a 350-foot shot into the leftfield seats after Dan Meyer doubled with one out in the second inning.

for the Reds, who made it two in a row over the Astros as Jack Billingham, who pitched six innings, picked up his first victory.

Mets 1, Expos 0

At New York, Felix Millan's fourth-inning double scored Butch Harrelson with the game's only run and Jon Matlack buried a four-hitter to give the Mets a 1-victory over Montreal.

Yankees 9, Brewers 7
At Milwaukee, the Yankees scored five runs in the ninth inning, highlighted by Chris Chambliss's two-run double and Lou Piniella's triple off the left field wall to give New York a 9-7 victory over the Brewers as Don Money's ninth-inning grand slam was disallowed.

Money's bases-loaded homer off Yankee reliever Dave Pagan was nullified when first-base umpire Jim McKean ruled that time had been called before the pitch was

Matlack was locked in a pitching duel with southpaw Woodie Fryman. Fryman had hurled a hitless ball through the first three innings when Harrelson hit a blooper which rightfielder Ellis Valentine could not catch and the ball bounced by him for a triple. Millan then stroked a long fly ball over leftfielder Gary Carter's head, scoring Harrelson and plunging the loss on Fryman.

Braves Sign Messersmith

SAN DIEGO. April 11 (UPI). —Andy Messersmith, the 30-year-old right-handed pitcher who became a free agent in a historic baseball decision four months ago, signed a multi-year contract yesterday with the Atlanta Braves, worth in excess of \$13 million.

Gartner broke open a pitching duel by doubling home two runs in the fifth inning for the only hit Angel ace Nolan Ryan yielded in his seven-inning stint. Then the A's second baseman, the ninth man in the batting order, ignited a three-run rally in the eighth inning with a triple off rookie Paul Hartzell's first major league pitch.

Messersmith and left-handed pitcher Dave McNally both became free agents when arbitrator Peter Seitz ruled that baseball's reserve clause was illegal in December. McNally, who started last season with Montreal, retired last summer. But Messersmith, a 19-game

Friday

Mets 3, Expos 2
NEW YORK, April 11 (UPI).—Bud Harrelson's two-run fourth-inning double carried the New York Mets to a 3-2 victory over the Montreal Expos Friday and kept Cy Young Award-winner

ever undefeated
ive opening-day

Seaver, who won 23 games last year, scattered five hits while striking out eight and allowing one run in seven innings. He has started every opening day since his second season and now has five victories and four no-deci-

Tennessee Team Ties Relay Mark

KNOXVILLE, Tenn., April 11 (UPI).—Tennessee's 880-yard relay team, anchored by Reggie Jones, tied the world record of 1:21.7 in the final day of competition of the Dogwood Relays at University of Tennessee-Knoxville's track yesterday.

Tennessee's mark tied the record set by Texas A & M at Des Moines in 1970.

Friday's and Saturday's Line Scores

FRIDAY'S GAMES		MINNESOTA		TEXAS	
NATIONAL LEAGUE		001 000 000-1 6 3		010 201 000-1 7 3	
Montreal	001 000 000-2 2 2	Decker, Paik (3), Loebner (1) and		Wagner, Umler (1) and Sander	
New York	010 200 002-3 4 1	Kassan City		L. Decker (1-1). Hr. Randle	
Peters (10-1) and Poole: Sower.		Chicago		(1-1)	
Hoppers (10) and Grote: W. Weaver		001 150 000-4 16 0			
(1-1).		Spartito, (1-1). Hr. McClellan			
Los Angeles	100 500 100-2 5 0	Hart and Realy: Wood (1-0) and			
San Francisco	100 201 000-4 6 0	Varney L. Spittorff (1-1). Hr.			
Sutton, Marshall		Spencer (1-1).			
Lavelle (1-0) and Taylor					
W. Montefusco (1-0), L. Sutton (1-1)					
Hr. Baker (1st), Murrer (1st) Ma-					
darsen (1st).					
St. Louis	000 000 000-0 6 1				
St. Louis	000 020 702-5 13 2				
Burris, Schulte (1), P. Reuschel (7)					
and W. Schulte (1-1) and					
Stumme (1-1) Burris (1-1)					
Atlanta	000 000 200-2 5 4				
San Diego	100 310 010-0 6 1				
Doyle (1-0) and Duff (1-0)					
Carroll (1-0) and Peacor: Williams;					
Jones and B. Davis, W. Jones (1-0).					
L. Morton (1-1).					
AMERICAN LEAGUE					
Boston	000 000 000-0 6 3				
Baltimore	000 000 000-1 5 3				
Baltimore and Pitt: Palmer, Mil-					
ler (1-0) and Hendricks, W. Palmer					
(1-0)					
Minneapolis	000 001 000 00-3 7 0				
Texas	010 000 000 01-2 9 3				
W. Hyleen, Campbell (1-1) and Wyne-					
car: Perry (1-1) Hr. L.					
Buttroughs (1-1).					
Oakland	100 210 010-0 6 2				
California	101 000 000-5 5 0				

Observer

Look Beyond the Nose

By Russell Baker

NEW YORK—My friend Murray says it will be Ted Kennedy. What is impressive about this prediction is that Murray lives in Queens, which is that part of New York City inhabited by people whom people in Washington and Manhattan think of as "the people."



Baker

I put quotation marks around "the people" to indicate they are different from Washingtonians and Manhattanites, who tend to the uneasy suspicion that while they themselves may be decent enough human beings, they are deficient in certain qualities which distinguish "the people" in such places as Dayton, Kansas City, Charlotte and Queens. Washingtonians and Manhattanites tend to fear that they are some kind of elite—which is terrible in a democracy—or that they are different from most people, which is even worse.

For this reason I listen to Murray with great respect when he says it will be Ted Kennedy. He lives over there in Queens among the real people who do the electing, and what do you know if your life has been circumscribed by Washington and Manhattan?

It is Manhattan that Americans across the Hudson are talking about when they tell you about the loathsomeness and despicability of New York, not Queens. To hate Queens is to hate America.

Queens is like Baltimore, South Philadelphia, Chicago beyond the Loop, it is New York's middle-class, blue-collar, beer-drinking secret, the place where City Hall forgets to scrape the streets when it snows, just like every other place where the real people live.

In matters on which such people will have the last word, one consults the wisdom of Queens in something like awe. This amuses Murray. What does he know about politics? He makes election bets with politically astute Manhattanites and usually wins, not because he knows anything, but only because he seems to have majority reflexes.

Like the majority in New York, he didn't vote in Tuesday's primary. Why not? He shrugs. My

sensitive Washington-Manhattan political-analysis antennae quiver and point me to a powerfully significant conclusion.

"Can it be that the people—the real people of America—are so indifferent to Carter, Jackson and Udall that all three are wasting their time?"

Murray shrugs. This leaping at powerfully significant conclusions is a Washington-Manhattan habit which makes his eyes glaze over, but I am not defeated. I continue to probe for the secret knowledge he carries.

Thus, I leap to the powerfully significant conclusion which I have been reading in all the newspapers and watching on all the television shows.

"It's going to be Humphrey, isn't it? Since neither Carter, nor Jackson, nor Udall can open up a lead, and since all the small-favorable sons are going to split the convention 12 ways, the Democrats will turn to Hubert, won't they?"

"It's going to be Ted Kennedy," he says.

I am stunned. Nobody astute has mentioned Ted Kennedy in months.

"Everything is falling into place for him," Murray explains patiently.

Yes. Yes. The scales are falling from my eyes. I am suddenly seeing the light, but outwardly I remain cool.

The way Murray sees it, Kennedy has been in the race all along. Maybe he has even planned it this way. By disappearing during the confusion of the primaries, he has stayed safe from the political knives. Confusion has conspired to his advantage. The primaries show vast indifference to an assortment of candidates. Humphrey begins to run noisily by not running. This draws attention to Humphrey. People begin remembering what they don't like about him, and when the convention meets the party is in such a mess that it can only be saved by Ted Kennedy's reluctant agreement to come out of the shadows and accept the nomination. It was planned that way all along.

That night on the television I watch Humphrey speechifying in Pittsburgh. It reminds me of some things about Humphrey I had forgotten.

Remember, you heard it from Queens first.

The municipal election is more than a year away, but Frank Rose's chances of winning appear slim indeed. The cleaning liquid which he promoted in the United States is unknown in Israel.

Mr. Clean Running For Israeli Office

By William J. Drummond

BEERSHEBA, Israel—Sporting a glistening bald pate and a gold earring, Frank Rose, 49, is campaigning for mayor of this city of 93,000 in southern Israel with the slogan: "Sweet Beersheba clean."

Rose, a recent immigrant from Texas, hates stubborn stains and built-up grime. He says he developed the fetish more than 10 years ago when he worked in the U.S. advertising campaign to promote Mr. Clean, a Procter & Gamble Co. cleaning agent.

Rose—a 6-foot-2, 225-pound former wrestler—still looks like the muscular gent on the Mr. Clean bottle.

He says that he was the model from which artists developed the cartoon character on the label. In addition, he said, he made personal appearances in supermarkets to promote the cleaning liquid. (Another actor portrayed Mr. Clean in a short period when the ad campaign dropped the cartoon character.)

Whiteness and brightness underlie Rose's approach today to city problems, from garbage collection to fighting delinquency.

"There is absolutely no need for Beersheba to be as dirty as it is," Rose said. "The city has 50 garbage trucks, yet you have garbage cans overflowing in the streets."

Rose's formula for attacking Israel's ills is to import U.S. values. "What I'd like to do is to give them the better part of American culture," he said.

His emphasis on hygiene is extreme, but basically Rose's approach is much the same as that of many other American Jews who have come to settle in Israel.

The American-born Israelis, who number 41,458 according to last year's census figures, share one thing in common: They would like to reshape the Levantine way of life.

For example, Rose's anti-delinquency plan is to form a 76-member major-league corps to represent Israel in the Tournament of Roses in Pasadena.

"I can see 76 girls marching down the streets," he mused, "bugles, drums, the majorettes in white boots, blue skirts, emblazoned with a white Star of David on the back and white cowboy hats."

Trying to cleanse Beersheba, however, is like Wyatt Earp trying to tame Dodge City.

Beersheba is a window on what is known locally as "the second Israel"—the seedy, problem-ridden, culturally desolate development towns that extend along the pre-1967 border areas from the Negev in the south to the Jordan Valley and Galilee in the north.

Whether it is Beersheba, Beit Shean or Kiryat Shmona, the background is roughly the same. Sephardic Jews from underdeveloped countries such as Morocco, Iraq and India were channeled into the frontier towns in the 1950s.

Unemployment and stagnation opportunities lagged behind. The tedious and monotonous life in the development towns made the ambitious and educated new immigrants revolt. After 20 years, the result has been stagnation and neglect, an embarrassment to Israel.



Beersheba is a cut above the rest because, as an administrative center and the seat of the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, it has resources most other development towns lack.

But the cultural, economic and social gap that exists everywhere in Israel between European Ashkenazi Jews and North African Sephardic Jews is readily apparent in Beersheba.

Rose's wife, Claire, born in Poland and a survivor of the European holocaust, said that she was shocked when she heard Sephardic Jews here referred to with contempt as "them."

Rose has been in the country less than four years, admits that his command of Hebrew is poor and is a convert to Judaism. Nevertheless, he has launched himself into Israeli politics.

He is an active and vocal member of the rightist Herut party, a member of the parents' advisory board of his daughter's school and a popular figure in youth work in Beersheba.

The municipal election is more than a year away, but the chances of Rose ousting the ruling Labor party coalition appear slim, indeed.

The cleaning liquid which Rose promoted is unknown to Israelis.

© Los Angeles Times

PEOPLE: Brigitte Bardot Quits Movies for Seal-Zed

Actress Brigitte Bardot said in an interview published in Paris that she has decided to abandon her film career to devote herself full-time to the newly established Bardot Foundation, which seeks to protect animals, particularly North Atlantic seals hunted for their fur in Canada and Norway. "I'll continue making records and publicity and writing my memoirs," she told the newspaper Le Figaro. "I always found film-making profoundly boring." The 41-year-old star said she had received contributions from many fans since she revealed her foundation this month. She said she would be glad to see Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau to plead for a ban on the hunting of baby seals in Canada. "If he will give me an appointment, I will go to see him," she said. She claimed there was no substantial demand for the fur of baby seals in Canada or in Europe. "The market is only prosperous in the United States," she declared.

Abbie Hoffman, the Yippie who jumped bail two years ago and fled drug charges, has partly unveiled the plastic surgery remodeled face he says he is using in his underground life. Hoffman, 38, posed for photographs for the May issue of Playboy magazine with a bandana covering his face up to his eyes. "Now I have a nice Arpano nose, nice Anglo cheeks," he said. "In my new life, people don't know I'm Jewish." Playboy said that Hoffman, who was a defendant in the Chicago '7 trial, uses several aliases. Hoffman and three others are charged with selling \$38,000 worth of cocaine to a New York State undercover agent in the summer of 1973.

The wife of missing ex-Teamsters boss James Hoffa is suing to force Teamsters president Frank Fitzsimmons and a bank to pay \$461,136 in pension benefits to her husband's estate. The suit says Fitzsimmons told the American Security & Trust Co. to make no payment to the Hoffa family because Hoffa owed money to the pension fund. Hoffa's pension totaled \$1.7 million, according to the suit, which says he agreed to leave \$461,136 of it on deposit until Jan. 1, 1976. Fitzsimmons did not say why he believed Hoffa owed the money.

Former Mayor Joseph Alioto of San Francisco has agreed to pay his estranged wife, Angelina, \$5,000 a month to support the highest traditional, pending final disposition of her college education.

Mrs. Alioto originally filed for divorce in February 1974. The couple were then separated again in March. Alioto, a lawyer, years ago declared his wife more than \$6 million a week at the first state divorce proceedings. He has been paying his wife a month as "an advance on the settlement" of the property.

A \$100,000 breach suit against Judith S. Kaye, filed Friday by a San Francisco lawyer, says she was to be paid \$100,000 money from public rights. He said he was 25 per cent after the death literary agency he took over some duties, and after a further cut, was from lawyer. Monaghan's tract, he said, would be \$100,000.

New York State leaders began last week applications for 60 seats for the National Convention in 1976. The former general and national of the party who has state Democratic convention. He has predicted that "most likely" will be Humphrey of Minnesota.

—SAMUEL A.

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